EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
As Moldova enters the final stretch before its September 28 parliamentary elections, the information warfare landscape continues to evolve with increasing intensity, while new institutional responses emerge to counter disinformation threats and cross-border influence operations become more coordinated. This period has witnessed new reveals including Russian-sponsored religious propaganda networks, the dismantling of Belarusian espionage operations involving former Moldovan intelligence officials, Vietnamese bot farms amplifying pro-Kremlin narratives, and the formal establishment of Moldova’s Counter-Disinformation Center alongside intensified law enforcement operations resulting in approximately 2,000 searches and multiple arrests connected to electoral corruption schemes.
WEEKLY OVERVIEW
Mediacritica’s analysis of 70 Telegram channels during the first two weeks of the electoral campaign revealed an intensification of disinformation narratives promoted. Five primary false narratives emerged: allegations that Chișinău and Kyiv are secretly discussing military intervention in Transnistria under British expert guidance, claims that Moldova has become a dictatorship with fascist and Nazi manifestations comparable to a police state, warnings that Maia Sandu might cancel the elections, comparisons of Sandu to Georgian ex-president Mikheil Saakashvili as a “Saakashvili in a skirt,” and accusations that Romania’s National Audiovisual Council is interfering in Moldova’s elections, with these narratives accumulating over 350,000 total views and employing emotionally charged terms like “Gestapo” and “nazism” to generate negative associations.
Ziarul de Gardă’s investigation exposed how clergymen from Moldova’s Metropolis, subordinated to the Russian Patriarchy, are spreading Russian propaganda narratives through a sophisticated digital infrastructure including Telegram channels, TikTok, Viber, and Facebook following a Jerusalem “pilgrimage” sponsored by the Șor-affiliated “Eurasia” organization. The investigation documented how Russian operative Alexandr Ralnikov instructed participating priests to engage youth through social media, leading to the creation of the “Salt and Light” Telegram channel that grew to over 8,000 subscribers and promotes false claims about EU membership threatening traditional values, family structures, and religious freedom. Several clergy members were caught on video spreading fabricated stories about EU restrictions on pet ownership, fishing licenses, with one priest later admitting the text was written by someone else and acknowledging he no longer supports those statements.
Moldova expelled a Belarusian Embassy collaborator declared persona non grata following the dismantling of a Belarusian espionage network across Czech Republic, Hungary, and Romania that included former SIS deputy director Alexandru Balan. Romanian authorities arrested Balan for allegedly transmitting state secrets to Belarus’s KGB between 2024-2025 through two meetings in Budapest, where he reportedly received instructions and payments for services rendered, with investigations revealing his activities posed risks to Romania’s national security.
Interior Minister Daniella Misail-Nichitin announced that approximately 2,000 searches have been conducted since the electoral campaign began, resulting in multiple criminal cases for electoral corruption including organized paid protests, disobedience to police orders, and violations of assembly legislation. Police conducted 15 searches across multiple localities on September 11 as part of criminal investigations into electoral corruption, illegal party financing, and money laundering connected to the Șor criminal organization’s preparation for voter bribery ahead of the parliamentary elections. The raids uncovered cash in various currencies, mobile phones, laptops, banking documents, cards, draft notes, lists of protest participants with payment amounts, and evidence of the “Taito” mobile application used to collect citizens’ personal data, reproducing mechanisms previously used through the sanctioned Russian Promsviazybank’s PSB application. Investigations revealed that organization members receive instructions from Russian coordinators via Telegram groups regarding the distribution and commentary of disinformation materials across Facebook, TikTok, and Telegram platforms.
WatchDog’s analysis of digital advertising between April 30 and July 28 revealed that Russia, through Ilan Șor’s network and local political actors, sponsored 1,505 advertisements on Meta platforms with an estimated budget of 45,000 EUR, while Șor and Natalia Morari placed 319 advertisements on YouTube. The analysis showed unprecedented resource concentration in Șor’s network, accounting for 88.1% of Meta advertisements and 70.4% of the budget, with MD24 functioning as a major proxy node running approximately 69% of Șor’s total advertisements before being deleted by Meta. The primary propaganda narratives promoted through these campaigns included claims that PAS will fraud parliamentary elections in diaspora, persecutes the Orthodox Church, impoverished Moldova, imposed censorship, and will never achieve EU membership, with these campaigns aimed at undermining Moldova’s pro-European trajectory and destabilizing political climate ahead of elections.
