Executive Summary

The Moldovan parliamentary elections of September 28 face unprecedented Russian interference, with Moscow deploying an estimated €100 million investment through cryptocurrency transfers, deepfake technology, and coordinated bot networks to derail the country’s EU accession trajectory.

Three critical threats stand out:

• Financial manipulation: Over 130,000 Moldovans have received direct payments via the “Taito” app for anti-EU activities, representing the largest documented vote-buying system in European election monitoring.
• Escalation of the information war: Russian networks are now deploying AI-generated deepfakes and cross-platform bot coordination, marking a technological escalation beyond traditional propaganda methods.
• Attempts at institutional capture: Pro-Moscow forces seek to exploit the narrow 50.4% outcome of the EU referendum to claim an illegitimate mandate and reverse accession negotiations.

Immediate risk assessment: HIGH. Current intelligence indicates that Russia views Moldova as a decisive test case for blocking EU enlargement. Failure to counter these operations risks not only Moldova’s democratic trajectory but also sets a dangerous precedent for interference in Ukraine’s future EU bid and in other Eastern Partnership states.

Implications for EU policy: European institutions must treat Moldova as an active laboratory of hybrid warfare requiring enhanced election monitoring, accelerated cooperation in cyber defense, and contingency planning for post-election destabilization scenarios.

1. Introduction

The period 2023 to 2025 stands as one of the most decisive moments in the modern history of the Republic of Moldova. The country has been at the center of a major geopolitical confrontation between Western and Russian influence, a position that has generated intense pressure on society and democratic institutions.

The war in Ukraine has fundamentally altered the regional security equation. The conflict unfolding at Moldova’s borders has created a climate of acute vulnerability within Moldovan society, offering an ideal context for exploiting fears through disinformation campaigns. The war has served both as a catalyst for accelerating Moldova’s European path and as a pretext for intensifying Moscow’s hybrid pressures.

Moldova’s European integration process has been the second major strategic factor. Obtaining EU candidate status in June 2022, followed by the official opening of accession negotiations in December 2023, marked a paradigmatic shift in the country’s geopolitical orientation. This process generated hope among supporters of European integration, but also strong resistance from those who perceive this direction as a threat to national independence and identity.

The state’s internal vulnerabilities have been systematically exploited. The separatist region of Transnistria, de facto controlled by Moscow since 1992, has remained a constant source of instability and a tool of pressure on the central authorities. Ethnic and linguistic divisions, especially in regions with Russian-speaking majorities such as Gagauzia, have provided fertile ground for amplifying social tensions and promoting narratives that challenge the legitimacy of a pro-Western orientation.

This analysis traces the evolution of Moldova’s political landscape between 2023 and 2025, focusing on the dynamics of the disinformation ecosystem and its impact on democratic processes. Through this three-year comparative approach, we identify recurring patterns, strategic shifts, and the escalation of tactics used in campaigns to manipulate public opinion, documenting how disinformation has evolved from a tool of political influence into a sophisticated hybrid weapon.

Why this analysis matters

• Moldova is at a historic turning point between 2023 and 2025. Choices made now will determine the country’s long term trajectory toward the European Union or renewed dependence on Russia.
• Hybrid threats are at their peak. Disinformation, illicit financing, and coercive leverage through Transnistria are converging.
• Internal divides are being weaponized. Ethnic and linguistic tensions, as well as questions of identity, are systematically exploited to weaken support for European integration.
• Information warfare has escalated. Campaigns have moved from traditional propaganda to AI-generated deepfakes and coordinated multi-platform bot networks.
• The stakes go beyond Moldova. Lessons from this case will influence how the EU manages future enlargement, especially with Ukraine and other Eastern Partnership states.
• The analysis provides actionable insights. It highlights early warning signs, recurring patterns, and practical implications for election monitoring, cyber defense, and democratic resilience.

2. General Socio-Political Context

The Start of European Integration (and Internal Vulnerabilities) – 2023

The year 2023 marked a period of fragility for the Republic of Moldova from a socio-political perspective, in which the initiation of the country’s European path was visibly hampered by pressures from the Russian Federation. These were aimed at amplifying internal divisions through disinformation campaigns and manipulation of public opinion. The authorities in Chișinău sought to strengthen the pro-European orientation through information defense measures and political initiatives of strategic value. At the same time, the elections in Gagauzia highlighted the persistence of pro-Russian influence in the region.

