May 2026 Overview of Emerging Disinformation Trends

This text has been published as part of the second edition of the new monthly EDMO Signals & Noise newsletter. Sign up here to receive future editions directly to your inbox.

Author: Paolo Cesarini, Chair of the Executive Board, European Digital Media Observatory (EDMO)

The disinformation ecosystem is evolving at extraordinary speed. In our previous monthly Overview, we identified a significant surge in war-related disinformation during March 2026, accompanied by a sharp rise in AI-generated manipulation and mounting concerns over the vulnerability of European electoral systems, particularly  in Hungary and Bulgaria. According to the latest EDMO Fact-Checking Brief (see figure below), the conflict involving the United States, Israel, and Iran remained the most recurrent target of information manipulations. However, its share of overall detected disinformation fell dramatically from 39% in March to 11% in April, as the focus shifted toward other geopolitical and social fault lines with sizeable increases in disinformation activity around the war in Ukraine (+4%) and migration-related issues (+3%).

With media attention partially diverting from the Middle East war, other events have taken the headlines: violent incidents, health scares, migration debates, Orban’s electoral defeat and its consequences on sanctions against Russia and economic support to Kyiv, have emerged as new information frontlines. In this evolving scenario, several interconnected patterns can be gathered from the last four Weekly Pulse editions:

• Normalization of conspiracy thinking, including a resurgence of pandemic-style conspiracies,
• Weaponization of identity politics,
• Smear campaigns targeting political opponents,
• Industrial-scale dissemination of AI-generated content,
• Growing monetization of outrage and fear.

The Mainstreaming of Conspiracy Narratives

The shooting at the White House Correspondents’ Dinner in April 2026 – the third attack against Donald Trump in two years – immediately generated waves of online speculation claiming the incident had been “staged” or constituted a “false flag” operation. These theories appeared within minutes after the event and spread rapidly across X, Reddit, TikTok, and fringe forums, illustrating how conspiracy thinking has become a default interpretative lens for many digital communities. Increasingly, users appear less inclined to wait for verified information and more likely to assume hidden manipulation or orchestrated political motives. Significantly, suspicion surrounding the Trump attacks was amplified by influencers from both right-wing and left-wing spheres, particularly on Reddit, highlighting a broader collapse in trust toward traditional media and official sources rather than any consistent ideological agenda.

At the same time, the hantavirus outbreak aboard the cruise ship MV Hondius revealed how rapidly Covid-era conspiracy ecosystems can reactivate in response to new public health emergencies. EDMO identified the rapid re-emergence of familiar narratives in early May: claims that governments were preparing new lockdowns, accusations that pharmaceutical companies were engineering crises for profit, allegations of covert bioweapons programs, and renewed “plandemic” theories. Prominent online figures revived familiar disinformation tactics, including the promotion of ivermectin and other unverified treatments – sometimes for personal economic gain – despite scientific evidence showing no effectiveness against hantavirus.

What stands out is the modularity of these conspiracies. Researchers increasingly describe them as “plug-and-play” frameworks in which pre-existing narrative templates can be rapidly attached to any emerging crisis. Covid-19 pandemic did not merely trigger a temporary wave of disinformation but rather created a durable emotional and psychological trauma rooted in fear, uncertainty, memories of lockdowns. Interestingly, the latter recently morphed into an “energy lockdown” variant at a moment of heightened public concern over the Middle East war and the double blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, with rising energy costs and fears of inflation fuelling false claims whereby the European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen would have urged Europeans to “stay at home” in response to the crisis.

Migration, Violence, and Identity-Based Disinformation

In the same vein, crimes allegedly involving migrants or ethnic minorities continue to support xenophobic narratives and are routinely reframed as evidence of broader demographic threats. In turn, this feeds into the old “great replacement” conspiracy theory – claiming that political elites are deliberately replacing native European populations through mass migration.

A tragedy in Modena, Italy, involving a mentally ill Italian citizen of Moroccan origin who drove into a crowd on May 16th, is the latest example of how complex events such as street crimes, crowd killings and other acts of violence are simplified into anti-immigration propaganda. This is a recurring problematic phenomenon. Something similar happened on May 4th in Leipzig, Germany, where a man – wrongly identified as an Afghan or Syrian refugee – drove his car into a crowd, and in Spain, where a woman underwent euthanasia due to irreversible injuries from a suicide attempt that she committed after having been victim of a sexual assault falsely attributed to minor migrants. The latter story spread widely online and was amplified by right-wing political figures during debates about migrant regularization policies enacted by Pedro Sanchez’s government last April. Such events are used to justify calls for stricter immigration controls and harsher security measures, while simultaneously contributing to significant increases in online hate speech and, in some cases, real-world violence against minority groups and migrants.

