Analysis of Social Media presence of Romanian presidential candidates

Executive Summary

This analysis reveals not just a presidential campaign unfolding on social media, but a digital theater that raises suspicions about some performers who have secretly involved extras to fill empty seats. Examining 23 days of activity on Meta and TikTok platforms, we have documented patterns that don’t just suggest manipulation—they practically announce it, with engagement spikes that defy both platform norms and statistical probabilities.

Following the controversial 2024 elections—where Călin Georgescu’s TikTok-driven rise was linked to a coordinated €1 million operation involving 25,000 accounts—and recent accusations by Nicușor Dan regarding foreign bot attacks on his accounts, our findings raise serious concerns about the integrity of the digital campaign landscape. As Romania approaches a critical election in less than two weeks, this report serves both as a warning and as evidence of algorithmic manipulation potentially shaping public perception.

Electoral context and approach

Funky Citizens conducted a detailed analysis of the online activity of presidential candidates on Meta platforms (Facebook and Instagram) and TikTok from April 1 to April 23. The report aims to decipher the digital strategies used by candidates in online promotion, content typology, and to provide an assessment of the impact of campaign messages transmitted by candidates through Social Media platforms. By examining their official profiles, we aimed to identify both distinctive elements and common trends in the way presidential candidates build their image and communicate with the electorate in the online environment.

Why did we chose to analyze candidates’ campaigns?

Discussions about inauthentic promotion of candidates have intensified recently. The key moment is Călin Georgescu’s campaign during the first round of the presidential elections, the surprise candidate of the November 2024 elections, in which massive increases were identified on social networks, especially TikTok. We recall that this campaign propelled Călin Georgescu, a marginal figure previously known for his anti-Western views, towards an unexpected victory in the first round through what appeared to be a carefully orchestrated social media operation. Intelligence services officially accused the existence of a €1 million campaign involving 25,000 coordinated TikTok accounts, none of which were declared in official campaign finance reports. According to disclosed documents, the operation presented clear state actor characteristics, with technical infrastructure linked to Russia supporting content distribution in 19 countries.

Funky Citizens published a final report in December 2024 regarding disinformation campaigns from the first round of presidential elections, which can be consulted in detail here – Undermining Democracy: Weaponizing Social Media in Romania’s 2024 Elections.

In the 2025 presidential election campaign, another key moment that sends worrying signals about the propulsion of candidates on social networks is the inauthentic growth of Nicușor Dan’s official pages, an independent presidential candidate. The candidate publicly denounced what he described as a coordinated attack against his social media accounts. During a press conference, he declared that they were “invaded by hundreds of thousands of fake accounts” from countries such as Vietnam, India, and Pakistan, forcing him to suspend his online campaign, for which he was spending approximately €15,000 daily.

Given the context of the 2025 presidential elections and the difficult events that led to the cancellation of the 2024 elections, we consider it necessary to pay increased attention to how candidates in this round manage to reach the electorate and to identify, where appropriate, anomalies in unexpected increases that propel candidates overnight. Funky Citizens continues to monitor closely the false narratives circulating during this period on social networks, along with careful monitoring of candidates’ electoral campaigns to inform the public about the activity of candidates they will vote for at the polls in less than two weeks.

Analysis of candidates

Based on the most recent opinion polls regarding Romanians’ preferred candidates for the presidential elections, we conducted an analysis of the online presence for the top five candidates on Meta platforms. We also examined the presence on TikTok for 10 of the 11 candidates (one of them not having an account on this platform).

We also took into consideration the number of followers they have on social media.

How does the information landscape on platforms look near the presidential elections?

If you want to learn more about the evolution of disinformation near the presidential elections, you can consult the weekly newsletters available here: Romania’s Information Landscape in the Context of the 2025 Presidential Elections.

The information landscape on social media platforms around Romania’s presidential elections is dominated by a complex network of disinformation, largely centered on the figure of Călin Georgescu. According to our analysis of reports, we have identified several predominant trends and narratives:

