IN THIS EDITION
ON THE RISE
Weekly Watch of Emerging Disinformation Risks
EDMO defending election integrity via the RRS: True transparency and censorship nonsense
The Rapid Response System (RRS) of the EU’s Code of Practice on Disinformation (now the Code of Conduct on Disinformation) is a cooperation and communication mechanism that enables the rapid sharing of information between online platforms and non-platform stakeholders during elections. Its purpose is to identify and discuss potentially harmful disinformation trends that could threaten the integrity of electoral processes in the EU.
Clearly, it is not an instrument of censorship. Any decision about removing, labeling, or downgrading content is entirely up to the platforms. It is their responsibility, and no one else’s.
Until recently, however, RRS’s nature and functioning were not entirely clear to the public, because social media platforms insisted on sharing as little information as possible outside the Taskforce of the Code of Practice, whose activities and discussions are covered by confidentiality. This uncertainty created a grey area where legitimate concerns, unfounded speculation, and outright lies thrived.
In particular, the ongoing disinformation campaign by the U.S. administration, and specifically by the House Judiciary Committee chaired by Jim Jordan, about the EU’s regulation of the information space (the Code of Practice but also the Digital Services Act, or DSA) benefited from the lack of sufficient, clear, and publicly available information. The attacks from across the Atlantic prompted civil society organisations that are members of the Code of Practice Taskforce to take a firmer stance and call for greater transparency and accountability.
This push has led to more information about the RRS becoming publicly available and, for EDMO, to the drafting of strict guidelines that ensure, among other things, a better use of the RRS, more closely aligned with journalistic standards.
The EDMO guidelines provide, regarding the transparent use of the RRS, that the EDMO Hubs involved should publicly announce their participation in the system and explain what it is and what it does; that the notifications sent to platforms should also be published on EDMO websites; and that, after the vote, an ex post analysis of the RRS’s performance (how many notifications were sent, to whom, how many received feedback from the platforms, and what kind of feedback was received, etc.) should be published on EDMO websites. These recommendations—and others not specifically related to the RRS, but concerning the publication of analytical content before, during, and after the elections—were followed, for example, during the Hungarian, Maltese, and Cypriot elections and facilitated a more transparent use of the RRS, as well as more consistent monitoring of the electoral cycle.
The nature and scope of the RRS should not be misinterpreted, even now that more information is publicly available. The work of civil society organisations within the RRS cannot compensate for the deficiencies of platforms in ensuring compliance with EU and national laws and regulations, as well as with the platforms’ own policies. The RRS is primarily useful for testing the performance of the platforms, highlighting shortcomings, and providing the platforms themselves and the EU institutions with useful information to address these issues (where there is the political will) and improve future performance. This objective should be pursued with particular determination ahead of the busy electoral year of 2027, when France, Italy, Spain, Poland, and many other EU countries will hold major elections.
Before these elections take place, and before disinformation about the EU, the DSA, the Code of Practice, and the RRS is spread by a variety of actors (both domestic and foreign), it is important to underline once again that analyzing online content, providing evidence, and informing the public – together with institutions, platforms, and other stakeholders – is the opposite of censorship. It is about adding information, not removing it.
ZOOM-IN
A Closer Look at Cases Detected by the EDMO Network
The following analysis and fact-checking articles offer a closer look at how electoral disinformation unfolds in practice. The most recent investigations from MedDMO and NORDIS illustrate some of the forms electoral information manipulation can take – coordinated domestic influence operations in Malta and Russian disinformation targeting upcoming länder elections in Germany – confirming the broader cross-country patterns identified by EDMO in its analysis of the past elections in Hungary, Bulgaria, Malta and Cyprus. They also demonstrate how transparent monitoring and evidence-sharing through the Rapid Response System strengthens public understanding of electoral threats without restricting lawful online speech.
A comparative analysis of electoral disinformation in Hungary, Bulgaria, Cyprus and Malta
Four general elections across Hungary, Bulgaria, Cyprus and Malta revealed distinct but increasingly sophisticated information battlegrounds, according to EDMO’s analysis of the Spring 2026 electoral cycle. While each country faced unique vulnerabilities, a common pattern emerged: electoral manipulation has shifted away from isolated falsehoods towards coordinated campaigns combining artificial intelligence, opaque political advertising, algorithmic amplification and operational capabilities of foreign actors.
Hungary experienced the most extensive manipulation, with AI-generated propaganda, coordinated fake social media networks and Russian-linked influence operations supporting pro-government narratives. Bulgaria, by contrast, saw limited AI use but extensive coordinated activity on Telegram and pro-Kremlin campaigns designed to undermine trust in democratic institutions rather than promote specific parties. Cyprus faced a mixture of domestic political disinformation, anonymous advertising networks and Chinese state-backed influence, while Malta’s largely domestic campaigns centred on AI-generated content, misleading political advertising and polarising rhetoric.
The analysis also found that internationally recognisable narratives spread easily across borders, whereas locally focused controversies remained confined to national audiences. Across all four elections, social media platforms emerged as critical vulnerabilities, with inadequate advertising transparency, limited researcher access to platform data and largely reactive content moderation hampering oversight. EDMO concludes that safeguarding future elections will require stronger political advertising transparency, improved data access for researchers, clearer Digital Services Act enforcement standards and closer cooperation between platforms, regulators and civil society.
