EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
With less than two days remaining until Moldova’s parliamentary elections, disinformation and voter manipulation campaigns have intensified. Russian-backed networks systematically recruited Orthodox priests through Moscow pilgrimages to spread anti-EU propaganda via Telegram channels, while fugitive oligarch Ilan Șor coordinated illegal observer recruitment across the diaspora and financed educational forums in Gagauzia through sanctioned entities. As election day approaches, authorities have escalated countermeasures by blocking over 100 fake news websites, excluding compromised parties from electoral competition, and documenting extensive last-minute violations including administrative resource abuse, coordinated bot networks, and AI-generated deepfakes designed to undermine public trust in the electoral process.
WEEKLY OVERVIEW
The Central Electoral Commission (CEC) voted to exclude Irina Vlah’s “Heart of Moldova” party from the parliamentary elections, removing all 25 party candidates from the “Patriotic” Bloc. The decision came after CEC identified potential illegal financing and material benefits that could undermine democratic principles and political pluralism. The exclusion followed earlier actions by the Ministry of Justice, which successfully petitioned the Court of Appeals to suspend the party’s activities for 12 months.
A Reuters investigation exposed how Orthodox priests from Moldova were systematically recruited during pilgrimages to Russia and rewarded financially to spread pro-Russian propaganda through Telegram channels. Weekly groups of approximately 50 priests received 10,000 rubles each for church purchases, attended lectures emphasizing Moldova-Russia historical ties and opposition to the “morally corrupt West,” and were given Russian bank cards before returning home. They were instructed to create Telegram channels for parishioners to share content from the main source “Salt and Light,” which published over 600 posts between May and August promoting traditional family values while criticizing EU integration as threatening Moldova’s “faith, language, and roots.” The campaign reached over 27,000 people monthly, with three-quarters of participating accounts redistributing the anti-European content that mirrors pro-Kremlin rhetoric without directly mentioning Russia.
Former oligarch Vladimir Plahotniuc was extradited to Moldova on September 25 after being detained in Greece while attempting to travel to Dubai using false identity documents. Greek authorities found Plahotniuc and his companion Constantin Țuțu living in a luxury villa worth €5,000-9,000 per night, confiscating €155,000 and 17 false documents during raids. Anti-corruption prosecutor Marcel Dumbravan emphasized the extradition’s importance for Moldovan justice, while Plahotniuc’s lawyer criticized authorities for turning the process into a “tasteless political spectacle” staged before the parliamentary elections. The oligarch, who had been sought for over six years, was transported under heavy security to Penitentiary No. 13 to face multiple arrest warrants and pending criminal cases.
The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) warned that the Kremlin is establishing conditions to generate potentially violent protests to remove President Maia Sandu from power following the September 28 parliamentary elections, regardless of the outcome. ISW suggests Russia may attempt to create a Kremlin-initiated mirror image of Ukraine’s 2014 Euromaidan protests, though the institute notes this represents a high-impact but uncertain probability scenario that Russia might not pursue or could fail to execute.
The Lawyers’ Union of Moldova (UJM), led by politically affiliated attorneys, registered nearly 1,200 electoral observers for the parliamentary elections—almost matching the established Promo-LEX organization’s numbers despite having no previous monitoring experience. The organization is headed by former socialist Maxim Lebedinschi, who previously represented Igor Dodon, while its president is Adrian Lebedinschi’s brother, an ex-socialist deputy now running on the “Patriotic” Bloc ticket. The organization showed no financial activity from 2020-2023 but declared 196,748 lei in revenues for 2024, primarily from organizing a marathon event. When questioned about the monitoring mission’s budget, Lebedinschi declined to provide details, citing internal organization matters and the mix of volunteers and contracted personnel involved.
The Audiovisual Council imposed 70,000 lei in total fines and six public warnings on 15 television stations for violating electoral legislation during campaign coverage. Additional sanctions targeted stations for broadcasting discriminatory content, specifically allowing phrases about “introducing harsh sanctions for LGBT propaganda in schools” during electoral programming.