The main narratives present Călin Georgescu as the “legitimate president” of Romania, whose victory was allegedly annulled through a supposed “coup d’état” orchestrated by corrupt internal institutions and foreign powers. These claims are supported by falsified court decisions and alleged international pressures to reinstate his candidacy.
A significant volume of content focuses on the idea of resuming the second round of presidential elections, promoting it as inevitable and legally mandatory. These narratives frequently cite false deadlines and fabricated legal documents to create an alternative reality around the electoral process.
Another recurring theme is the existence of a “parallel state” plotting against Georgescu, suggesting that Romanian intelligence services, the judicial system, and political leaders are collaborating to disqualify him through manipulation. These narratives portray Georgescu as a persecuted national savior.
Disinformation campaigns have also been amplified by narratives related to external threats, such as an imminent war with Russia, presenting Romania as being forced into a military conflict by the EU (especially France) and NATO. Other posts claim the existence of secret military mobilizations and forced recruitments that would take place.
During the analyzed period, we identified coordinated inauthentic activity aimed at promoting and amplifying the messages of candidates and political parties. This activity takes place through networks of fake or coordinately managed accounts, with the purpose of manipulating public perception and artificially increasing the visibility of specific political actors.
These narratives strategically use emotional triggers – feelings of betrayal, injustice, nationalism, and existential threat – to erode trust in Romanian democratic institutions and create a parallel political reality that legitimizes marginal actors. Concerning is the fact that explicit calls for violence have also been reported in conjunction with these disinformation themes.

Regarding specific disinformation about presidential candidates, the analyzed posts highlight a series of trends:

In addition to the central narratives about Călin Georgescu, there are disinformation campaigns targeting other candidates as well, especially Nicușor Dan and Crin Antonescu. These narratives present them as part of an “anti-Georgescu political bloc” or as accomplices in a broader anti-national scheme.
From our monitoring, it appears that disinformation about Nicușor Dan presents him as explicitly opposing Călin Georgescu, framing him in the alleged plot against Georgescu. These narratives tend to diminish the legitimacy of Dan’s candidacy through his association with contested power structures.
Similarly, narratives have been identified that use misleading and manipulated content around Crin Antonescu’s candidacy. These posts claim the existence of alleged judicial interventions or last-minute political decisions that would affect his candidacy, creating confusion among voters.
Other marginal, but present narratives in the information space include bizarre claims such as Elon Musk running for president of Romania, or the spread of AI-generated political deepfakes to undermine trust in the electoral process and candidates.

Methodology

To achieve a broader, yet detailed perspective of the growth identified among candidates, we focused on the main growth indicators of accounts on platforms: the number of followers, likes, shares, and statistics regarding the engagement of posts and official profiles of candidates. The entire analysis is centered specifically on the official accounts of presidential candidates, precisely to determine if there are amplifications and popularity peaks on social media platforms in the period April 1-23, 2025.

However, a few mentions must be specified to ensure the accuracy of the collected data:

The analysis focuses on the totality of posts made by candidates during the monitored period;
Interaction indicators (views, likes, comments, and shares) are analyzed within the limits of access granted by platforms – there are cases detailed below where data about views or likes are not available;
Day-to-day fluctuations of engagement metrics (likes, comments, shares, views)
Statistical anomalies in engagement reports
Linguistic analysis of suspicious patterns in comments
Temporal distribution of engagement (frequency of comments per minute)
Language detection of accounts among followers
Cross-platform comparisons to identify synchronized patterns
Comparative analysis with statistical norms of organic behavior on each platform

Analysis tools and techniques

For this digital investigation, we used:

Social Media monitoring tools: Specialized systems for collecting data on engagement, views, and shares in real-time.
Anomaly detection algorithms: Statistical methods for identifying significant deviations from normal engagement patterns.
Linguistic analysis: Natural language analysis software for identifying automatically generated or coordinated comments.
Temporal analysis: Examination of the temporal distribution of comments to identify behaviors suggesting automation.
Network analysis: Techniques for identifying potential connections between accounts involved in suspicious activities. All these methods were applied with attention to data confidentiality, using only public information available on the respective platforms.

Methodology limitations

While our methodology is robust, we acknowledge several important limitations:

Limited access to data: Platforms restrict access to complete data, especially for private accounts or internal metrics.
Algorithmic changes: Frequent changes in platform algorithms can influence visibility and engagement in a way that doesn’t necessarily reflect manipulation.
Legitimate marketing interventions: Some spikes may result from legitimate digital marketing campaigns, although the specific patterns suggested in the report are atypical even for paid promotion.
External factors: Current events can influence engagement without necessarily implying manipulation. These limitations were taken into consideration in the interpretation of data and formulation of conclusions.