Context.ro’s investigation exposed a Russian-sponsored religious disinformation network using the US-sanctioned Eurasia Foundation to promote a website hosted on Russian servers that spreads false claims about EU threats to traditional values, while Orthodox clergy who participated in Kremlin-funded Jerusalem “pilgrimages” now operate digital channels spreading fabricated stories about European restrictions on religious practices, with support from Romanian AUR party figures and documented Russian agent Victor Josu.
President Maia Sandu approved the organizational structure of the Center for Strategic Communication and Countering Disinformation, establishing a 29-member institution designed to analyze inauthentic behavior in the information space through two specialized directorates. The center will operate through a Situational Awareness and Forecasting Directorate focusing on information space analysis and coordinated inauthentic behavior detection, alongside a Resilience Strengthening Directorate responsible for institutional capacity building and societal research, representing a step of institutionalization of Moldova’s counter-disinformation efforts that had been operating under interim leadership since October 2024.
Romanian police discovered 13 Moldovan citizens operating from a hotel in Iași who were making calls to Moldovan voters encouraging them to support Igor Dodon’s Socialist Party in the upcoming parliamentary elections, leading to their immediate departure from Romania after being questioned by authorities. The group, led by former Chișinău police officer Serghei Medic and UK-educated Evghenii Ceban, had rented conference facilities until September 26 and were equipped with laptops and headsets for their calling operation.
Romania’s National Audiovisual Council issued a second notification to TikTok under the Digital Services Act regarding 84 accounts exhibiting coordinated inauthentic behavior that could influence Romanian voters participating in Moldova’s parliamentary elections. The decision reflects concerns about content targeting Romanian citizens with dual citizenship and represents an interpretation of regulatory authority over cross-border information manipulation that affects domestic populations.
The Audiovisual Council imposed 15 public warnings and financial penalties totaling 12,000 lei on broadcasters for electoral law violations during the first week of campaigning, with particular concern about discriminatory content and unbalanced coverage. Regional public broadcaster TV-Găgăuzia faced criticism for failing to cover any electoral competitors in its news programming while allowing discriminatory statements about sexual orientation, while PRO TV Chișinău was sanctioned for permitting age-based discrimination against a political leader.
A new WatchDog.MD/CBS Research poll reveals deep institutional distrust with only 41% of citizens believing the country is heading in the right direction, while confidence levels remain highest for schools and churches but lowest for parliament, government, and the prime minister. The survey shows PAS leading with 29.7% support, followed by the Patriotic Bloc at 13.2% and Our Party at 7.5%, with 26.8% of respondents remaining undecided, while EU membership support stands at 51.7% compared to 32.2% favoring Eurasian Economic Union membership, indicating a polarized but pro-European leaning electorate.
SOCIAL MEDIA DIS and MIS-INFORMATION
Moldova’s online information space has become a central battlefield where disinformation campaigns systematically undermine public trust in democratic institutions. Social media platforms serve as amplifiers for false narratives. These narratives frame Moldova as a state captured by elites, with elections allegedly manipulated through pre-marked ballots, falsified diaspora votes, and the suppression of opposition parties.
The messaging often recycles conspiracy theories about foreign manipulation, Soros networks, and NATO interference, embedding them in sensationalist or AI-generated content for viral spread. Propaganda channels and inauthentic networks promote themes of judicial corruption, censorship of free speech, and alleged persecution of political rivals, seeking to erode confidence in the electoral process.
By leveraging social media platforms, disinformation actors weaponize provocative videos, manipulated polls, and fake news portals to stir outrage and mobilize protests. The overarching goal is to delegitimize Moldova’s democratic trajectory and EU integration path, while presenting civil disobedience, mass rallies, and pro-Russian alternatives as the only solutions.
(SOCIO) Socio-Economic Decline & Public Hardship
This cluster revolves around narratives portraying Moldova as a country in deep socio-economic collapse under PAS and Maia Sandu. The messaging emphasizes poverty, unemployment, mass emigration, rising energy tariffs, and the decay of public services such as education and healthcare. PAS is framed as corrupt, incompetent, and indifferent, with citizens depicted as abandoned to hunger, cold, and despair while leaders enrich themselves and stage propaganda events.
A strong strand focuses on agriculture and rural decline: farmers are shown as ruined, villages emptying, schools and preschools closing, and traditional livelihoods being destroyed while imports from the EU are allegedly prioritized. Another common storyline blames PAS for demographic decline, with youth forced to emigrate and birthrates falling, leaving Moldova a “country without people.” Narratives also accuse the government of systemic corruption—stealing public money, raising taxes, mismanaging loans, and exploiting citizens through artificially inflated utility bills.