The elections for the governor of the autonomous region of Gagauzia, that traditionally is pro-Russian, took place in April and May. The two rounds of voting were therefore dominated by pro-Kremlin candidates: Evghenia Guțul (Șor Party) and Grigori Uzun (independent, supported by the PSRM). The electoral campaign was saturated with disinformation messages, anti-government rhetoric, and anti-Romanian and anti-Western narratives. The elections were won by Evghenia Guțul, accused of voter corruption and spreading disinformation. Nevertheless, she assumed the title of governor of Gagauzia, the highest local political position, consolidating the pro-Russian influence in the region.

The pro-Russian tendencies were, however, counterbalanced by efforts of the pro-European central authorities. In response to the intensification of the “Kremlin’s hybrid attacks,” on May 29, President Maia Sandu announced the creation of a National Center for Information Defense, nicknamed “Patriot,” in Chișinău. The mission of the center is to identify, assess, and combat disinformation, aiming to counter the wave of false information propagated through television and the internet.

In addition, the organization of the second European Political Community Summit in Bulboaca in June marked a historic first for Moldova and a symbolic step toward the state’s pro-European direction. Simultaneously, however, pro-Kremlin media instrumentalized the event, turning it into an opportunity for spreading false narratives. It was presented as an attempt by Brussels to form a coalition against Russia and to convince other states to join sanctions against it.

On November 5, general local elections were held in most administrative-territorial units of the Republic of Moldova, for the election of mayors and local councilors. The elections generated a series of disinformation efforts and public opinion manipulations, while the competition between opposition candidates unfolded along the West-East axis. In this context, the Commission for Exceptional Situations suspended the broadcasting licenses of six TV stations, due to their involvement in disinformation campaigns aimed at influencing the local elections.

The opening of accession negotiations with the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine to the European Union was approved at the end of the year, crowning the government’s numerous efforts in the pro-European direction throughout 2023. European Council President Charles Michel described this decision as “a clear signal of hope.” The announcement once again triggered the spread of false news and speculation from pro-Russian sources, which portrayed both the Moldovan government and the West in a negative light.

Overall, 2023 was a year of significant strategic progress for the Republic of Moldova on the path to European integration, despite the Kremlin’s efforts to undermine its pro-Western course. At the same time, however, developments during this period highlighted that the state’s ability to counter Russian hybrid pressures and the resulting social polarization will prove decisive for the country’s future. The struggle for defining the state’s political identity, between West and East, continued to shape the socio-political context in the following years.

Local Elections and Regional Dynamics – 2024

In 2024, the Republic of Moldova entered a crucial stage of political and geopolitical transition, positioned at the intersection between consolidating the European path and the increasingly visible pressures exerted by the Russian Federation. The central event of the year was the general local elections, held in a climate of heightened polarization, representing a significant test for political parties ahead of the 2025 parliamentary elections.

The 2024 general local elections clearly highlighted the division of society between pro-European and pro-Russian forces. The Party of Action and Solidarity (PAS) sought to maintain its support by promoting continuity and reforms but faced difficulties in major urban centers and in areas traditionally dominated by the opposition. Meanwhile, left-wing parties and those aligned with Russian interests exploited citizens’ discontent over rising energy prices and living standards. The electoral campaign was marked by a wave of disinformation and media attacks, especially on social networks and through television channels affiliated with pro-Russian groups. The main narratives targeted supposed “dangers” of moving closer to the European Union, the risk of “losing sovereignty,” and exploited identity and linguistic tensions. The authorities in Chișinău repeatedly accused the Russian Federation of financing opposition parties and orchestrating protests aimed at destabilizing the electoral process.

At the regional level, 2024 was marked by new tensions in Transnistria, fueled both by the war in Ukraine and by economic and energy pressures exerted by Moscow. Although the separatist region remains internationally unrecognized, its economic dependence on the European Union market grew significantly. At the same time, there were signs of possible hybrid provocations at the border: from military intimidation attempts to disinformation campaigns aimed at spreading panic among the population. The Moldovan authorities’ response was reinforced by the support of European and American partners, who warned about the risk of Russia using the Transnistrian region as a destabilizing tool ahead of the electoral cycle.

Beyond internal challenges, 2024 was also the year in which Moldova’s relationship with the European Union took a decisive step: the official launch of accession negotiations. This process strengthened the Sandu government’s position abroad but also gave pro-Russian opposition new grounds to criticize the European orientation, citing economic and social risks. The EU consistently expressed its support, both through financial assistance and by strengthening cooperation in security and disinformation counteraction.

