EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
With just weeks remaining before Moldova’s September 28 parliamentary elections, the country faces an information warfare campaign designed to undermine democratic institutions and electoral integrity. Sophisticated disinformation networks are deploying AI-generated content, coordinated bot armies, and cross-platform manipulation to spread false narratives about war mobilization, economic collapse, and democratic backsliding. While authorities have strengthened cooperation with platforms like TikTok and established anti-corruption hotlines, the scale of foreign influence operations including Moscow-coordinated troll farms and artificial amplification networks poses a real threat to electoral legitimacy. With nearly 30% of voters remaining undecided and disinformation campaigns intensifying across six key narrative clusters targeting sovereignty, security, and democratic governance, Moldova’s democratic resilience faces another important test as foreign actors weaponize social media to destabilize the electoral process and erode public trust in European integration.
The Kremlin plans to replace Chișinău’s pro-European leadership with a pro-Russian one after the September 28 parliamentary elections, allocating at least $350 million to carry out this plan.
WEEKLY OVERVIEW
The Central Electoral Commission has finalized the parliamentary ballot model, confirming 23 electoral competitors including 15 political parties, four electoral blocs, and four independent candidates. The Action and Solidarity Party secured the top position, followed by the “Democracy at Home” party, while the Electoral Patriotic Bloc of Socialists, Communists, Heart and Future of Moldova appears in ninth position and the Alternative Bloc in tenth, with Our Party listed last at position 23. This ballot configuration represents the culmination of the electoral registration process and sets the stage for voters to make their final choices on September 28.
Moldova’s National Police has signed a landmark cooperation agreement with TikTok to combat the spread of disinformation, establishing a rapid response mechanism that can block suspicious accounts within three hours rather than the previous three-day timeframe. While authorities have established effective communication channels with TikTok for rapid content removal, cooperation with Telegram remains problematic as the platform consistently ignores requests from Moldovan authorities to remove harmful content, creating significant challenges in combating the spread of false narratives that could influence electoral outcomes.
False claims have emerged alleging that President Maia Sandu would send 700 Moldovan volunteers to fight in Ukraine if the PAS party wins the parliamentary elections, a narrative that experts have definitively debunked as part of a foreign-orchestrated disinformation campaign. Investigatoria have uncovered compelling evidence of adaptable troll farms switching operations between Romania and Moldova, accidentally exposing their artificial nature when dozens of accounts with Romanian names began posting comments in perfect Russian during a live Facebook intervention by pro-Russian politician Renato Usatîi.
The electoral period has witnessed a proliferation of unauthorized opinion polls appearing on obscure platforms and anonymous pages, with the Promo-LEX observation mission identifying at least 10 cases of illegal polling activities that violate electoral regulations. While the Central Electoral Commission has officially authorized only 13 legitimate polls conducted by eight entities, numerous unauthorized surveys have emerged without proper registration, financing transparency, or methodological disclosure, raising serious concerns about their potential to manipulate public opinion rather than genuinely measure it.
The National Anticorruption Center has established two dedicated hotlines for citizens to report electoral corruption, illegal party financing, and voter intimidation as part of intensified efforts to protect electoral integrity. Following over 100 searches conducted last week across Moldova that resulted in nine arrests including the deputy mayor of Comrat and members of a political formation linked to Irina Vlah’s “Heart of Moldova” party, authorities are encouraging citizens to report suspicious activities through round-the-clock services available via phone, messaging apps, and international calling options. The raids uncovered cash in multiple currencies, electronic devices, bank cards, and lists of individuals allegedly paid to participate in protests. The Central Electoral Commission issued an official warning to Ion Ceban, mayoral candidate for the Alternative Electoral Bloc, after finding he violated electoral law by traveling to Italy in his official capacity as Chișinău mayor despite being required to suspend his duties upon the start of the electoral campaign.
A new iData poll conducted between August 20 and September 3 reveals a highly competitive parliamentary race, with the Electoral Patriotic Bloc of Socialists, Communists, Heart and Future of Moldova leading with 25.2% support, followed closely by the Action and Solidarity Party at 24.3%. Only one other formation, Our Party, would cross the electoral threshold with 5.9% support, while the Alternative Bloc sits precariously at the 5.5% threshold but falls short of the 7% requirement for electoral blocs to enter parliament. Perhaps most significantly, nearly 30% of respondents remain undecided about their voting intentions, suggesting the final outcome remains highly unpredictable with substantial room for last-minute shifts in voter preferences.