Foreign actors are instrumentalized to amplify these grievances. EU loans are framed as debt traps that will bankrupt future generations, while Romania and European leaders are accused of exploiting Moldova’s resources or hiding the country’s poverty during official visits. In this framing, European integration is equated with colonization, with Moldova depicted as a dumping ground for European goods and a laboratory for failed reforms, deepening the sense of national decline and betrayal.
(DEMO) Democratic Backsliding & Authoritarianism
This cluster revolves around claims that PAS and Maia Sandu have usurped power, dismantled democratic institutions, and replaced them with an authoritarian system. Narratives allege that Moldova has become a dictatorship where dissent is silenced, opposition parties are neutralized, and elections are manipulated to guarantee PAS victories. The Constitutional Court, CEC, and judiciary are depicted as fully captured tools of PAS, enforcing selective justice, silencing critics, and persecuting opponents. Sandu is frequently compared to Plahotniuc or foreign “puppets,” portrayed as consolidating personal control through censorship, illegal laws, and the systematic suppression of independent voices.
The police and security forces are central in these narratives, accused of acting as PAS’s private militia to attack peaceful protests, intimidate citizens, and ban opposition gatherings. Disinformation frames Moldova as a “prison state,” where TikTok, Telegram, and independent TV channels are blocked to prevent free speech, while critical journalists, lawyers, and civic activists face persecution. Narratives also highlight alleged corruption and hypocrisy: public funds are said to be redirected toward loyal media, fake NGOs, and intimidation campaigns, while ordinary citizens face fines, poverty, and fear. Overall, this cluster portrays Moldova under PAS as suffering from systemic repression, destroyed democracy, and authoritarian consolidation disguised as European integration.
(SOV) Sovereignty & Geopolitical Influence
This cluster is dominated by disinformation framing Moldova’s pro-European course as a betrayal of national sovereignty and submission to foreign powers. Narratives depict the EU, NATO, Romania, and Western leaders (Macron, von der Leyen, Soros, U.S. officials) as controlling Moldova’s politics, economy, and culture through loans, “curators,” and external directives. European integration is portrayed not as an opportunity, but as colonization: Moldova is allegedly turned into an EU dumping ground, a source of cheap labor, and a NATO outpost, while citizens inherit massive debt. Romania in particular is framed as exploiting Moldova economically, selling overpriced gas and treating Moldovans as its diaspora.
Another strong thread is the cultural and values dimension: disinformation claims the EU forces Moldova to abandon traditions, language, and Orthodoxy in exchange for aid, replacing them with LGBT propaganda and “foreign values.” Sandu and PAS are accused of destroying the Russian language, removing Pushkin monuments, attacking the church, and promoting a Western agenda disconnected from Moldovan identity. Sovereignty is further undermined by narratives of election interference: EU delegations allegedly fund PAS campaigns, foreign leaders openly back Sandu, and even Moldovan state assets (Giurgiulești port, Energocom) are said to be sold to NATO or Romania. Altogether, these narratives paint Moldova as a powerless pawn in a geopolitical game, whose future is dictated abroad rather than decided by its people.
(INFOMAN) Fake & Manipulative Narratives
This cluster revolves around manipulative, defamatory, and fabricated content targeting Maia Sandu, PAS, and pro-European actors. It includes conspiracy theories, AI-generated deepfakes, satirical distortions, pseudo-scientific claims, and sensational scandals designed to ridicule or delegitimize leadership. Narratives portray Sandu as mentally ill, morally corrupt, or personally implicated in child trafficking, billion-dollar thefts, or bizarre scandals such as buying biomaterial or being involved in sexual relationships with foreign leaders. PAS is framed as a criminal sect tied to human trafficking, organized crime, and repression, while fabricated polls and pseudo-expert analyses suggest electoral collapse despite evidence to the contrary.
A major strand in this cluster exploits AI-generated videos, memes, and false “investigations” to create provocative visual disinformation: Sandu shown with Macron or Usatîi, compared to demons or animals, presented as a stripper, or mocked through football defeats. Other manipulative techniques include fabricated polls, false screenshots, and pseudo-scientific narratives (Moldovan vs. Romanian language, rebirth of fascism in history textbooks) meant to sow confusion.
(ELEC) Electoral Fraud & Manipulation
This cluster revolves around claims that elections in Moldova under PAS and Maia Sandu are fundamentally illegitimate, manipulated, or already decided in advance. Disinformation narratives allege systemic fraud: ballot stuffing, votes from deceased citizens, manipulated voter lists, and falsified diaspora votes (especially in Russia). The Central Electoral Commission (CEC) is consistently portrayed as captured by PAS, blocking opposition candidates, reducing polling stations in Transnistria and Russia, and opening unnecessary ones in Western Europe where PAS allegedly has more support.
