This report was published by BROD, one of fifteen EDMO Hubs.
Executive Summary
The parliamentary elections held on September 28, 2025, in the Republic of Moldova shows us a new stage in the transformation of democracy in the digital age. At the polling stations, things went surprisingly well–citizens were able to vote in optimal conditions, the systems worked, and classic fraud such as “stolen ballots” or “padded ballot boxes” was practically absent. This is good news and deserves recognition: the Republic of Moldova organizes logistically fair elections. But this technical achievement hides a deeper challenge. The fairness of election day no longer matters so much when the real battle for citizens’ opinions was fought months earlier, in another place.
That “other place” is the digital space, where a manipulation campaign has been unfolding that makes everything we have seen before seem rudimentary. We are not talking about random fake posts or improvised bots. We are talking about Orthodox priests methodically trained in Moscow and paid to build religious propaganda networks on Telegram. We are talking about hundreds of fake accounts activated in a coordinated manner to simulate popular support. We are talking about entire cloned news sites that, once blocked, reappear under different domains within hours. We are talking about deepfakes that are becoming increasingly difficult to distinguish from reality. The problem is not just that these tactics exist–the problem deepens when social media platforms systematically amplify them, and the reaction often comes too late, when the goal of reaching millions of views has already been achieved. The Republic of Moldova has become a laboratory for testing the future of democratic elections: a future in which election day is fair, but the elections are already manipulated months in advance by social media algorithms.
However, what is noteworthy and constitutes the main set of good practices that Romanian authorities in particular must take into account is institutional communication both before and during the electoral process, with real-time updates on election day. Proactive communication and the reduction of the risks of fraud and electoral manipulation were the basis for building a framework of trust between the state and its citizens, given the constant justification of the measures taken by the authorities to protect electoral integrity, even if these measures were sometimes harsh on the political candidates in this election. We believe that this model of open communication with citizens has led to a common understanding within society of these measures to exclude electoral competitors who have violated electoral law and to sanction illegal practices. Furthermore, clearly communicating the penalties and explaining in plain language the legal risks that citizens face by getting involved in networks of electoral interference and manipulation ultimately discouraged these practices and reduced violations of the law. This electoral experience provides an opportunity to learn and implement measures in Romania that can reduce polarization and radicalization and, last but not least, fill the information gap often filled by malicious actors who have a clear goal during the election period and beyond: to erode trust in democratic processes.