Moldovan society remained deeply polarized, split between support for European integration and the appeal of pro-Russian narratives. The public sphere was dominated by online manipulation campaigns, protests organized with external support, and a constant struggle for control of the public discourse. State institutions and fact-checking organizations attempted to counter these phenomena, but the impact on public opinion remained significant.

The Year of Parliamentary Elections – 2025

In 2025, the Republic of Moldova faces one of the most important political moments since independence, in a context strongly marked by the confrontation between the pro-European orientation and persistent pressures from the Russian Federation. On September 28, parliamentary elections will take place, considered by analysts and European leaders as a decisive test for the country’s strategic direction. The vote follows Maia Sandu’s re-election as president in the fall of 2024 and a consultative referendum in which citizens narrowly voted, with 50.4%, in favor of EU accession. The close referendum result confirmed the deep polarization of Moldovan society, divided between the pro-EU vision and a hard-core pro-Russian bloc.

The 2025 electoral campaign unfolds under the sign of this geopolitical rift. The governing Party of Action and Solidarity (PAS) is promoting continued reforms and the acceleration of EU accession negotiations. In opposition, several parties regrouped into a left-wing bloc (PSRM and PCRM, led by Igor Dodon and Vladimir Voronin) and a new coalition called “Alternative,” led by former prosecutor Alexandr Stoianoglo and Chișinău mayor Ion Ceban. The “Victory” bloc, affiliated with fugitive oligarch Ilan Șor, was excluded by the Central Electoral Commission for illicit financing, while Gagauzia’s pro-Șor governor, Evghenia Guțul, was sentenced in August 2025 to seven years in prison for using Russian funds in political campaigns.

Against this backdrop, the authorities in Chișinău repeatedly warned of Russian plans for massive election interference. The Information and Security Service estimated that Moscow could inject up to $100 million in cryptocurrencies for covert financing, alongside disinformation campaigns, deepfakes, electoral bribery, and cyberattacks on state infrastructure. European leaders confirmed these risks and intensified support for protecting the electoral process, including through a security and defense partnership and additional funds dedicated to cyber resilience.

Moldova’s relationship with the European Union entered a stage of consolidation in 2025. After obtaining candidate status and launching accession negotiations in 2024, on July 4, 2025, the first EU-Moldova summit took place in Chișinău. The Union reaffirmed the strategic objective of integration, approved a support package of up to €1.9 billion, and offered citizens direct benefits: Moldova’s integration into the SEPA payment system, the elimination of roaming tariffs with the EU starting in 2026, and financial support for infrastructure, health, and energy.

On the other hand, Russia continues to use hybrid pressures to destabilize the country. In January 2025, it completely cut off gas supplies to Transnistria, triggering an energy crisis that revealed the region’s dependence on external imports. Although internationally unrecognized, the region currently exports about 80% of its production to the EU market, making it vulnerable and increasingly interdependent on Chișinău.

Society remains polarized, but recent polls also show growing confidence in the European path. Almost half of citizens say the country is moving “in the right direction,” the highest level of optimism in the past twenty years. Nevertheless, vulnerabilities remain evident: online disinformation campaigns, protests orchestrated with external financial support, and cyberattacks on public institutions are part of an information war aimed at undermining the legitimacy of the democratic process.

The year 2025 represents a turning point for the Republic of Moldova. The outcome of the parliamentary elections will determine whether the country continues its path toward the European Union or whether pro-Russian forces succeed in slowing this course. Despite pressures and internal divisions, the Sandu government has managed to secure unprecedented European support, maintain a functional democratic framework, and offer citizens the first tangible benefits of closer ties with the EU. The stakes are twofold: consolidating internal democracy and confirming the irreversibility of the European option in the face of hybrid threats from the East.

3. Disinformation in the years 2023-2025

2023
Throughout 2023, the Republic of Moldova was the target of disinformation campaigns designed to undermine its pro-European path and to keep the country within the sphere of influence of the Russian Federation, exploiting social divisions along the East–West cleavage. The main false narratives promoted focused on three interconnected directions: the contestation of national identity through themes such as “Romanization” and the loss of statehood, the cultivation of skepticism towards the European Union, and the fueling of Soviet nostalgia through the instrumentalization of historical symbols (the replacement of Victory Day). All three themes reinforced each other and formed a coherent discourse, easily exploited politically, instilling insecurity and motivating opposition to a pro-Western orientation.