A recurrent strand frames pre-election economic measures (like lowering electricity or utility bills, subsidies for farmers, or selective aid programs) as “electoral bribes” meant to buy votes. Parallel narratives accuse PAS of abusing administrative resources: using police, courts, and censorship to suppress opposition, intimidate mayors, and restrict campaign activity.
Foreign actors are weaponized: the EU and Romania are framed as funding PAS’s campaign, using diaspora votes for manipulation, and interfering in Moldova’s elections. U.S. and EU aid are depicted as tools for electoral fraud, while Romania’s institutions (like CNA) are accused of censoring opposition candidates. AI-generated satire and manipulated polls further amplify distrust, suggesting winners are chosen before voting begins and that PAS will cancel or annul results if it risks losing.
Overall, this cluster seeks to delegitimize the entire electoral process, portraying Moldova as a country without free and fair elections where PAS survives only through fraud, intimidation, and foreign backing.
(WAR) War and Security Threats
This cluster portrays PAS and Maia Sandu as pushing Moldova into war by aligning the country with NATO and Ukraine. Disinformation narratives depict Moldova as losing its neutrality and sovereignty, becoming a NATO outpost and battlefield for Western interests.
A central storyline alleges that Sandu is preparing to send Moldovan soldiers to Ukraine or other NATO missions, with claims of forced mobilization of youth, mercenary recruitment, and even deaths of Moldovan soldiers hidden by authorities. Hospital beds, infrastructure, and enterprises are said to be diverted to military purposes, while vineyards and land are allegedly destroyed to build NATO bases. These narratives frame PAS as sacrificing Moldovan lives for foreign wars in exchange for EU or NATO benefits.
Another recurring theme is that Moldova will “follow Ukraine’s path,” being dragged into conflict with Russia or Transnistria. NATO and Western powers are accused of preparing provocations, buying Moldovan enterprises for war production, and installing bases and weapons testing grounds. PAS leaders are portrayed as hypocritical and detached, allegedly ready to flee if war breaks out, while ordinary Moldovans are forced to fight.
Overall, this cluster amplifies fear of militarization, foreign occupation, and war. It frames PAS and Sandu as reckless actors destroying Moldova’s neutrality and peace, turning the country into “the next Ukraine” and a pawn in NATO and EU geopolitical games.
(GAG) Gagauzia and the Guțul Case
This cluster focuses on Evghenia Guțul, the Bashkan of Gagauzia, framing her legal troubles as politically motivated persecution by PAS and Maia Sandu. Disinformation narratives depict Guțul as a victim of injustice and a “symbol of freedom,” while PAS is accused of fabricating charges, intimidating Gagauzia, and suppressing regional autonomy.
Central storylines allege that Guțul was sentenced on Sandu’s direct orders in a trial lasting only minutes, with claims of political execution, fabricated evidence, and violations of fair trial rights. Narratives emphasize double standards, suggesting “thieves are free while innocents are imprisoned,” and frame Guțul’s detention as proof that Moldovan justice under PAS is corrupt and controlled.
The Gagauzia issue is instrumentalized to highlight broader themes of regional repression and resistance. Claims suggest that Brussels, the EU, and even the UN demanded Guțul’s release, with some narratives warning that her case could delay Moldova’s EU accession. Protest slogans like “Freedom for Guțul” and photo montages (e.g., Sandu and Guțul behind bars) are used to dramatize the narrative.
(CIB) Coordinated inauthentic behavior
Vietnamese bot networks linked to the Moldavian Calendar Facebook and Instagram accounts were used to artificially amplify pro-Kremlin narratives and support Ilan Shor’s political agenda. The assets posed as independent news sources while smearing PAS and Maia Sandu, building large inauthentic followings (31,500 on Facebook and 29,100 on Instagram) with bot accounts primarily from Vietnam, Thailand, and Russia.
The content aligned with Shor’s political movement, portraying PAS and Sandu as corrupt puppets of the West undermining Moldova’s sovereignty. Manipulative tactics included paid ads, fake “news” branding, and networks of inauthentic accounts to create false legitimacy and reach Moldovan audiences.
Thanks to our partners GLOBSEC for flagging this case.
This newsletter is part of our ongoing work with the Bulgarian-Romanian Observatory of Digital Media, member of EDMO.
Author: BROD / Funky Citizens