EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
With just five days remaining until Moldova’s September 28 parliamentary elections, the country faces an unprecedented foreign interference campaign as multiple investigations have exposed Russia’s comprehensive electoral manipulation strategy involving hundreds of millions of euros in vote-buying schemes, disinformation networks operated through the sanctioned Eurasia NGO, and coordinated social media manipulation across six primary narrative clusters that systematically undermine democratic institutions and European integration. Moldovan authorities have responded with over 250 searches resulting in 74 arrests, while international partners have documented extensive evidence of Russian intelligence coordination through GRU officers and agents codenamed “Bes,” revealing how Moscow has weaponized everything from Orthodox Church networks to AI-generated content and fictitious Romanian residency schemes in a desperate attempt to derail Moldova’s democratic trajectory and prevent its continued alignment with European values and institutions.
WEEKLY OVERVIEW
The National Unity Bloc announced its withdrawal from the electoral race and support for the Action and Solidarity Party through an agreement signed by PAS president Igor Grosu and BUN co-presidents Ion Hadârcă and Valentin Dolganiuc, with the unionist formation mobilizing its electorate behind PAS to prevent the return of pro-Russian revanchist forces.
The Central Electoral Commission launched a “7 Ways to Recognize Disinformation” campaign on September 21 ahead of the parliamentary elections, responding to intensified circulation of false information and warning citizens about a fake CEC website with the false “.st” extension that falsely claimed polling stations for Transnistrian voters had been closed under the pretext of Russian influence.
Police Chief Viorel Cernăuțeanu disclosed that the Șor criminal organization coordinated from Moscow is targeting diaspora voters with payments up to 300 euros using a “ballot carousel” method, where accomplices remove blank ballots from polling stations during staged emergencies, pre-mark them for preferred candidates, then have paid voters exchange clean ballots for marked ones in countries with large Moldovan populations including Romania, France, Germany, Italy, and Britain.
CU SENS investigation revealed that law enforcement detained several men including two Finnish citizens suspected of organizing mass disorders after receiving guerrilla training in Republika Srpska camps connected to the Russian Wagner paramilitary group, with the detained individuals including people with criminal backgrounds investigated for rape, robbery, and mafia-style assaults, while prosecutors indicated participants were promised payments starting at 400 euros for organizing mass disturbances, leading to the connection of their case with a broader mass disorder preparation investigation launched in September 2024.
Bloomberg obtained documents revealing Russia’s comprehensive strategy to intervene in Moldova’s parliamentary elections through four main directions: recruiting Moldovans from the diaspora including from Russia to mobilize voting in EU polling stations, funding destabilizing protests, conducting massive social media disinformation campaigns, and using compromising materials to blackmail public officials and disrupt the electoral process, with the ultimate goal of removing President Maia Sandu from power and blocking Moldova’s European trajectory.
BBC’s undercover investigation discovered a secret Russian-funded network that promised to pay participants for posting pro-Russian propaganda and false news undermining Moldova’s pro-EU path, with recruits receiving 3,000 lei monthly through the sanctioned Russian state bank Promsvyazbank to create social media content using ChatGPT and conduct illegal polling under a non-existent organization’s name, revealing connections to sanctioned oligarch Ilan Șor and the Eurasia NGO.
Promo-LEX’s latest observation mission report documented at least four cases of religious cult involvement in the electoral campaign despite legislative prohibitions, including the Patriotic Electoral Bloc launching their campaign near Căpriana Monastery with religious imagery in their electoral materials, independent candidate Andrei Năstase receiving blessing and endorsement from a local priest during his campaign launch, and Archbishop Marchel of Bălți and Fălești urging Christians to reject European values, continuing his pattern of electoral involvement that previously resulted in a 3,500 lei fine for campaigning for Victoria Furtună in 2024.
Mediacritica identified coordinated disinformation on September 19 when eight anonymous Telegram channels spread false claims about Romania preparing military intervention in Transnistria during parliamentary elections, citing a Polish publication that referenced fabricated Romanian sources alleging troop mobilization near Moldova’s border at Maia Sandu’s request, with the false narrative accumulating 190,000 views and 2,725 shares in one day while using foreign media citations as a legitimization tactic to make the conspiracy theory appear credible.