Four education officials from Gagauzia, including three school directors and the regional education chief Natalia Cristeva, possess bank cards from Russian bank Promsvyazbank and participated in Moscow educational forums organized by the “Eurasia” Association—an entity created by fugitive oligarch Ilan Șor and sanctioned by the EU and UK. The Ministry of Education’s Ethics Council found that 28 teachers who attended these forums violated education codes by participating in activities supporting military aggression and destabilizing actions. Only Cristeva received money transfers from Russia, while she also failed to declare tens of thousands of lei in bank interest income to integrity authorities. The “Eurasia” Association regularly finances forums inviting teachers from Gagauzia, with participants receiving payments and instructions on promoting Russian narratives against European integration.
Promo-LEX’s fourth monitoring report covering September 11-24 documented significant electoral violations, including 84 cases of administrative resource abuse, religious involvement in six cases despite legal prohibitions, and coordinated inauthentic behavior on social media using AI-generated content and fake accounts. The most intense parliamentary campaign in Moldova’s history saw 1,984 activities with PAS and the Patriotic Bloc being most active, while campaign financing reached 23.8 million lei in declared revenues, with 78% concentrated among four competitors. The organization identified at least 693,243 lei in unreported expenses, primarily for social media advertising, and noted that 15 third-party entities promoted electoral narratives, including Russian-coordinated networks spreading anti-EU content.
After being exposed in RISE Moldova investigations, Moldovan authorities have blocked over 100 fake news websites since Russia’s Ukraine invasion, with 35 pro-Kremlin propaganda pages blocked this electoral year alone. Recent targets include sites spreading parliament data leaks and AI-generated articles, with some controlled by fugitive oligarch Ilan Șor reappearing after being blocked. The Security and Intelligence Service requested blocking of mostenire.online (registered by Russian citizen Sergei Sokolov), parlamentleak.com, and two other sites distributing parliament email leaks. Many blocked sites quickly reappear with new domains, including Șor’s party website which moved from partidulsor.com after being blocked and the Russian propaganda project salutmld.su which cloned itself as salutmld.online.
Fugitive oligarch Ilan Șor’s network recruited Moldovans abroad as illegal electoral observers for the September 28 vote, offering 500 euros cash through Facebook page “Lumen Personal” administered from Poland. The recruitment campaign reached 1.45 million Moldovan citizens across EU countries plus the UK, with participants receiving WhatsApp instructions to “monitor” polling stations for 19 hours and report irregularities. Police chief Viorel Cernăuțeanu confirmed official requests to law enforcement in eight countries to intervene near polling stations and prevent potential fraud, while the National Anti-Corruption Center recorded 41 diaspora fraud attempts by mid-September.
Police chief Viorel Cernăuțeanu reported that thousands of residential Wi-Fi routers were compromised on September 24, designed to launch cyberattacks against the Central Electoral Commission’s servers on election day to paralyze institutional operations. The Central Electoral Commission dismissed false online claims that correspondence voters received incomplete ballots missing certain electoral competitors. CEC confirmed that all 2,472 correspondence ballots were printed transparently and contain all 23 registered electoral competitors, calling the disinformation an attempt to undermine public trust in the electoral process. Police raided a printing house and seized 200 ballots pre-stamped for the “Alternative” Electoral Bloc, suspected of being prepared for a “carousel” voting scheme. The bloc’s candidate Andrei Oțel claimed these were educational materials to show voters their position on the ballot, similar to 50,000 such materials used in 2023 local elections, though police suspected fraudulent intent.
Stopfals.md fact-checkers conducted live verification during four electoral debates ahead of the September 28 parliamentary elections, debunking false statements and manipulations made by participating candidates during the televised discussions organized by Radio Moldova and Moldova 1.