The contestation of national identity was one of the main directions of manipulation, built on themes such as the “Romanianization” of the Republic of Moldova. This type of discourse peaked in the context of elections in Gagauzia, especially among Russian-speaking communities, and was promoted by pro-Russian politicians (such as Evghenia Guțul or Ilan Șor) and pro-Russian media sources, with the purpose of mobilizing voters. Disinformation was amplified by legislative changes that coincided with the replacement of the phrase “Moldovan language” with “Romanian language” in legal acts. Thus, efforts were made to steer public opinion toward the perception that closer ties with Romania and the EU could represent a threat to the independence of the Republic of Moldova.

Another essential component of disinformation was the fueling of Soviet nostalgia, especially among Russian-speaking Moldovans. This gained momentum following the adoption of a law that replaced the USSR-imposed date for commemorating the end of the Second World War, “Victory Day” on May 9, with the “Day of Remembrance and Reconciliation” on May 8. This change was exploited by left-wing and pro-Russian politicians, who accused the Chișinău administration of “desecrating” history,” in an attempt to legitimize rapprochement with Russia as its natural continuation.

The propaganda line was further reinforced by cultivating skepticism toward the European Union and spreading the “No to Europe” narrative. The information space associated with Kremlin propaganda (Telegram channels, news websites) was periodically flooded with alarmist messages about the consequences of the European path, such as the loss of traditional values or a massive influx of refugees. Although this discourse had a constant presence throughout the year, it was intensified at key moments such as the European Political Community Summit in Bulboaca and the local elections at the end of the year, seeking to portray the Western path as a dangerous choice that contradicts the values and interests of Moldovan citizens.

2024
In 2024, the Republic of Moldova faced multiple internal and external challenges that significantly influenced the country’s political and social climate. The year was marked by an intensification of disinformation campaigns from both internal and external sources. Social networks were flooded with false information about alleged electoral fraud and the dangers of joining the European Union.

The 2024 disinformation campaigns aimed to undermine citizens’ trust in state institutions and in Moldova’s European trajectory, promoting several recurring narratives. Among them was the fear of a possible war with Transnistria, spread through false information claiming that Moldova was preparing to attack the separatist region, which could trigger a military conflict with the Russian Federation. Messages also circulated portraying EU accession as a danger to national sovereignty, suggesting that European integration would amount to subordination to foreign interests. Public opinion was further manipulated through networks of fake accounts on platforms such as Facebook, TikTok, and Telegram, which promoted pro-Russian messages and attempted to silence critical voices in society.

The Republic of Moldova faced a severe energy crisis in the second half of 2024. In December, the authorities declared a state of emergency in the energy sector due to fears that Russia might cut off natural gas supplies, essential for the operation of the Cuciurgan power plant in the separatist Transnistria region. This could have led to prolonged blackouts and an economic and humanitarian crisis.

At the same time, rumors and false information circulated on social media, claiming that the country would be left without electricity starting December 16. Authorities denied this information, but the impact on public trust was significant.

Judicial reforms continued to be a sensitive topic in 2024. Although the government promoted measures to strengthen the rule of law, criticism regarding their implementation and the alleged political selection of corruption cases under investigation arose. These perceptions were amplified by disinformation campaigns, which presented the reforms as politically motivated and as a form of control over the opposition.

2025
In the spring of 2025, the Republic of Moldova was targeted by disinformation campaigns aimed at influencing public opinion and destabilizing the political climate ahead of the parliamentary elections in the fall. Around May 9 (Europe Day), political leaders such as Igor Dodon, president of the Party of Socialists of Moldova, spread messages portraying the European Union and the United States as “foreign interfering forces” seeking to subjugate the country.

Also in spring 2025, Moldova’s information space was heavily affected by the activity of networks of fake accounts created on Facebook, TikTok, and Telegram. Their goal was twofold: on the one hand, to create the impression of massive popular support for pro-Russian messages, and on the other hand, to silence critical voices. Kremlin-linked Telegram channels were flooded with nearly identical comments, written in Russian but posted by accounts with apparently ordinary Romanian names. Under each post, dozens of repetitive reactions could be found, a clear sign of a coordinated campaign.

The narratives promoted were recurring: Chișinău authorities were allegedly pushing the country into a war with Russia, preparing an attack on Transnistria, arming themselves with European funds, and repeating the Ukrainian scenario. In parallel, the government was accused of destroying the opposition and controlling the press.