SOCIAL MEDIA DIS and MIS-INFORMATION
Moldova faces a disinformation campaign targeting its democratic framework, portraying the PAS party and President Maia Sandu as creators of an authoritarian system controlled by external forces. The propaganda presents a narrative of democratic collapse, alleging that courts have been politicized, the Central Electoral Commission compromised, and law enforcement turned into instruments of oppression. These claims are accompanied by assertions that elections are systematically falsified through pre-marked ballots, exploitation of overseas voters, and predetermined invalidations.
The disinformation network amplifies these themes through recurring conspiracy theories involving George Soros, foreign manipulation, and a justice system purportedly used to suppress political opposition. This coordinated messaging ultimately advocates for mass demonstrations and civil disobedience as means to “reclaim” democratic governance.
(DEMO) – Democratic backsliding
This cluster captures disinformation and propaganda narratives portraying Moldova as sliding into authoritarianism under the leadership of Maia Sandu and PAS. Narratives consistently frame the government as repressing dissent, persecuting the opposition, and eroding democratic institutions. A recurring theme is the accusation that Moldova has become a “dictatorship,” echoing comparisons with past oligarchic regimes or even with North Korea.
Content often highlights claims of arbitrary arrests, police abuse, censorship of media and social platforms, and the silencing of opposition parties. The Constitutional Court and the Central Electoral Commission are depicted as captured institutions, manipulated to favor PAS and prevent genuine competition in elections. Protests are portrayed as grassroots resistance against an authoritarian regime, while any restrictions on them are framed as proof of repression.
Supplementary narratives accuse PAS of intimidating critics, fabricating criminal charges, and monopolizing political life. References to George Soros and foreign partners reinforce the idea of betrayal of national sovereignty, while linking democratic backsliding to external influence.
Overall, this cluster aims to delegitimize Moldova’s democratic institutions and leadership by presenting an image of a state where rights and freedoms are crushed, the opposition is persecuted, and power is usurped under the guise of European integration and security.
(SOCIO) – Socio-Economic Decline & Public Hardship
This cluster centers on narratives portraying Moldova as a country in socio-economic collapse under PAS and Maia Sandu. Disinformation highlights themes of poverty, corruption, rising prices, depopulation, and failing services, with the ruling party framed as parasitic and indifferent to citizens’ suffering.
A recurrent storyline blames PAS for mass emigration, collapsing healthcare, low pensions, and high utility costs, painting Moldova as a “state without people.” Energy tariffs and winter preparedness are heavily weaponized: narratives claim that electricity and gas price reductions are pre-election tricks, while shortages of firewood, spoiled agricultural products, and fake crises in energy supply are used to depict mismanagement and contempt for citizens.
Another strand accuses PAS of systemic corruption and resource theft. From allegedly enriching themselves through gas pipeline deals to privatizing state land and universities. Farmers’ protests and debt crises are framed as evidence that rural communities are being abandoned, while villages that do not support PAS are allegedly discriminated against.
Foreign actors are also instrumentalized: European loans are described as debt traps that erode sovereignty, Macron and EU leaders are framed as interfering in Moldovan politics, and Romania is accused of exploiting Moldova economically. Disinformation frequently claims that Moldova’s external debt has doubled under PAS, turning the country into a colony of foreign creditors.
(SOV) – Sovereignty & Geopolitical Influence
The SOV cluster captures disinformation that frames Moldova as a country stripped of sovereignty and subjugated to foreign powers under Maia Sandu and PAS. The narratives allege that national decisions are dictated by Brussels, Washington, Bucharest, or George Soros, portraying Moldovan leaders as puppets of the West rather than representatives of their own citizens.
Recurring claims insist that Sandu has “sold out” Moldova’s sovereignty in exchange for financial support, loans, or EU accession promises. These stories depict Moldova as a colony of the EU or Romania, where citizens are reduced to “slaves” of foreign agendas. Romania in particular is accused of exploiting Moldova economically or culturally, while EU leaders are said to interfere directly in elections, dictate policies, and ignore Moldovan traditions and identity.
Disinformation also amplifies anti-Soros rhetoric, presenting him as the architect of Moldova’s decline, financing NGOs, corrupting politicians, destroying education, and pushing unwanted “liberal” values. Narratives link Soros with PAS and accuse him of orchestrating Moldova’s loss of sovereignty.
The sovereignty theme frequently weaponizes identity politics and religion, claiming that PAS and the EU are erasing Moldovan identity, imposing Romanianization, tolerating LGBT “propaganda,” and betraying Orthodox values. Populist voices like Victoria Furțună and Ilan Shor are positioned as defenders of sovereignty against foreign colonization, despite their own links to Russian influence.