A Barometer of Public Opinion poll conducted September 12-22 showed PAS leading with 28.6% support among decided voters, followed by the Socialist-Communist Electoral Bloc (BEP) at 13.9% and Our Party at 5.1%. President Maia Sandu topped trust ratings at 22.3%, while 80.3% of respondents indicated they would vote in the parliamentary elections.
SOCIAL MEDIA DIS and MIS-INFORMATION
(CIB) Coordinated Inauthentic Behavior
Funky Citizens investigated a bot network operation and uncovered coordinated digital manipulation campaigns linked to the Communist Party of the Republic of Moldova, revealing systematic attempts to artificially amplify anti-government messaging through fake accounts and stolen identities.
This cluster documents coordinated digital manipulation campaigns linked to the Communist Party of the Republic of Moldova. Activity centers on the systematic use of fake Facebook accounts and bots to artificially amplify opposition narratives, discredit President Maia Sandu, and delegitimize Western support.
Investigations identified 160 fictitious accounts generating over 200 comments between 15–20 September 2025, with a visible peak on 19 September when 99 new accounts were created in a single day. The accounts frequently used stolen or misappropriated identities, often with cropped profile photos to evade reverse-image searches, drawing from sources in Russia and Transnistria. These fake profiles engaged in overnight “comment floods” on the Communist Party’s page, creating the illusion of massive grassroots engagement.
The messaging followed consistent patterns:
- Delegitimization of Sandu and PAS through framing her as a “puppet of Brussels” and accusing the government of corruption, repression, and national betrayal.
- Contrastive framing that presents “patriotic parties” as close to the people while labeling the government an elite foreign-controlled entity.
- Emotionally charged attacks, including sexist insults (“monster in a skirt”), tropes of cruelty (“merciless stepmother”), and cynicism (“cold, heartless creature”).
- Exploitation of grievances, especially fines imposed on Gagauz citizens and narratives of poverty, to mobilize resentment against central authorities.
This activity replicates patterns previously detected with the Modern Democratic Party of Moldova, showing a shared toolkit of nighttime bot activation, identity theft, and comment coordination.
In the final 72 hours before Moldova’s parliamentary elections, Funky Citizens monitored 5,450 social media posts and identified seven distinct disinformation clusters systematically targeting democratic institutions, electoral integrity, and public trust in the voting process.
(DEMO) Democratic Backsliding & Authoritarianism
This cluster frames PAS and Maia Sandu as running Moldova through a repressive, dictatorial regime that dismantles democracy and terrorizes citizens. Narratives consistently describe the government as illegitimate, equating PAS with authoritarianism, fascism, or even totalitarian control. Claims emphasize that Sandu and PAS have usurped state institutions such as the CEC, judiciary, Constitutional Court, prosecutor’s office and police, turning them into political instruments to suppress the opposition, rewrite laws and falsify elections.
The police, SIS and CNA are depicted as partisan tools used to intimidate protesters, raid opposition offices and fine citizens unfairly. Stories highlight searches, detentions and fabricated criminal cases as intimidation tactics against parties like Inima Moldovei, Moldova Mare, Victorie Bloc and Democrația Acasă. Ordinary people are portrayed as living in fear, unable to protest without harassment or violence.
A recurring theme is censorship and information control. PAS is accused of blocking or shutting down TV channels, social media platforms such as TikTok, Telegram and YouTube, and news portals, while financing loyal outlets and spreading propaganda. Narratives claim Sandu has created institutions such as the “Patriot Center” to monitor online speech, effectively criminalizing dissent.
Alongside repression, the cluster integrates corruption and betrayal narratives. PAS leaders are accused of theft, enriching themselves, selling national assets and caring only about personal perks while neglecting citizens. The government is branded as a Yellow Plague or Mafia Group, betraying promises and driving Moldova into poverty and chaos.