The actors: Romania’s digital candidates

Before diving into anomalies, let’s get to know the distribution of characters in this digital drama, classified by their number of social media followers:

Candidate	Facebook Followers	Instagram Followers	TikTok Followers
George Simion	658,972	293,187	541,328
Elena Lasconi	386,192	98,271	163,495
Victor Ponta	772,384	92,481	127,982
Nicușor Dan	271,538	112,387	96,324
Crin Antonescu	95,872	63,921	52,137
Other candidates	< 50,000	< 30,000	< 40,000

Candidate	Facebook Followers	Instagram Followers	TikTok Followers
George Simion	658,972	293,187	541,328
Elena Lasconi	386,192	98,271	163,495
Victor Ponta	772,384	92,481	127,982
Nicușor Dan	271,538	112,387	96,324
Crin Antonescu	95,872	63,921	52,137
Other candidates	< 50,000	< 30,000	< 40,000

Digital profile of candidates

George Simion – The AUR leader relies predominantly on a strong organic presence on Facebook, where his community is very active. His digital strategy seems to prioritize content quality over quantity, with a more conservative approach on TikTok.

Elena Lasconi – The USR candidate demonstrates a balanced approach between platforms, with an emphasis on authenticity and direct interaction. Her presence is stronger on Facebook than on visual platforms.

Victor Ponta – The former prime minister has adopted an aggressive volume strategy on all platforms, with particular emphasis on TikTok. His accounts show the clearest signs of coordinated artificial amplification.

Nicușor Dan – The capital’s mayor has publicly acknowledged significant spending on online promotion (€15,000 daily), reflected in sudden but non-uniform increases across all analyzed platforms.

Crin Antonescu – The former PNL leader maintains a moderate digital presence, focusing on traditional political content, although his accounts also show suspicious engagement anomalies.

Cross-platform models: “the smoking gun”

The most credible evidence of manipulation appears when examining cross-platform engagement models:

1. Synchronized peaks: The period April 20-22 shows simultaneous increases in followers and engagement across all platforms for multiple candidates (mainly Ponta, Dan, and Antonescu), suggesting a coordinated multi-platform amplification campaign.

This synchronization is particularly evident when we overlap follower growth graphs for TikTok with Instagram likes and Facebook shares—resulting in an almost identical activity pattern in the same time window, despite fundamental differences in the functioning of these platforms’ algorithms.

2. Platform-specific strategies: Different candidates seem to target different platforms—Ponta dominates TikTok views while Simion leads Facebook reactions—indicating strategic allocation of promotional resources rather than organic audience preferences.

This strategic segmentation suggests a sophisticated approach to the digital campaign, with specialized teams for optimizing presence on each platform and potentially different amplification services used for different metrics and platforms.

3. Anomalies in engagement ratios: Extreme comment-to-like ratios for Ponta on Instagram and almost perfect engagement rates for Dan on TikTok represent statistical impossibilities in organic social media behavior.

For perspective, a normal comment-to-like ratio on Instagram varies between 1:20 and 1:100, depending on the type of content and the level of community engagement. Ponta’s 1:3 ratio is a severe statistical anomaly which, in the absence of extraordinarily provocative or controversial content (which was not the case), indicates artificial manipulation.

4. Foreign language infiltration: The appearance of Russian comments on Dan’s Instagram and the prevalence of foreign language follower accounts across all platforms indicate coordination beyond Romania’s borders.

Geographical analysis of posting times for these foreign language comments and interactions reveals patterns consistent with time zones in Southeast Asia and the Middle East—regions known for hosting “content farms” that offer social media amplification services.

5. Post-peak regression: Each dramatic engagement peak is followed by an immediate return to baseline metrics, contradicting the natural momentum and algorithmic advantages that would sustain truly viral content.

In the case of organic viral content, the positive effects on platform algorithms tend to persist, creating a “halo effect” that increases the visibility of subsequent posts. The absence of this effect after the dramatic peaks observed suggests that these increases were generated through mechanisms that bypass the platforms’ normal algorithmic recommendation systems.

Content strategies and narratives

Beyond metrics and numbers, analysis of the candidates’ post content reveals distinct communication strategies and dominant narratives:

Victor Ponta: nostalgia and experience

Ponta’s content focuses predominantly on two main narratives: his previous governmental experience, presented through the lens of nostalgia for “better times” and economic visions and promises of financial stability. His best-performing videos show moments from his time as prime minister, hitting emotional notes and evoking feelings of past stability and prosperity.

Nicușor Dan: The pragmatic reformist

Dan’s content strategy focuses on: concrete achievements as Bucharest’s mayor, a technical, data-based approach to national problems, and implicit contrast with “old” politicians and the “corrupt system”. His posts with the highest engagement tend to be those presenting completed infrastructure projects and graphically visualized statistics.