Moldovan authorities conducted over 250 searches and detained 74 people in connection with mass disorder preparations coordinated by Russian intelligence services, revealing that 111 individuals received tactical training in Serbia and Moldova from Russian operatives including a GRU officer identified as Andrei Pavlov Vladimirovici and another agent codenamed “Bes,” with participants recruited through Șor network Telegram groups and paid approximately 400 euros for learning riot dispersal tactics, weapons handling, and resistance techniques against law enforcement while preparing for electoral destabilization activities.
NordNews conducted a five-month undercover investigation infiltrating the Russian-sponsored Eurasia NGO network, documenting how Moscow operatives recruited young Moldovans through “Electoral Technology Hackathon” training programs led by Russian political technologists, with participants receiving payments through cryptocurrency and sanctioned Russian banks to conduct illegal polling, create social media propaganda, and support pro-Russian parties including Moldova Mare and the Patriotic and Alternative blocs, ultimately leading to ten arrests including coordinator Alina Juk following the investigation’s evidence submission to authorities.
Government spokesman Daniel Vodă dismissed Russian Foreign Intelligence Service allegations about EU preparations for military intervention in Moldova as “hysterical fabrications” designed to spread fear and undermine European integration ahead of elections, responding to Moscow’s claims that NATO forces were concentrating in Romania for potential occupation of Moldova, which came one day after President Maia Sandu warned that Russia was spending hundreds of millions of euros to buy votes and spread disinformation in an attempt to capture Moldova’s democratic institutions.
Romanian police in Iași County conducted searches targeting citizens from Moldova, Ukraine, and Russia suspected of using fictitious addresses for obtaining Romanian identity documents, with operations focusing on locations connected to the Corduneanu clan that allegedly helped over 10,000 Moldovan citizens establish fake residency, including former prosecutor and parliamentary candidate Victoria Furtună affiliated with fugitive oligarch Ilan Șor, who declared her address at a property owned by clan members previously involved in supporting pro-Russian candidate Călin Georgescu.
Mediacritica’s monitoring of 15 YouTube channels during the first three weeks of the electoral campaign identified 382 videos containing disinformation narratives out of 867 total uploads, with the most prevalent false claims being political repressions in the country (19%), Maia Sandu’s illegitimacy as president (14%), and opposition persecution (12%), while comments sections amplified disinformation four to ten times more than video content itself, with channels TV6 Moldova, MLive, and anonymous Russian-language channels serving as primary vectors for coordinated narrative attacks that peaked around specific political events.
SOCIAL MEDIA DIS and MIS-INFORMATION
(SOV)
These narratives exhibit a sweeping anti-European and anti-Western perspective that frames PAS and Maia Sandu as foreign-controlled actors who have allegedly “sold” Moldova’s sovereignty to Brussels, Washington, and Bucharest. European integration is repeatedly depicted as a project of exploitation that will bring poverty, debt, censorship, and the imposition of unwanted values such as LGBT rights, while robbing Moldova of its language, traditions, and national identity. Romania is singled out as a colonial power allegedly seeking to absorb Moldova, buy its land and ports, and erase the “Moldovan language” through forced “Romanianization”. The EU is portrayed as dictating policy, interfering in elections, and using Moldova as a pawn against Russia, while PAS is accused of carrying out this agenda in exchange for foreign financing from the EU, the U.S., or Soros.
At the same time, the narrative advances the idea that Moldova is becoming a “dictatorship and a colony of the West”, echoing comparisons to Georgia or Ukraine and warning that Moldova faces economic collapse, cultural destruction, and mass emigration if it continues on the European path. Contradictory claims are used strategically: on the one hand, Moldova is supposedly unwanted in the EU, with membership impossible for years; on the other, Brussels is accused of rushing Moldova’s accession to secure control. Russia is contrasted as a natural partner and “brotherly nation”, while citizens are urged to reject Western integration in favor of neutrality or closer ties with Moscow.
(DEMO)
These large-scale narratives are portraying PAS and Maia Sandu’s government as authoritarian, repressive, and illegitimate. Repeatedly, they claim that Moldova is under dictatorship, that freedoms of speech, press, religion, and protest are being crushed, and that law enforcement is subordinated to PAS for political purposes. Police are depicted as agents of harassment—raiding homes, blocking roads, dispersing protesters, fining citizens, and even attacking peaceful demonstrators. The government is accused of censorship, shutting down TV channels, blocking online accounts, and creating surveillance structures like the “Patriot Center” to monitor citizens’ speech. The narrative also connects PAS with corruption, nepotism, foreign financing, betrayal of national interests, and attempts to manipulate or control democratic institutions such as the Constitutional Court and Prosecutor’s Office.