A parallel thread reframes Russia as a protector, contrasting Western exploitation with narratives that Moscow offers labor rights, cultural alignment, or stability. Russian pop culture and Orthodox symbols are used to reinforce this framing, while criticism of the Kremlin is presented as an attack on heritage and identity.
(ELEC) – Electoral Manipulation
This cluster focuses on disinformation narratives that attempt to undermine trust in Moldova’s electoral processes. Content in this category frames elections as fundamentally illegitimate, portraying Maia Sandu and PAS as orchestrating fraud, manipulating institutions, and silencing opposition to maintain power.
Recurring claims include ballot-stuffing, pre-stamped ballots, falsified voter lists, and hidden symbols allegedly used to control votes. Narratives also accuse the government of controlling the Central Electoral Commission, blocking opposition parties, and excluding Moldova Mare on fabricated grounds. The diaspora vote is a frequent point of contention, with accusations that PAS deliberately restricts polling stations in Russia while expanding them in the West to secure favorable results.
Symbolic events such as Independence Day celebrations or high-level visits are reframed as campaign tools and evidence of Western interference in Moldova’s elections. False claims also circulate about PAS using state resources for electoral gain, including manipulating tariffs, soliciting donations, or even promising to send Moldovans to Ukraine after the vote.
(INFOMAN) – Disinformation, Manipulation & Conspiracy Content
This cluster groups together fabricated, sensationalist, and manipulative narratives designed to discredit PAS, Maia Sandu, and Moldova’s European trajectory. A key tactic is the use of deepfakes, fortune tellers, and conspiracy theories, which exploit emotion and spectacle to spread doubt and distrust. Examples include AI-generated videos linking Maia Sandu to the LGBT lobby, false claims that she wastes public money, or Baba Vanga “prophecies” portraying her as an omen of destruction.
Recurring themes emphasize collapse and chaos: Moldova is allegedly on the verge of losing its sovereignty, traditions, or very existence if PAS remains in power. Disinformation recycles familiar scare tactics such as fabricated school closures, “LGBT propaganda,” or invented EU and NATO plots to control Moldova, while portraying Russia as a guarantor of stability.
Another dimension involves pseudo-legitimization techniques, including manipulated foreign press clippings, staged fortune-telling predictions, and fabricated documents that attempt to lend credibility to falsehoods. These messages often frame pro-European policies as unnatural impositions, contrasting them with nostalgic or authoritarian alternatives presented as safer and more authentic.
(WAR) – War & Security
This cluster aggregates narratives portraying Moldova as being dragged into war by PAS and President Maia Sandu, in violation of the country’s neutrality. Core claims allege imminent mobilization (e.g., “700 mercenaries” or mass conscription), foreign militarization on Moldovan soil (NATO bases, training, or Ukrainian forces operating in the country), and medical/logistical support for a foreign army (e.g., thousands of hospital beds “allocated” to Ukrainians). These stories depict Moldova as a “second Ukraine,” suggesting leaders take orders from Western patrons and are preparing the country for conflict.
A recurring tactic is alarmism without evidence: recycled rumors about mobilization, miscaptioned or decontextualized footage (e.g., trucks entering a unit), and speculative posts that inflate EU/NATO “plans” for Moldova. Narratives conflate defensive or civil-security cooperation (equipment, training, border resilience) with offensive war-making, to imply neutrality has already been breached. High-profile names (Macron, EU leaders, “Soros”) are invoked to personalize alleged foreign control and to frame PAS as complicit.
These war-focused messages interlock with sovereignty (SOV) and information manipulation (INFOMAN) themes: Moldova is said to be a Western proxy while Russia is cast as the guarantor of peace and stability. The strategic objective is to fuel fear, depress trust in government, and polarize the electorate, particularly around elections, by presenting PAS’s policies as steps toward unavoidable conflict.
(GAG) – Gagauzia & Regional Autonomy
This cluster centers on disinformation narratives portraying the Moldovan government and PAS as systematically persecuting Gagauzia and its elected leadership, particularly Evghenia Guțul. Narratives frame her trial, sentencing, and imprisonment as politically orchestrated acts of repression, designed to silence regional voices and undermine Gagauzia’s autonomy. Claims include falsified evidence, denial of due process, and selective justice, often contrasted with leniency shown in other criminal cases.
Guțul is frequently depicted as a symbol of popular resistance against PAS, with narratives emphasizing her role as a victim of state oppression and a rallying point for public anger. Recurrent protests in Chișinău and Gagauzia are highlighted as evidence of nationwide opposition, framed as spontaneous uprisings against political double standards and “dictatorial” governance.