George Simion: The combative sovereignist

Simion’s content, although less frequent, follows a clearly defined strategy: strong nationalist-sovereignist messages, direct, often provocative criticism of the “establishment”, and direct interaction with supporters through live and Q&A sessions. We notice, however, a strategic change in promoting the candidate in the electoral campaign: the online presence with which George Simion earned his supporters has radically diminished.

Elena Lasconi: authenticity and novelty

Elena Lasconi’s approach focuses on: authenticity and transparency, with emphasis on her personal story, success as mayor in a small town as a model for Romania, and appeal to generational change in politics. Her content presents the highest level of personal veracity among all analyzed candidates, with fewer signs of excessive professionalization.

Crin Antonescu: the rehabilitated intellectual

Antonescu’s strategy focuses on: rehabilitating his political image after years of absence, articulated discourse appealing to traditional democratic values, and positioning as a “mature” and “balanced” alternative. His most effective posts are those highlighting his oratorical skills in interviews and debates.

Mirror, Mirror, which candidate has the biggest growth in the country?

Instagram

In what follows, you will be able to observe the growth of Instagram accounts broken down by days (April 1-23), fluctuations of increases and decreases among interactions (especially unexpected peaks and abrupt decreases), massive increases in comments that raise the possibility of using bots for promotion, distribution of such comments per minute, as well as other data about likes, views, shares, and followers appearing overnight.

How active are the candidates on Instagram?

In the analyzed interval, Victor Ponta dominated Instagram activity with 126 posts. Following were Nicușor Dan with 82 posts and Crin Antonescu with 80 posts. Elena Lasconi recorded a moderate presence, with 68 posts, while George Simion had a minimal presence, publishing only one post.

1. Comments: when bots enter the conversation

The graph highlights the dynamics of Instagram comments for the five presidential candidates from April 1-23, 2025. Data aggregated in this analysis are extracted from all posts of all analyzed candidates – all comments from candidates’ posts broken down by day. The following trends are observed:

Victor Ponta’s suspicious growth: the miracle of over 3000 comments

One of the most visible increases in comments on candidates’ posts is that of Victor Ponta on April 15. In the analyzed period, the rounded average of comments on Ponta’s posts (without the one recording the peak from April 15) is 34 comments with an average of five posts per day. On April 15, Victor Ponta posted six times, of which one post stands out with 3003 comments. The other five gathered 175 comments. In the case of Victor Ponta’s post that suddenly had a peak of 3000 comments, the ratio to the 9000 likes is unusually high – 1 comment to 3 likes. In the absence of content that would justify such a massive organic reaction, such a high comment ratio can raise questions about the authenticity of the engagement or the intention behind the post. After this peak, a steep decrease is observed in the following days, with comments not rising above 100/post.

Analyzing the comments on this post, signs of concern become increasingly visible: out of the 3003 comments, 1276 were available for analysis within the limits of information provided by monitoring software. Out of the 1276 comments, 240 of them indicate the likelihood of still active bot behavior. Most comments are in support of candidate Victor Ponta, with repetitive messages such as: “the most trained competitor,” “the even more trained competitor,” “that more trained candidate,” “that more ready contender.”

The analyzed accounts, and at the same time, suspected bots, generated 152 distinctive comments, which can be consulted in the interactive material below, along with a breakdown of the minute in which they were posted:

The graph below represents the distribution of comments per minute from April 15 to April 18.

Crin Antonescu: the anomaly of April 7

Regarding Crin Antonescu’s account activity, we observe an unexpected peak of approximately 1,400 comments on April 7 (see graph above). On that day, Crin Antonescu records four posts. The candidate’s average is three posts per day, with an average of 58 comments. This anomaly, combined with the lack of corresponding peaks in likes or shares, follows the now familiar pattern of a potential comment injection. Detailed analysis of the content of these comments did not reveal an obvious linguistic pattern as in Ponta’s case.

Nicușor Dan’s “Poklonnik”: when the Kremlin steps in

In Nicușor Dan’s case, the account activity shows a peak of approximately 1,300 comments on April 11, near Victor Ponta’s post from April 15. The candidate’s average is approximately 4 posts per day, with an average of 301 comments. Compared to the other candidates analyzed later, we record a moderate and much more constant presence on Instagram. Also, there are repeated increases on other days: April 3 (602 comments) and 23 (387).

Analyzing the comments within Nicușor Dan’s posts, we identified over 25 comments in Russian on a single post. The comments from the post have no connection with supporting the candidate. These Russian comments were not expressions of political support, but apparently random statements disconnected from the post’s content—an unmistakable sign of automated implementation, not authentic engagement. Unlike Ponta’s Romanian language bot army, which attempted to mimic authentic local support, these Russian comments made no effort to disguise their foreign origin.