Alongside these structural accusations, the messages also personalize the attacks against Maia Sandu, casting her as disconnected from Moldovan society (claiming she has foreign citizenship, no family ties in Moldova, and allegiance to the Vatican instead of Orthodoxy). She is described as aggressive, manipulative, and a threat to the people’s well-being, allegedly spreading propaganda while failing to solve economic and social problems. Many posts escalate to extreme claims—PAS as fascist, criminal, or worse than previous oligarchic regimes—mixing conspiracy theories, emotional appeals, and dramatic examples of supposed abuses. The sanctions imposed on Irina Vlah were framed as political persecution, as well as the controversy around Victoria Furtuna and the Moldova Mare party.
Accounts exhibiting coordinated inauthentic behavior (CIB) disseminated messages which allege that PAS has mobilized armies of online bots (including foreign — “European” — actors) and that hackers possess kompromat to blackmail the opposition parties. Several claim PAS is moving to control and suppress digital platforms and dissent — creating a TikTok-focused police subgroup to close accounts spreading “disinformation,” planning to shut down TikTok in Moldova, and preparing a population surveillance system. There’s also an assertion that police are cooperating with TikTok to target and eliminate political opposition.
Taken together, the tone is conspiratorial and urgent, framing PAS as a both digitally manipulative and repressive regime. The messages mix technical-sounding claims (bots, kompromat, surveillance systems) with direct political charges (platform shutdowns, police collusion), which can fuel fear and distrust.
(ELEC)
These narratives focus overwhelmingly on delegitimizing elections in Moldova by framing PAS, Maia Sandu and the Moldavian government as preparing to interfere in the elections by means of massive fraud, censorship and repression, in order to maintain power. They allege that if PAS does not win, the elections will be annulled by the Constitutional Court or the government itself, and that both domestic institutions (CEC, police, courts) and international actors (EU, Romania, even the U.S.) are complicit in manipulating results in PAS’s favor. Repeated claims center on PAS hiding Moldova’s GDP figures until after the elections, intimidating opposition parties such as Moldova Mare and Inima Moldovei, limiting polling stations for the Russian diaspora and Transnistria, and engaging in vote buying and money laundering. The narrative stresses that the electoral system is “captured” and that citizens’ right to freely choose is being denied.
At the same time, the messages try to erode trust in Western alignment by presenting EU and Romanian support for PAS as foreign interference designed to steal the elections. They also seek to fuel anger and fear among Moldovan citizens by repeating themes of repression—opposition arrests, blocked accounts, intimidation of voters, and threats to close schools or kindergartens if people don’t vote PAS. Economic manipulation is grafted into the electoral centred discourse, with constant repetition that GDP data are being hidden or falsified.
(SOCIO)
Appealing to financial vulnerabilities, these narratives portray Moldova under PAS and Maia Sandu as being in deep economic and social collapse. Rising gas and electricity tariffs, soaring inflation, unaffordable housing, and growing foreign debt are framed as evidence that PAS has bankrupted the country while hiding real GDP figures from the public. Farmers, pensioners, and young people are depicted as the main victims—forced to sell belongings, emigrate, or survive without state support. At the same time, accusations of corruption are tied to alleged “gas scams”, money laundering through Energocom, misuse of EU loans, and enrichment of PAS officials at the expense of ordinary citizens. The government is portrayed as both incompetent and deceitful, fabricating statistics, borrowing recklessly, and funneling funds into propaganda while schools, factories, and hospitals are said to be closing.
Alongside the economic narrative, cultural and moral anxieties are targeted as PAS is accused of importing poor-quality foreign products, destroying Moldovan traditions, and imposing “LGBT propaganda” and sex education in schools. Supporting other type of narratives described in this report, the Moldavian culture and language is portrayed as being under an existential threat from foreign (Romania, the EU) and domestic (PAS, the Moldavian government) actors which seek to cancel the Moldavian identity itself and replace it with “that of the occupier”. Referring to the Moldavian vs. Romanian language controversy, these narratives are painting Gagauzia and Transnistria as being the “guardians” of Moldavian identity.
European integration is framed as synonymous with poverty, debt, and social decay, bringing only higher prices, cultural erosion, and LGBTQ parades rather than prosperity. The recurring theme is that PAS is foreign-financed, detached from ordinary citizens, and actively depopulating the country by driving young people abroad. In contrast, opposition figures such as Victoria Furtună and the “Moldova Mare” party are positioned as whistleblowers exposing criminal schemes and defending the people.