Russian campaign spreads false claims in videos impersonating well-known media ahead of German elections
Nordis’ article reports that German authorities have identified a Russian-linked disinformation campaign aimed at influencing the upcoming state election in Saxony-Anhalt. Since early July, the campaign has circulated fabricated claims about candidates from the Greens, CDU, SPD and Die Linke through short videos distributed by a coordinated bot network on X. To make the content appear credible, the videos misuse the logos and branding of well-known German media outlets, including Süddeutsche Zeitung, FAZ, Spiegel TV and Die Zeit. Germany’s domestic intelligence agency (BfV) says the operation represents unlawful foreign information manipulation intended to affect the election outcome.
Notably, the far-right AfD has reportedly not been targeted by false stories, potentially allowing it to benefit indirectly. Authorities believe the activity forms part of the long-running Russian influence campaign known as “Operation Matryoshka”, which seeks to amplify fabricated content by prompting journalists and media organisations to investigate or inadvertently spread it. Police are investigating those responsible, while experts warn that such campaigns increasingly exploit trusted media brands to undermine confidence in democratic elections and public information.
Operation Apostle: An Influence Operation Targeting Malta’s 2026 General Election
Following its initial investigation last May, MedDMO has carried out a deeper analysis of the “Operation Apostle”, a coordinated online influence campaign that allegedly sought to shape public opinion ahead of Malta’s general election in May 2026. Researchers identified a network of interconnected websites, Facebook pages and online domains that appeared shortly before the election and consistently promoted narratives favourable to the governing Labour Party while attacking the opposition Nationalist Party. The operation combined AI-assisted content with locally informed messaging, suggesting human oversight rather than fully automated production.
Investigators found links between sites such as Appostli, Good Morning Malta and other recently registered domains, which recycled news content, amplified partisan themes and purchased social media advertisements using obscure payment identities. The report highlights evidence of coordinated behaviour, including suspicious engagement patterns and troll-like activity, while noting that definitive attribution remains unproven. It argues that the campaign illustrates how sophisticated influence operations can blend authentic political discourse with manipulated content, making detection more difficult. The authors call for greater transparency in online political advertising, stronger platform enforcement, and continued monitoring of coordinated disinformation campaigns to protect electoral integrity and public trust in democratic processes.
GLOBAL PULSE
Disinformation narratives shaping the world’s conversations
Iran Damaged US Bases in the Middle East, but Claims of Total Destruction Are Overstated
Posts circulating online claimed that 27 US military bases in the Middle East had been reduced to ashes by Iranian attacks. The Romanian fact-check found this to be partly false: Iranian strikes did cause significant damage to US military facilities, but not on the scale suggested by viral claims.
Available satellite imagery and media reporting indicate that several bases and military assets were hit, forcing relocations and disrupting operations in parts of the region. However, the evidence points to damaged infrastructure and equipment rather than the complete destruction of dozens of bases. The misleading posts combined real military setbacks with exaggerated figures and unsupported claims, including unrelated allegations about a Romanian military helicopter incident.
Misleading Maps Exaggerate Russian Gains in Ukraine
Social media posts claimed that Russia had made its largest territorial advances in months, citing analysis by the battlefield mapping project DeepState. However, the posts selectively reported only part of the findings. According to the fact‑check by The Journal, DeepState’s assessment noted Russian gains in June but also found that, once Ukrainian advances were taken into account, Russia had lost more ground than it gained overall.
The claims spread widely on social media, using dramatic headlines and imagery to suggest a significant shift in battlefield momentum. Yet the source they cited reached a different conclusion: for the second consecutive month, Russian territorial losses outweighed its gains.
Heatwave Conspiracies Blame Solar Flares Instead of Climate Change
As record temperatures swept across Europe and North America, viral social media posts claimed that the heat was caused by solar flares, solar storms, or even directed-energy technologies, rather than climate change. Some of the content was also circulated in AI-generated formats.
Scientists reject these claims. While solar flares are real bursts of energy from the Sun, experts explain that they do not affect temperatures at Earth’s surface and cannot produce the kind of heatwaves seen in 2026. The viral posts repurpose genuine scientific concepts and present them out of context, offering solar activity as an alternative explanation for extreme weather despite the scientific consensus linking worsening heatwaves to greenhouse-gas emissions and climate change.
World Cup Match Revives Falklands Sovereignty Debate
Ahead of the 2026 World Cup semi‑final between Argentina and England, an exchange on social media between Argentine Foreign Minister Pablo Quirno and former Thatcher adviser Nile Gardiner reignited debate over the Falkland Islands/Malvinas. Gardiner argued that the sovereignty question was settled by the 1982 war, while Quirno pointed to a UN resolution adopted after the conflict that treats the dispute as unresolved and subject to negotiation.
Days later, after Argentina defeated England, players celebrated with a banner reading “Las Malvinas son Argentinas” (“The Malvinas are Argentine”), prompting calls in the UK for a FIFA investigation and renewing international attention to the dispute. The discussion fed into a broader debate about President Javier Milei’s foreign policy. While Milei’s government has sought closer relations with the UK, it has also continued Argentina’s longstanding sovereignty claim through international organisations.
ON A DIFFERENT NOTE
The European Parliament welcomes the work of the Media Literacy Expert Group and the European Digital Media Observatory (EDMO), and their important role in bringing together policymakers, researchers and practitioners to build a multidisciplinary community of experts, share best practices and enhance awareness
Paolo Cesarini, Editorial Director
Tommaso Canetta, Editor-in Chief
Editorial Staff include Elena Coden, Paula Gori, Elena Maggi
This edition draws in part on automated translation and reflects information available as of 23 July 2026. Later developments may not be included.
The Weekly Pulse takes a summer break and will return on 27 August. We wish all our readers a restful summer and look forward to reconnecting after the break.