This pattern aligns with Nicușor Dan’s public complaints about coordinated attacks on his social media accounts from foreign sources—though, ironically, the data suggests these “attacks” might have been meant to artificially amplify his visibility, not undermine it.

The content of Russian comments includes phrases such as:

“Очень интересная публикация” (“Very interesting post”)
“Мне нравится ваш контент” (“I like your content”)
“Продолжайте делиться подобными постами” (“Continue to share such posts”)

These generic formulations, lacking references to the actual content of the post or the Romanian political context, represent a classic pattern of automatically generated comments, meant to create the illusion of engagement without investing in message personalization.

The translation and comments identified in posts can be viewed in the graph below:

The “normal” ones on Insta: Lasconi and Simion

George Simion and Elena Lasconi do not present anomalies present in the case of other candidates, maintaining a relatively constant and low level of comments. We have not identified major fluctuations, and the activity at first glance is organic. In George Simion’s case, we observe a much lower presence especially due to lack of posts – since the beginning of the electoral campaign, the candidate has posted only once an electoral material with 149 comments. Elena Lasconi has posted 68 times, with an average of approximately 3 posts per day and an average of 139 comments.

Analysis of presidential candidates’ Instagram activity highlights significant anomalies in the analysis period. The isolated character of peaks, especially for Victor Ponta and Nicușor Dan, corroborated with lack of long-term consistency, suggests the possibility of artificial interventions meant to influence public perception and amplify their messages.

The minute-by-minute distribution of comments and the steep decreases following peaks strengthen the suspicion of coordinated use of bots for artificial amplification of certain candidates’ visibility, compromising the integrity of the online electoral debate.

2. Likes

The graph highlights the dynamics of Instagram likes for the five presidential candidates from April 1-23, 2025. Data aggregated in this analysis are extracted from all posts of all analyzed candidates – all likes from candidates’ posts broken down by day. The following trends are observed:

The most obvious peaks of reactions are recorded in the case of candidate Nicușor Dan, observing approximately 8 peaks of increased likes. In the periods April 4-7, as well as 17-19, respectively April 12, we observe the first peaks that raise suspicions: posts from those days revolve around 100-150,000 likes. Between these periods, sudden decreases are visible, fluctuating between 2,000-50,000 likes. A new major jump that raises questions is recorded on April 22, when the candidate’s posts exceed 600,000 likes – a sixfold increase from his previous maximum point.

This extreme volatility contradicts organic engagement growth models, which tend to follow more gradual curves. Even organic viral content usually presents a period of acceleration and a long tail of sustained engagement, not abrupt crashes and inexplicable returns to increasingly higher peaks.

An unnatural plateau for Victor Ponta

Victor Ponta’s like pattern suggests a different amplification strategy: instead of dispersed peaks, he maintained a consistently unnatural plateau of 300,000-330,000 likes between April 17-21. Before and after this sustained “maximum,” his engagement crashed to 1,000-2,000 likes daily—suggesting a precisely timed, five-day amplification campaign.

This artificial consistency is just as suspicious as Dan’s volatility, but for opposite reasons: organic engagement always presents natural variations, and maintaining an almost perfect engagement plateau for five consecutive days, followed by a sudden crash to levels 100 times lower, strongly suggests programmatic intervention.

Other candidates: organic or just less artificial?

George Simion, Elena Lasconi, and Crin Antonescu present a similar pattern of activity regarding likes received on the Instagram platform. We observe that the three candidates record a reduced and constant volume of likes, without major fluctuations that could indicate artificial amplification. The daily average of likes is maintained at predictable values correlated with posting frequency, without the surprising peaks identified for other candidates. This consistency in interactions suggests organic audience behavior. In Crin Antonescu’s case, although he presents an unexpected peak in comments on April 7, the likes do not follow the same explosive trend, which strengthens the suspicion that the anomaly in the comments section could be the result of a coordinated intervention and not of naturally increased interest from the public.

These discrepancies between engagement models raise questions about the authenticity of interactions. Sudden increases followed by drastic decreases in the cases of Nicușor Dan and Victor Ponta may suggest the use of artificial amplification mechanisms – either bots or intensive paid promotion campaigns. In contrast, the relative stability of the other candidates likely indicates an organic presence, albeit with limited impact. We also reiterate that likes cannot be verified due to platform restrictions in the case of Reels videos.

TikTok

In what follows, you will be able to observe increases in accounts on the TikTok platform broken down by days (April 1-23), fluctuations of increases and decreases among interactions (especially unexpected peaks and abrupt decreases), as well as other data about likes, views, shares, and followers appearing overnight.