(ELEC) Electoral Fraud & Manipulation
This cluster focuses on claims that elections in Moldova are neither free nor fair, but carefully manipulated by PAS, Maia Sandu, and captured state institutions. Narratives allege that PAS falsifies results, excludes competitors, reduces polling stations in Transnistria and Russia, and uses the CEC as a loyal instrument to eliminate opposition parties. Stories emphasize that entire blocs are struck from the race under fabricated legal pretexts, while independent observers are obstructed and voter lists allegedly inflated with deceased citizens.
The diaspora vote is a central theme. Posts accuse PAS of “stealing elections through the diaspora,” claiming the government opens hundreds of polling stations in Europe while deliberately restricting those in Russia, thus disenfranchising hundreds of thousands of Moldovans. Narratives also highlight fake or bought polls, carousel voting, unused ballots for stuffing, and invitations sent to dead people as evidence of systemic fraud.
PAS and Sandu are accused of using state resources, public events and even the Church for electoral campaigning. Ministers are framed as insulting citizens who vote “incorrectly,” while police are said to tear down opposition posters, raid offices, and intimidate voters with slogans such as “don’t play with your vote or you will lose everything.” Allegations extend to hiding economic data before elections, bribing voters with aid packages, and deploying state institutions to fabricate charges against rivals.
These narratives frame PAS as incapable of winning honestly. Elections are depicted as already rigged through CEC manipulation, selective law enforcement, and foreign interference allegedly coordinated with the EU, Romania, and international donors. At the extreme, posts warn that if PAS risks losing, the government will cancel or annul the elections altogether. Citizens are urged to view the process as a farce where democracy is only a façade, and real change is possible only by resisting fraud and rejecting PAS at the ballot box.
(SOV) Sovereignty & Geopolitical Influence
This cluster centers on the claim that Moldova has lost its sovereignty and become subordinated to Western powers, particularly the EU, the United States, Romania, and the Soros network. Narratives portray Maia Sandu and PAS as foreign puppets serving Brussels and Washington rather than the Moldovan people. The government is accused of selling national assets such as the Giurgiulești port, the Republican Stadium, and even farmland, leaving the country dependent on foreign interests.
European integration is framed as a false promise and a threat to Moldova’s independence. Posts insist that Moldova will not join the EU in 2028, that Brussels exploits the country as a buffer zone, and that accession brings only poverty, corruption, censorship, and persecution of the Church. Narratives warn that the EU and the West seek to erase Moldova’s traditions, impose LGBT “propaganda,” undermine Orthodoxy, and enforce Romanianization of language and history.
Russia is positioned as a natural partner and protector of Moldovan sovereignty, with figures like Dodon and Șor promoting closer ties with Moscow for peace, stability, and economic security. Russian officials and media emphasize neutrality and accuse PAS of stirring conflict, while protesters and clergy highlight the defense of traditional values against “Western servitude.”
These narratives also invoke conspiracy themes: Soros allegedly “planted” Maia Sandu, Europe funds PAS through NGOs and embassies, and international donors manipulate justice, elections, and media to keep PAS in power. Panic-inducing claims suggest that Europe will occupy Moldova with foreign troops after disputed elections, while the EU and USAID are portrayed as colonial powers stripping the country of sovereignty.
(GAG) Gagauzia and the Guțul Case
This cluster focuses on disinformation and polarizing narratives built around Evghenia Guțul, the pro-Shor governor of Gagauzia, as well as the broader theme of Gagauz identity under attack by PAS and Maia Sandu. Narratives frame Guțul as a political prisoner, falsely accused and persecuted for political revenge. Repeated claims insist that her trial was ordered by PAS, that she was arrested before elections to intimidate voters, and that her imprisonment violates human rights and is monitored by international organizations, including European institutions and Turkey. Symbolic elements such as Guțul spending her birthday in prison or being awarded a “Solidarity” prize by Russian journalists amplify her portrayal as a martyr of government repression.
Irina Vlah, another prominent Gagauz politician, is similarly depicted as unfairly accused and banned by PAS, reinforcing the narrative that Chişinău systematically targets Gagauz leadership. Stories extend to alleged intimidation of pensioners fined for “electoral corruption,” and portray PAS as hostile to Gagauzia’s autonomy, traditions, and faith.
