The race for Moldova’s parliament is heating up – and so is the battle for truth. From ghost websites to viral videos, the playbook is familiar – but the stakes in Chișinău are uniquely high. And it’s not just about content – it’s about coordination. This week, EFOR’s monitoring uncovered a TikTok network of 17 accounts that generated over one million views in just one week for the hashtag #vasilecostiuc, fueled by nearly 1,000 suspicious follower accounts. This is disinformation dressed up as organic popularity, showing how Moldova’s digital space is being distorted at scale.
Context.ro’s investigations show that AUR’s propaganda machine has crossed the Prut, cloning websites, spreading conspiracy theories on TikTok, and pushing anti-European narratives into Moldova’s political bloodstream. With the help of AI tools, their reporters tracked how George Simion and 12 AUR MPs amplified false claims about Maia Sandu and election fraud, while shadowy actors stirred trouble even at the border.
In this first FACT Moldova Elections newsletter, we bring you Context’s deep dive into the propaganda channels crossing into Moldova, EFOR’s analysis of the coordinated amplification tactics now shaping its campaign, and Rise Moldova’s investigation on new fronts to Kremlin-linked networks.
Twin Hearts, One Agenda: Kremlin-Linked Structures in Moldova
The investigative outlet Rise Moldova found out that a TikTok influencer working for the pro-Russian oligarch Ilan Shor and Irina Vlah, a Kremlin-linked Moldovan politician, have established two organizations with similar names: “Sufletul și Inima Moldovei” (The Soul and Heart of Moldova) and “Inima Moldovei” (The Heart of Moldova).
“The Soul and Heart of Moldova” is led by a police officer accused of receiving money through the Russian commercial bank PromsvyazBank (PSB) to bribe the Moldovan electorate. The second organization is the “The Heart of Moldova” party, led by pro-Russian leader Irina Vlah, who, during the 2015 elections for the position of Bashkan of Gagauzia, used speeches drafted in the Kremlin containing pro-Russian, anti-European, and anti-Romanian phrases. “We call on all patriots of our autonomy to vote for a dignified future alongside Russia,” Vlah said.
Read the full investigation here.
Artificial Amplification: The Costiuc Surge
EFOR identified a coordinated network of 17 TikTok accounts that generated over 1 million views in the last 7 days promoting the hashtag #vasilecostiuc, a 300% increase compared to the previous period. The network shows signs of inauthentic behavior, with 993 suspicious accounts (medium/high risk of inauthenticity) systematically following the same political accounts. We argue that electoral systems are vulnerable to manipulation through political advertising disguised as social media content and that there is a need for systemic action to ensure real transparency from large platforms.
Patterns identified: The same 993 suspicious followers (empty accounts, deleted videos) systematically follow multiple accounts in the network, creating an overlap density of 95.8%. Despite the high number of views for videos, we identify relatively small accounts with up to 1,000 followers each, making these early stages of coordination easy to ignore. This structure suggests possible artificial amplification mechanisms that can influence algorithms and generate apparent popularity for certain political messages.
Broader implications: What we are seeing in Moldova may represent an evolution of digital election manipulation techniques, a model of covert political advertising similar to that identified in the Romanian presidential elections. The fundamental challenge remains: in an era of global platforms and opaque algorithms, how do we ensure that national democratic processes are not potentially distorted by artificial manipulation techniques? The answer requires both stronger regulation and greater transparency from platforms.
Crossing the Prut: AUR’s Propaganda Machine in Moldova
Context.ro is monitoring the parliamentary elections in the Republic of Moldova. Alongside the weekly summary available here, we found that AUR’s propaganda mechanisms have crossed the border, we uncovered disinformation on TikTok, and identified the politician who stirred up trouble at the border with Moldova.
Context.ro has shown here how a series of ghost websites in the Republic of Moldova, which publish various false, anti-European content, are actually linked to the extremist party AUR. Some are clones of Romanian sites controlled by the party, such as the domains 60m.md and anchetatorii.md, which are almost identical copies of their Romanian versions, 60m.ro and anchetatorii.ro. These two domains were registered in early June by DGI Multimedia Design, AUR’s in-house company. Other sites that claim to be independent publications post pro–Vasile Costiuc articles; Costiuc is the candidate of the Democracy at Home Party, an ally of Simion and a former candidate for a seat in the Romanian Parliament on behalf of AUR. All the pages flagged by Context.ro have connections to the party led by Simion, either because they previously paid for the promotion of pro-AUR content on social media or through direct ties to the politicians.
Just before Romania’s presidential elections, and during the vote itself, George Simion launched disinformation on TikTok about Maia Sandu’s alleged involvement in election fraud. Context.ro used an AI disinformation-detection tool, developed together with two programmers, to discover that 23.60% of all content posted by Simion on his TikTok account consisted of false information, conspiracy theories, or biased and emotionally-trigging statements. Using the same tool, we also showed here how 12 AUR MPs posted videos on their TikTok accounts spreading the narrative of Maia Sandu’s fraudulent involvement in the Romanian elections. Simion’s allegations were rejected by the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and by two fact-checking platforms.
In a video posted on social media on May 10 – the date of President Nicușor Dan’s first official visit to Chișinău – George Simion called on Moldovan citizens to vote against Maia Sandu, namely against the Action and Solidarity Party (PAS), in the parliamentary elections in the Republic of Moldova. A month later, the AUR leader announced he would intervene in the September 28 elections. He stated that “we need 100,000 votes for Sandu to lose the parliamentary elections. (…) All of Soros’s agents and the so-called pro-Europeans in Chișinău must pay for the theft of Romania’s elections.”
Context.ro also uncovered the identity of the controversial politician who caused a stir at the Albița–Leușeni border at the end of June. A bus carrying young athletes was stopped at the Romanian-Moldovan border, on its way to the European Kickboxing Championship in Chișinău – an event supported by the Russophile mayor Ion Ceban and which became a national controversy in Moldova. Among those stopped was Marius Vasile Niță, a former PSD local councilor, previously associated with the Clanul Sportivilor crime group, and known as an agitator against Nicușor Dan and Codruța Kovesi. Last year, Marius Niță greeted us from Moscow. Now he appeared in a video posted on the TikTok account of Victor Pruteanu, a member of the National Alternative Movement (MAN) party and adviser to Ion Ceban, Chișinău’s pro-Russian and anti-EU mayor. The video gathered nearly 350,000 views, 14,000 likes, over 1,400 comments, and more than 1,600 shares.
This is the first edition of FACT’s Moldova Elections newsletter, and the first battle in our wider mission to fight disinformation in the region. Together with Context.ro, EFOR, and local partners, we are exposing how propaganda, digital manipulation, and cross-border influence seek to distort Moldova’s parliamentary race.
Follow us, share this newsletter, and stay with FACT as we track and expose the shifting landscape of disinformation across the region.The FACT Hub is our new regional platform for monitoring, analysis, and collaboration against disinformation — and Moldova’s elections are just the beginning.
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Author: FACT