Beyond Guțul’s case, disinformation extends to environmental and local grievances, such as false claims about rivers drying up in Gagauzia due to government neglect. Together, these narratives amplify perceptions of betrayal, marginalization, and repression of regional identity, aiming to inflame tensions between Chișinău and Comrat and to delegitimize the central government’s authority.
Proofs of coordinated inauthentic behavior on political pages (CIB)
TikTok
On PDMM’s TikTok presence, Funky Citizens, together with the Digital Forensic Team, identified an “AI comment factory” designed to astroturf support and erode trust in Moldova’s democratic trajectory, with nearly 300 pro-PDMM or anti-PAS/Maia Sandu comments generated by 59 inauthentic Romanian- and Russian-language accounts, featuring exact duplicates and multiple near-duplicates with over 90% textual similarity, clear markers of templated or AI-assisted content.
The accounts carried typical hallmarks of coordinated inauthentic behavior: generic handles, stock or missing avatars, empty bios, activity limited almost entirely to PDMM-related posts, and comment bursts at abnormal hours (01:00–04:00). The narrative strategy was consistent: portraying PDMM as a persecuted opposition, delegitimizing institutions such as the CEC and courts by pushing “rigged election” claims, and recycling Kremlin-style frames that depict EU integration as colonization, while presenting PDMM as a “reasonable” alternative to pro-European governance.
On PDMM’s Meta presence, Funky Citizens identified another coordinated “AI comment factory” designed to astroturf support and erode trust in Moldova’s democratic trajectory, with 121 pro-PDMM or anti-PAS/Maia Sandu comments generated by 54 inauthentic Romanian- and Russian-language accounts. Forty-two of the comments were posted during the night, between 2:00 and 6:00 a.m., hours that are unusual for the population of the Republic of Moldova.
The comments followed a consistent narrative playbook: framing PDMM as the victim of political persecution, accusing PAS and Maia Sandu of fabricating cases against opponents (e.g. Andronachi), delegitimizing democratic institutions (CEC, courts), and appealing to U.S. and international audiences by claiming Moldova’s elections have already been “stolen.” The rhetorical devices repeat victimhood, fear, and nostalgia for PDM, while portraying PAS as a dictatorial regime, an archetypal CIB tactic meant to simulate authentic civic frustration where in fact manipulation is at play.
In the last 10 days, Funky Citizens monitored narratives circulating on TikTok, Meta, and Google in the Republic of Moldova. The analysis identified recurring disinformation clusters grouped into key themes. The chart illustrates daily fluctuations, with TikTok emerging as the main platform for amplification. Peaks in CIB (September 5 and 8) show waves of coordinated, inauthentic activity, while DEMO, SOV, and WAR narratives maintained a steady presence throughout the period. Meta and Google also registered disinformation incidents, but at significantly lower levels compared to TikTok, confirming the latter’s role as the primary battleground for electoral manipulation and foreign influence campaigns.
CIB on Facebook, Instagram, TikTok and other social media platforms
Thanks to our partners Alliance4Europe, GLOBSEC, and Polisphere for flagging this case. In recent days, Ilan Șor has orchestrated a synchronized mobilization with the Victory (Victorie) Bloc and allied opposition figures for 16 August, presenting it as a “united effort” to oust PAS and “restore” Moldova. The calls start on VK and OK.ru, move through Telegram, and are recycled across TikTok and Meta, using templated messaging, city-branded channels, and a Telegram bot for sign-ups, coordination, and logistics, manufacturing the appearance of spontaneous grassroots support while centrally directing actions to create legitimacy and street pressure.
See other efforts to uncover disinformation in Moldova
Moldova’s disinformation landscape has been extensively documented by colleagues from the civil society and independent media who have uncovered manipulation campaigns targeting the electoral process. Ziarul de Gardă conducted an undercover investigation exposing how hundreds of fake accounts operated by real Victory Bloc activists were trained by Russian-speaking curators to spread anti-European propaganda across social media platforms, revealing a Moscow-coordinated troll farm that evolved from vote-buying operations to digital warfare targeting the parliamentary elections. Mediacritica.md has produced comprehensive analyses exposing fabricated polling data, coordinated Facebook networks exploiting Transnistrian voting issues, systematic Telegram disinformation campaigns, and AI-generated TikTok content designed to appear authentic. Meanwhile, FACT revealed the potential cases of coordinated inauthentic behavior on TikTok, including detailed case studies concerning political candidates.
This newsletter is part of our ongoing work with the Bulgarian-Romanian Observatory of Digital Media, member of EDMO.
Author: BROD / Funky Citizens