The consequences extend beyond rhetoric. EDMO’s monitoring reveals increasing harassment campaigns against NGOs, migrant-support organizations, and human rights groups. In Ireland, for instance, many nonprofit organizations assisting migrants recently reported coordinated abuse campaigns, severe enough to force reductions in their social media visibility and enhanced security measures for their staff. Beyond migration, similar narratives have increasingly been redirected toward other marginalized groups, including transgender communities, while also feeding the growth of a global “true crime” digital subculture. Together, these developments demonstrate how conspiratorial thinking has become deeply embedded within contemporary culture wars.

Character Assassination as Geopolitical Strategy

Rather than directly debating policies or military developments, disinformation campaigns often rely on personal attacks aimed at discrediting public figures through fabricated scandals, false associations, or insinuations of moral corruption. EDMO monitoring shows that pro-Russian networks have kept circulating false claims portraying Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky as morally compromised or corrupt. Similar tactics have targeted a growing number of European political figures, including Emmanuel Macron, Péter Magyar, and Ursula von der Leyen. EDMO research further indicates that smear campaigns have become a recurring feature of electoral environments in countries such as Malta, Germany, Hungary, and Cyprus.

These tactics are particularly effective because emotional attacks on personal integrity often resonate more strongly than factual political arguments. Even when disproven, reputational damage can persist long after false claims are debunked. Allegations surrounding corruption in Ukraine, for instance, gain traction because they intersect with public concerns in several EU countries about the cost of the economic and military support provided to Kyjv. More broadly, the personalization of disinformation reflects deeper structural changes in political communication, where digital attention economies increasingly reward emotionally charged narratives centred on individuals rather than complex policy debates.

AI-Generated Disinformation and “Slopaganda”

Although the proportion of AI-generated disinformation declined from 20% to 14% between April and May 2026, the phenomenon remains highly influential across political communication, electoral campaigns, and war-related propaganda. During Malta’s 2026 election campaign, EDMO documented the growing spread of what researchers now describe as “slopaganda”: mass-produced AI-generated memes, videos, and synthetic content designed less to persuade than to provoke ridicule, outrage, and viral engagement.

This marks a significant transformation in the nature of propaganda itself. Traditional disinformation campaigns often required coordination, ideological framing, and relatively sophisticated fabrication techniques. Today, AI systems allow the rapid industrial production of emotionally manipulative content at minimal cost. Quantity increasingly outweighs quality. Individual users, influencers, and anonymous accounts can now generate convincing synthetic material with limited technical expertise, while even poorly produced content can shape public narratives through constant repetition and algorithmic amplification.

Monetization and the Economics of Disinformation

EDMO has repeatedly stressed that many actors spreading conspiracies are motivated not only – or not always – by ideology, but also by profit. Social media monetization systems reward engagement regardless of accuracy. Outrage, fear, and conspiracy content often generate higher interaction rates than factual reporting, creating strong financial incentives for disinformation entrepreneurs. “Blue-check” amplification systems such as those adopted by X, algorithmic recommendation engines, influencer subscriptions, advertising revenue, and viral engagement all contribute to an economy where sensational falsehoods become profitable business models. This monetized ecosystem fundamentally changes the scale of the problem. Disinformation is no longer merely a political weapon or ideological project; it is increasingly a commercial venture.

Conclusion

The cumulative effect of the developments observed during the month of May confirms a disinformation environment that is faster, more adaptive, and more emotionally driven than at any previous stage. Conspiracy narratives are no longer confined to fringe communities but are increasingly integrated into mainstream online discourse, amplified by algorithmic systems that reward emotional intensity over factual accuracy. At the same time, the growing accessibility of AI tools and the financial incentives embedded within digital platforms are accelerating the phenomenon on a global scale.

Addressing these challenges requires coordinated efforts involving governments, researchers, technology platforms, media and civil society organizations, including fact-checkers. Without stronger safeguards, improved media literacy, and greater accountability within digital ecosystems, disinformation risks becoming not simply a recurring feature of online life, but a permanent structural force undermining democratic debate and public trust.