The Kremlin’s Double Game: Russian Attempts to Influence Poland’s 2025 Election
Moscow interfered in the presidential elections in Poland. But not in the way one might assume.
Less than two weeks before the first round of the presidential election, Minister of Digital Affairs Krzysztof Gawkowski stated that Poland was experiencing an unprecedented scale of attempts by the Russian Federation to influence the election. He pointed to disinformation, cyberattacks and other forms of hybrid threats. ‘Today in Poland, during every minute of my speech, several incidents involving critical infrastructure were recorded,’ the minister said.[1]
‘Concerned citizens’ powered by Kremlin propaganda
Despite the Kremlin’s persistent disinformation campaigns, many of its efforts targeting Polish audiences have failed to gain traction. This ineffectiveness is largely due to the strong public consensus in Poland against Russian influence and pro-Kremlin narratives.
One such attempt involved a bot network on X (formerly Twitter) linked to Operation Doppelganger.[2] The accounts targeting the Polish elections followed a predictable pattern: they were created from different locations around the world, initially posted a few tweets about cryptocurrencies, and then switched to Polish on the same day – pretending to be ‘concerned citizens’ voicing views aligned with Kremlin interests.
One of the dominant narratives in this operation was criticism of increased military spending.[3] Russian bots were programmed to post statements such as: ‘The disabled, the elderly, children – they will all be left to fend for themselves while money flows to the military’ or ‘It is our money that should be spent on improving the quality of life of Poles, not on financing the war industry.’ These messages were designed to sow doubt among real users in the run-up to the elections.
Isolated voices of resonance
The Kremlin also works to amplify isolated voices that express pro-Russian views, presenting them as ‘reasonable ideas’ within the ‘anti-Russian West’.[4] One such example occurred during a presidential debate, when candidate Maciej Maciak publicly defended Vladimir Putin. ‘None of us here in Poland would be able to withstand such pressure. This proves that Putin is a very good politician’[5], he said.
This statement drew significant coverage in Russian state-controlled media outlets, including TASS[6], Izvestia[7], and RT (formerly Russia Today).[8] Maciak was also featured several times on Belarusian propaganda television, where he expanded on his pro-Kremlin stance. He praised Russian soldiers for their ‘exceptional perseverance, cunning and appropriate tactics’ and addressed Lukashenko, Putin, and Xi Jinping directly: ‘Gentlemen, keep it up, you are doing a great job, y[9][10]
These statements align closely with standard Russian disinformation narratives.[11] Ultimately, however, Maciak secured only 0.19% of the vote – the second-lowest result among the thirteen candidates – underscoring the fact that open admiration for Putin resonates only among a very small minority in Poland.
Ineffectiveness of (some) Kremlin Propaganda in Poland
The creators of Operation Doppelganger appear to have misjudged public sentiment in Poland, promoting narratives that directly clashed with deeply rooted values – particularly on defence. According to the GLOBSEC Trends 2025 report[12], Polish respondents showed the strongest support among surveyed countries[13] for increasing military spending (92%), establishing a voluntary mechanism to ensure societal resilience in times of crisis (89%), and defending the homeland (84%). In this context, the Kremlin’s efforts to undermine military spending failed to resonate and appear to have had little impact.
Support for national defence is not the only area of consensus. Poles also share a broad, unified stance on Russia itself. The same GLOBSEC report found that 86% of Polish respondents consider Russia a threat – the highest result in the region – while only 4% view the Kremlin as a strategic partner. Core themes of Russian propaganda, such as the notion of the ‘Russian world’, appeals to Slavic brotherhood, or admiration of Putin, find little traction in Polish society.
Grey zone of Russian influence
While some pro-Kremlin narratives fail in Poland due to strong national consensus, Russia propaganda finds more fertile ground on issues where Polish society is divided – particularly on relations with Ukraine and attitudes toward Ukrainian migrants.
A poll conducted in autumn 2024 by the Centre for Public Opinion Research showed that only 53% of Poles supported the admission of Ukrainian migrants – a drop of more than 40 percentage points since March 2022.[14] Similarly, a survey by the Warsaw-based Mieroszewski Centre found that only 25% of respondents had a positive view of Ukrainians, while 30% held negative opinions and 41% remained neutral.[15] These trends are confirmed by the GLOBSEC Trends 2025, which revealed that nearly 40% of Polish respondents believe that aid to Ukraine unnecessarily prolongs the war, and 77% say that cheap Ukrainian products harm the Polish economy – the highest level of such sentiment in the region.
This issue provides fertile ground for the Kremlin’s oldest tactic: divide and rule.[16] In such cases, pro-Russian actors do not need to overt messaging – subtle manipulation is enough. By amplifying resentment, framing Ukrainians as antagonistic to Poles, and invoking historical grievances, they deepen existing fault lines.[17] During the election campaign, Russian and pro-Russian networks exploited these tensions to stir up the anti-Ukrainian sentiments and widen societal divisions.[18]
Moscow’s goal is not limited to spreading pro-Kremlin messages; it is equally invested in amplifying polarising narratives – against NATO, the EU, or Ukraine – that weaken national unity.[19] These narratives do not need to be directly pro-Russian. It is enough that they sow doubt, confusion, and mistrust, so that the country becomes less cohesive and, ultimately, less of a strategic threat to Kremlin.
Protecting Democracy Through Strategic Communication
In today’s information environment, where information threats can be as damaging as conventional warfare, democratic societies are especially vulnerable to this type of polarisation. The recent elections confirmed that in many topics Poland remains politically and socially fragmented – conditions that favour malign influence. Although both leading candidates were critical of Putin’s regime, and Karol Nawrocki’s victory was viewed as unfavourable for [20], the fractured political landscape continues to serve Russian interests.
To counter this, democratic leadership must take a more proactive approach. Dialogue is essential – within Poland and across the European Union – but it must be paired with robust strategic communication. Governments need to pre-emptively address societal vulnerabilities, particularly on sensitive grey-zone issues like migration, economic inequality, and national identity. Building societal resilience means not just reacting to disinformation but anticipating it – and ensuring adversaries do not get there first.
[2] Operation Doppelganger is a Russian-linked disinformation campaign that uses fake versions of Western media websites to spread pro-Kremlin narratives and undermine support for Ukraine. It has been linked to Russian entities such as the Social Design Agency and Structura National Technologies, https://www.disinfo.eu/doppelganger-operation
[3] https://alliance4europe.eu/doppelganger-polish-presidential-p2
[5] https://youtube.com/shorts/BSJdoglkpJA
[12] https://www.globsec.org/what-we-do/publications/globsec-trends-2025-ready-new-era
[13] Other surveyed countries are: Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia. GLOBSEC Trends is an annual survey-based report that monitors public opinion across Central and Eastern Europe on key geopolitical, security, and democratic issues.
[14] https://www.pap.pl/aktualnosci/czy-polacy-popieraja-przyjmowanie-ukrainskich-uchodzcow-sondaz
[15] https://mieroszewski.pl/wiedza/badania-opinii-publicznej/polacy-o-ukrainie-2025
[16] https://www.politico.eu/article/europe-farmer-protest-russia-war-propaganda/
[17] https://nask.pl/magazyn/zewnetrzne-linie-narracyjne-obecne-w-polskiej-infosferze
Author: GLOBSEC, member of CEDMO