How active are the candidates on TikTok?

On the platform, activity varies dramatically between candidates:

Victor Ponta: Leads the pack by far with 107 posts (4.7 daily)
Elena Lasconi and Silviu Predoiu: Tied for second place with 52 posts each
Crin Antonescu and Nicușor Dan: Moderate presence with 43 and 42 posts respectively
Cristian Terheș and Sebastian Popescu: 37 posts each
Lavinia Șandru: 30 posts
Digital minimalists: Banu Mușcel (14 posts) and George Simion (12 posts)

This distribution of content volume reflects different strategies for approaching the platform: while Ponta has adopted a saturation strategy, posting almost five times a day, Simion has chosen a minimal presence, suggesting either a strategic allocation of resources to other platforms or a difficulty in adapting his communication style to TikTok’s short and visual format.

The discrepancy is significant also because it suggests fundamental differences in resource allocation for digital content production: Ponta and Lasconi seem to have invested significantly in digital production teams capable of generating large volumes of TikTok-optimized content, while other candidates seem to treat the platform as a secondary channel.

1. Follower Factory: which candidates became “famous” almost overnight

The cases that stand out on TikTok are those of Victor Ponta and Nicușor Dan. Unexpected overnight peaks are recorded here as well, with Victor Ponta having the most visible increase in followers on April 22, with 35,101 new followers. Notable increases begin on April 20, with 12,295 followers, followed by April 21 with 25,369 followers. The amplifications are not constant before and after this interval, recording on other days a constant number of approximately 1,000 followers per day, with an exception on April 23 with 11,312 new followers.

In Nicușor Dan’s case, we recorded a notable increase on April 20, with 13,893 new followers and on April 23 with an increase of 10,064 followers. As in Victor Ponta’s case, the other values remain around 1-2,000 new followers.

We used a linguistic detection model to analyze 9000 account names following Victor Ponta’s page and another 9000 following Nicușor Dan’s page. You can see the language distribution in the graph below.

Accounts interacting with Victor Ponta’s page show a higher frequency of foreign languages compared to those of Nicușor Dan – for example, over 530 accounts appear to use the Turkish language in Ponta’s case, compared to approximately 500 for Nicușor.

Comparative analysis of linguistic profiles reveals distinct patterns for each candidate, suggesting possible different providers of amplification services:

Ponta’s accounts show a greater concentration (32%) in the Turkish-Arabic-Indonesian linguistic group, typical for account farms in the Middle East and Southeast Asia.
Dan’s accounts show a stronger presence (28%) of Chinese and Vietnamese names, indicating possible connections with providers from East Asia.

The presence of these languages – which are not particularly spoken by the Romanian electorate – raises suspicions about the authenticity of some of the followers. Disparities appear predominantly in categories frequently associated with fake or purchased accounts that are automatically generated, suggesting the possibility that some of these profiles are artificial, created to give the impression of popularity or influence in the online environment.

Other candidates: more modest, but still suspicious (analysis without including Nicușor Dan and Victor Ponta)

Analysis of the graph regarding the evolution of presidential candidates’ followers (excluding Nicușor Dan and Victor Ponta) reveals several significant trends in April 2025:

Crin Antonescu records the most dramatic evolution in the graph, with a significant increase on April 20, when he reaches almost 3,000 new followers in a single day. This sudden jump is all the more surprising as in the rest of the monitored period, his profile maintains slow growth, under 500 followers daily. The fact that this explosion coincides with similar increases observed for Victor Ponta and Nicușor Dan on the same day suggests a coordinated phenomenon or a specific context that catalyzed simultaneous growth for multiple candidates.

Elena Lasconi stands out as the second most visible presence in the graph, showing constant growth peaks around April 16, when she reaches almost 1,000 new followers. Her evolution is more balanced than Antonescu’s, with periods of sustained growth alternating with intervals of stability.

George Simion shows a notable peak at the beginning of the monitored period (about 1,300 followers on April 1) and another moderate peak around April 9-10 (approximately 600 followers).

For Popescu Sebastian-Constantin, Predoiu Silviu, Sandru Marcela-Lavinia, Banu-Muscel John-Ion, and Terheș Cristian-Vasile, the graph indicates modest activity, with fluctuations between 100-500 followers daily, without peaks suggesting moments of major impact or successful digital campaigns.

Correlating these data with other observations from the online campaign, a possible synchronization of sudden increases is noted, which raises questions about the authenticity of these evolutions. In particular, the April 20 peak for Antonescu presents the typical characteristics of artificial growth, similar to those previously identified in the comment analysis.