The arrest of Gagauzia’s governor, Evghenia Guțul, was also turned into a central theme of the 2025 disinformation campaigns. Messages propagated by Kremlin-affiliated media, such as Pravda or Matryoshka, presented Chișinău’s authorities as tools of the West, allegedly seeking to limit the region’s autonomy and silence the pro-Russian opposition under the pretext of fighting corruption. These narratives were carefully calibrated to resonate with local sensitivities and to fuel ethnic and political tensions.

Such messages received vocal support from Russian officials, who accused Chișinău of undermining the rights of the Gagauz, though without presenting any concrete evidence. Thus, an individual court case was used as a pretext to construct a victim–aggressor narrative, aimed at fueling insecurity and undermining trust in Moldova’s European direction.

In 2025, disinformation campaigns also included sophisticated techniques based on artificial intelligence. A notorious example was an electoral deepfake released in July 2025, in which former head of the Central Electoral Commission, Angelica Caraman, appeared making false statements about foreign interference in the elections. The Commission denounced the video as fake and warned of the intensification of this phenomenon, intended to undermine public trust in the electoral process.

Simultaneously, Moldovan authorities documented an illegal financing operation of political campaigns through an app called “Taito,” used from the Russian Federation for voter bribery and laundering funds destined for Kremlin-affiliated parties. The investigation was made public by the National Police and reported by Radio Moldova.

Also in 2025, the Matryoshka propaganda network launched a wave of false narratives against Maia Sandu shortly before the EU–Moldova summit in July. EUvsDisinfo showed how these channels fabricated stories about a fictitious “competition” between Sandu and other European leaders, seeking to erode the president’s image and weaken the legitimacy of the upcoming summit.

At the same time, campaigns targeting the Moldovan diaspora were also present, carried out through websites and pages falsely presented as European media. These attempted to discourage voter turnout among citizens abroad and, in some cases, promoted fictitious pro-European parties designed to sow confusion and distrust in the democratic process.

Lastly, between June and August 2025, Belarusian media hosted a coordinated manipulation campaign aimed at discrediting Moldova’s parliamentary elections and legitimizing Igor Dodon as an alternative to the current government. Belarusian state outlets consistently promoted messages about “electoral fraud,” loss of independence, and “European dictatorship,” synchronizing their content to amplify the perception of a Moldova collapsing under Western influence.

4. Case Studies

2023
The disinformation campaigns throughout 2023 largely exploited the existing social polarization in Moldovan society. Key socio-political moments were instrumentalized to propagate false narratives aimed at eroding trust in central authorities and undermining support for the European path of the Republic of Moldova, while simultaneously promoting a pro-Russian agenda. Disinformation spread across all social media platforms, from Facebook to TikTok and Telegram, as well as through traditional mass media channels, and was perpetuated by pro-Russian politicians.

The elections for the position of governor of Gagauzia provided fertile ground for launching disinformation campaigns on the theme of the “Romanization” of the Republic of Moldova, which exploited fears of losing national identity and autonomy. Alarmist rhetoric claiming that the pro-Western course was equivalent to unification with Romania and the subsequent disappearance of Moldova from the map was heavily propagated during this period, particularly for electoral purposes.

2025
In August 2025, just weeks before the parliamentary elections, former Moldovan politician Ilan Șor, residing in Russia and under European Union sanctions, publicly launched a mobilization campaign in which he promised exorbitant sums to participants in anti-government protests in Chișinău. In a video message broadcast on social media, Șor declared that he was willing to pay up to $3,000 per month to each protester, suggesting that the benefits of “victory” could be felt immediately. Furthermore, he announced the opening of “accounts” at protest sites to facilitate payments, turning the demonstrations into a tool for buying loyalty and participation.

Moldovan authorities reacted firmly. The police labeled the message as incitement to commit crimes, warning that those who accepted the offer would be subject to criminal investigation. In an official statement, law enforcement institutions stressed that they would not allow “criminal groups to organize illegal protests aimed at provoking disorder and violence.”

The case reignited debates about Șor’s role as a key agent of Kremlin influence in the Republic of Moldova, especially since he had already been sentenced to 15 years in prison for his involvement in the “billion-dollar theft” and his party had been outlawed. Such episodes illustrate how Moscow seeks to undermine Moldova’s stability not only through propaganda narratives but also through the direct instrumentalization of financial resources for political destabilization.