(SOCIO) Socio-Economic Decline & Public Hardship
This cluster frames PAS governance as directly responsible for Moldova’s economic collapse, mass emigration, and the decline of living standards. Narratives claim that under PAS, more than 600,000 Moldovans have left the country, over 70% of the population lives in poverty, and ordinary people face unaffordable housing, healthcare, and utility costs. Moldova is portrayed as a state in irreversible decline, where citizens die in poverty while leaders enrich themselves.
PAS is accused of large-scale corruption and fraud, with particular emphasis on the so-called “gas procurement scheme,” which is framed as the biggest theft in Moldova’s history. The government is said to launder money through villages, steal funds intended for road repairs, and sell national assets such as the Giurgiulești port or the land of the Agrarian University. Loans from abroad are depicted not as tools for development, but as money siphoned into private pockets, while GDP and economic data are allegedly hidden until after elections to cover up mismanagement.
Rising prices are central to this narrative. Energy tariffs, car insurance, and food costs are said to increase endlessly, with warnings that gas could reach 25 lei after elections. Moldova is compared unfavorably to Romania and Ukraine, where prices are claimed to be lower, reinforcing the sense of unfairness. Citizens are told that PAS focuses on propaganda, foreign trips, and medals instead of jobs, pensions, or social services.
(WAR) War and Security Threats
This cluster revolves around the claim that PAS and Maia Sandu are dragging Moldova into war, abandoning neutrality, and turning the country into a Western military outpost. Disinformation campaigns amplify fears of imminent conflict by linking Moldova’s internal politics to regional instability, NATO expansion, and the war in Ukraine.
Narratives allege that Moldova, Romania, and Ukraine are secretly preparing an attack on Transnistria, with road and bridge repairs framed as infrastructure for NATO troop movements. Maia Sandu is accused of planning to send Moldovan youth to fight in Ukraine, of inviting foreign troops into the country, and of preparing a NATO base without public consent. PAS is said to be running its electoral campaign by frightening citizens with “war stories,” such as threats of Russian occupation or a loss of neutrality if the ruling party loses elections.
Recurring themes position the EU and NATO as aggressors seeking to occupy Moldova, seize territory, and transform the country into a battlefield. Viral falsehoods, such as photos of French soldiers misrepresented as NATO troops in Chișinău or leaked calls allegedly showing U.S. meddling, aim to create panic about Western militarization. Protests against NATO are used to showcase supposed popular opposition, with slogans like “Moldova without NATO, children alive!” and polls amplified to claim that two-thirds of Moldovans reject membership.
(INFOMAN) Fake and Manipulative Narratives
This cluster highlights the use of false, distorted, and AI-generated content to discredit PAS, Maia Sandu, and Moldova’s European course. Narratives emphasize that the government manipulates public opinion with propaganda while itself becoming the target of hostile disinformation campaigns built on lies, deepfakes, and fabrications.
A recurring theme is the portrayal of PAS as both source and victim of propaganda. On one side, claims insist that PAS spends billions on propaganda, creates fake social media accounts, and establishes organizations like the “Patriot Center” or a so-called “Ministry of Surveillance” to monitor and censor ordinary people. On the other side, opposition actors and foreign-linked outlets push fabricated content that depicts Maia Sandu and other PAS leaders as corrupt, threatening, or incompetent.
AI-generated videos and deepfakes are central tools. Examples include fabricated clips of Sandu allegedly announcing the end of elections, Mihai Popșoi appearing to admit he impoverished the country, or Igor Grosu being blamed personally for economic collapse. Sarcasm and irony amplify these distortions, with hostile nicknames such as “Black Widow,” videos mocking Sandu and Nicușor Dan, or exaggerated comparisons to historical inquisitions.
This newsletter is part of our ongoing work with the Bulgarian-Romanian Observatory of Digital Media, member of EDMO.
Author: BROD / Funky Citizens