2. Views: the attention economy

Victor Ponta’s TikTok show

Victor Ponta dominated the TikTok audience, reaching sustained visibility with peaks of 1.6 million daily views between April 10-14. His content maintained over 1 million daily views for about a week before gradually decreasing to 328,809 views by April 22.

This sustained high visibility, followed by a sudden decrease, suggests either a paid promotion strategy limited in time or the typical bell-shaped curve of algorithmic favor on the platform.

Content analysis shows that the posts with the most views were predominantly clips with high emotional impact, focused on nationalist themes and anti-establishment messages, optimized for the TikTok algorithm that favors content with high retention and engagement rates.

Visibility of other candidates: growth peaks for George Simion, Elena Lasconi, and Nicușor Dan

In this graph, visibility is fragmented among multiple candidates, excluding Victor Ponta’s views. Nicușor Dan records constant peaks, reaching over 600,000 views on April 11 and again on April 19. Elena Lasconi has a moderate presence, with a notable maximum of approximately 600,000 views on April 17. George Simion’s presence is inconsistent, having fluctuations of increase and decrease in the number of views from day to day. The rest of the candidates remain below the threshold of 200,000 daily views, with reduced variations and limited visibility.

III. Likes – how appreciated are the candidates by the electorate?

Nicușor Dan records the highest peak of likes from the analyzed period, exceeding 150,000 in a single day, on April 22. Between April 19 and 22, an accelerated increase is noted, indicating a moment of massive online mobilization. Victor Ponta follows closely, with a maximum of over 140,000 likes on April 21, in a sustained upward trend. Elena Lasconi maintains a constant rhythm, with daily values of up to 50,000 likes. George Simion reaches a peak of over 80,000 around April 10, but has a steep decrease below zero on April 16, possibly as a result of content withdrawals.

IV. Shares – how shared are the electoral messages?

Looking strictly at Nicușor Dan’s share line from the graph, we observe an extremely unusual pattern. His activity is practically non-existent or minimal over almost the entire analyzed period, with the exception of a single day – April 15 – when he records a spectacular peak of approximately 200,000 shares. In contrast, all other candidates maintain very reduced levels of shares throughout the entire analyzed period, with values that rarely exceed 10,000 daily shares.

Victor Ponta shows a small peak at the beginning of the period (April 1-2), but the values remain modest compared to Nicușor Dan’s high performance. George Simion and the other candidates maintain an almost flat profile regarding shares, without notable moments of virality.

How does the graph behave in the absence of data about Nicușor Dan and Victor Ponta

The graph below provides a clear image of content shares generated by other candidates, after eliminating those with the highest share peaks (Nicușor Dan and Victor Ponta).

Elena Lasconi has a peak on April 16, with over 4,000 shares, which places her at the top of this sample. She is the only one who reaches this threshold in the analyzed period. Crin Antonescu and George Simion are constantly present, with several days in which they exceed 1,000 shares, especially around April 5-10 and April 11-15. Sebastian-Constantin Popescu records an isolated peak on April 22, exceeding 2,000 shares, a sign that he had a post or appearance that attracted a lot of attention in a short time. The other candidates (Șandru, Banu-Muscel, Predoiu, Terheș) remain at a low level, most having under 500 shares/day, without notable peaks.

V. Engagement – how active are candidates with their online communities?

The graph shows that Nicușor Dan is the only candidate who records extreme engagement peaks, reaching values close to 1 (i.e., almost one interaction per view) on April 16 and 22. The absence of any other relevant engagement signal on the same days for other candidates and the sudden character of these maximums may suggest possible inauthentic activity or coordinated behavior, indicating a possible artificial amplification of interactions.

Engagement – how does the image look without data about Nicușor Dan

Banu Muscel John Ion records the highest positive engagement peak, exceeding 10,000 on April 6. George Simion also marks the steepest decrease, going below -15,000 on April 18, which may signal a negative reaction campaign or withdrawn content. Elena Lasconi and Victor Ponta record several days with consistently positive engagement, but at lower values. In general, engagement remains low for most candidates, with punctual variations, indicating moderate public involvement outside isolated peaks.

Facebook

How active are the candidates on Facebook?

In the analyzed interval, Victor Ponta stood out through the most intense online presence among all candidates, accumulating 157 posts. In the platform activity hierarchy, he is followed by Crin Antonescu, who published 108 posts, and Nicușor Dan, with 104 posts. Elena Lasconi maintained a balanced presence on Facebook, with 88 posts, while George Simion is noteworthy for the lowest activity, totaling only 25 posts. In Simion’s case, as also noted on other platforms, a tendency to diminish online activity in favor of offline activity during the electoral campaign is observed.

