With Bulgaria’s parliamentary elections on 19 April 2026 approaching, this briefing documents the active narrative pressure and infrastructure risks identified throughout February and March 2026.
The briefing maps the operational behaviour of Bulgaria’s domestic disinformation amplification ecosystem, tracking how pro-Kremlin content is flooded, laundered from fringe to mainstream discourse, and strategically amplified across platforms. Key findings include the rapid activation of the Pravda network around the seizure of Ukrainian assets in Hungary, the systemic republication of content from EU-sanctioned Russian entities, and the demonstrated effectiveness of Telegram as a high-reach distribution layer with 51% of Pogled Info’s reposted videos accounting for nearly 88% of its total monthly reach. The briefing also examines the “Petrohan” case as a live example of narrative laundering from fringe outlets into parliamentary discourse.
Structural vulnerabilities identified include content-flooding capacity, sanctions enforcement gaps, and the under-monitoring of TikTok and short-form video platforms. The briefing is designed as an executive risk update and does not assess the accuracy of political statements, focusing instead on how narratives move and gain traction through documented amplification infrastructure.