(WAR)
Other narratives disseminated fear-based messages that Moldova, under Maia Sandu and PAS, is being dragged into war at the behest of NATO, the EU, and Ukraine. They allege that foreign troops will be deployed in Moldova, that NATO bases will be built near Transnistria, and that Moldovan soldiers are already being secretly sent to fight in Ukraine. PAS and Sandu are depicted as deliberately provoking Russia and Transnistria, hiding casualty numbers, and spending citizens’ taxes to support NATO soldiers instead of domestic needs. Repeated claims warn that if PAS wins, Moldovans will be conscripted and forced into conflict, but if PAS loses, Russian troops will invade—framing both outcomes as catastrophic and inevitable. European leaders, particularly France and the UK, are portrayed as external forces destabilizing Moldova to use it as a pawn against Russia.
At the same time, these narratives present PAS as exploiting fear of war to manipulate elections, suggesting that slogans about Russian threats are fabrications to keep power. The discourse mixes alarmist predictions—such as 10,000 Russian soldiers entering Moldova if PAS loses—with conspiratorial claims that Sandu signed for armed
invasions, that prisoners are sent to fight abroad, or that Western “curators” demand Moldova start a war in exchange for aid. Another angle used by these narratives was to exploit the rift between Chisinau and Tiraspol, implying that if PAS wins the elections Moldova will attack Transnistria with the intent of forceceful reintegration of the defacto state.
(INFOMAN)
Some narratives were pushed using AI-generated and manipulated content to ridicule and discredit Maia Sandu, PAS, and their allies. It mixed satirical videos, ironic montages, and outright fake news, presenting Sandu and Nicușor Dan in absurd or humiliating scenarios—claiming they are romantically involved, married, or even have a child together. AI-generated montages show PAS ministers admitting failures, while fabricated speeches or “parodies” of Sandu’s appearances at the European Parliament are circulated to mock her. Other AI propaganda portrays Sandu and her government as mentally unstable, untrustworthy, or controlled by foreign interests, while absurd exaggerations—such as Putin becoming president of Moldova or the Pope praying for PAS—are used to undermine trust and sow confusion.
At the same time, these narratives intertwine AI satire with political conspiracies, particularly around Plahotniuc and Șor. Plahotniuc is framed as holding damaging secrets that could destroy PAS, with claims that his extradition is being delayed until after elections or manipulated to PAS’s advantage. Șor and his allies are portrayed as more competent than the current government, while disinformation about the EU’s dependence on Russian gas and attacks on Moldova’s pro-European orientation are introduced through AI-generated content.
(GAG)
Other narratives centered on portraying the detention of Evghenia Guțul, the Bashkan of Gagauzia, as a politically motivated act orchestrated by PAS and Maia Sandu. They frame the case as a “political vendetta” and “retribution,” highlighting alleged legal irregularities and the involvement of international lawyers who condemn the proceedings. The narrative insists that Guțul is innocent, while Sandu and PAS are corrupt and abusive of power, using the judiciary to eliminate rivals. Claims also suggest that Guțul was offered freedom in exchange for her mandate, further reinforcing the idea of persecution. At the same time, Irina Vlah, another Gagauz political figure, is presented as a victim of PAS pressure, with bans, interrogations, and financial restrictions cited as examples of repression.
Beyond Guțul’s individual case, the messages expand into broader narratives about Gagauzia itself, framing the autonomy as under attack from central authorities who allegedly want to strip it of power or liquidate it entirely. Protests in support of Guțul are amplified, with exaggerated numbers (tens of thousands) cited as proof of popular outrage. PAS and Sandu are depicted as mocking or hating the Gagauz people, repressing their media, and threatening their right to self-determination. The discourse ties Gagauzia’s struggle to larger geopolitical themes, invoking Moscow’s support, Transnistria’s resistance, and EU lawyers’ involvement, all to reinforce the message that Moldova under PAS is illegitimate, hostile to minorities, and moving against democracy. Footage of protests and manifestations outside Guțul’s imprisonment facility was constantly disseminated, portraying her as an honest Moldovan family woman representing the interests of the many, in antithesis to an illegitimate group of politicians and elites persecuting and exploiting the masses. The overarching aim is to transform Guțul’s legal case into a symbol of national resistance against Sandu’s government.
This newsletter is part of our ongoing work with the Bulgarian-Romanian Observatory of Digital Media, member of EDMO.
Author: BROD / Funky Citizens