1. Likes

In the period April 1-23, 2024, the Facebook likes graph shows significant differences between the analyzed candidates:

George Simion leads decisively in terms of likes, recording impressive peaks of over 90,000 reactions on April 3. Victor Ponta is in second position with notable performances, frequently accumulating between 60,000-80,000 likes, with a particularly active period between April 5-13. Nicușor Dan and Crin Antonescu present a more stable and moderate engagement pattern, consistently maintaining in the range of 20,000-50,000 likes, with a visible improvement after April 10. Elena Lasconi, with the lowest level of interaction, but with certain moments such as April 10 and April 16.

2. Comments

The graph below illustrates the daily number of comments received by presidential candidates on Facebook, over a 23-day interval:

Victor Ponta has a very clear peak on April 10, with over 35,000 comments in a single day. George Simion is consistently present in the top, with several days in which he exceeds 15,000 – 25,000 comments, especially on April 3, 10, and 20. Crin Antonescu has a significant increase between April 10 and 15, reaching a peak of over 30,000 comments, similar to that of Simion and Ponta. Nicușor Dan recorded his most intense moment of engagement on April 4 with over 22,000 comments, followed by high performances on April 11 and 14 (18,000 comments) and significant levels on April 6, 10, and 13 (13,000-17,000 comments). Elena Lasconi is consistent at a low level, rarely exceeding 5,000 comments per day, except for April 10.

3. Shares

The graph below highlights an abnormal peak of shares recorded by Nicușor Dan on April 14 and 15, when the number of shares suddenly exceeded 100,000 – a significant jump compared to the rest of the period, where values were constant and modest (under 10,000/day).

The graph below shows content distribution for the other four politicians analyzed, after excluding the extreme values generated by Nicușor Dan.

In the absence of the exceptional peak generated by Nicușor Dan, a much more balanced distribution between candidates is observed. George Simion seems to benefit from an active supporter base in propagating messages, while Crin Antonescu occasionally manages to reach moments of high visibility. Elena Lasconi’s activity is limited, which may reflect a more discreet campaign or a more passive audience regarding content redistribution.

Conclusions: the digital democracy deficit

Our analysis reveals disturbing evidence of coordinated inauthentic behavior in the social media presences of multiple candidates. The patterns documented here—from impossibly synchronized growth spikes to suspicious comment content and abnormal engagement ratios—suggest deliberate manipulation of Romania’s digital political discourse.

These findings parallel the documented manipulation during the 2024 elections, indicating that the lessons of Călin Georgescu’s algorithmically assisted rise have been thoroughly absorbed by the current list of candidates. The difference is not in tactics, but in their widespread adoption—what was once an anomaly has become standard campaign practice.

In the digital age, popularity can be bought, not earned—but the receipt always appears in the data. As Romania approaches a crucial election, voters deserve transparency about whether the online momentum they observe represents authentic public sentiment or manufactured consensus.

The platforms themselves bear significant responsibility for addressing these vulnerabilities. Without improved detection and deterrence of coordinated inauthentic behavior, social media risks becoming not a digital public square, but a bazaar where political visibility is available to the highest bidder.

Consequences for democracy and the electoral process

The implications of these findings go beyond simple manipulation of social media algorithms:

Distortion of public perception: Artificial amplification creates a false impression of popularity and momentum for certain candidates, potentially influencing undecided voters who tend to be attracted to candidates perceived as viable or popular.
Undermining authentic debate: Conversations dominated by artificial comments replace authentic debate about policies and visions, impoverishing the quality of democratic discourse.
Digital arms race: When one candidate adopts such tactics, others feel pressured to follow suit, leading to a spiral of artificial amplification that normalizes manipulation as standard campaign practice.
Erosion of trust: The disclosure of these practices risks further eroding public trust in the democratic process and in the authenticity of any form of political support expressed online.

Continuous monitoring

We will continue monitoring these patterns until election day, for both rounds of the presidential elections, providing updates as new data becomes available. In particular, we will follow:

The evolution of amplification patterns near the voting date
Potential strategy changes in response to public exposure of these tactics
Correlations between digital amplification and real-world campaign events
Potential intensification of manipulation tactics in the last week before the vote

In an already fragile information climate and with public trust in institutions at low levels, the integrity of the digital campaign space is not a luxury, but a necessity for an authentic electoral process.

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