

IN THIS EDITION
ON THE RISE
Weekly Watch of Emerging Disinformation Risks

Dublin, Southport, Belfast: Who is Fanning the Flames?
After Dublin in November 2023, Southport and other English cities in August 2024, Belfast has now become the latest flashpoint of far right unrest and street violence. The pattern is by now familiar: following a horrific crime in which the alleged perpetrator is a person of colour, social media channels associated with the far right quickly amplify the story. In doing so, they often employ incendiary rhetoric and, at times, circulate distorted or outright false claims about the suspect’s identity, frequently portraying them as an undocumented migrant or a Muslim, even when that is not the case. Calls for protests follow, crowds gather, and what begins as demonstrations against immigration or “crime” frequently descends into vandalism, rioting, and indiscriminate attacks on ethnic and religious minorities. In the process, the wishes of victims’ families – who often call for restraint and an end to further violence – are largely ignored.
Those involved in these outbreaks are often convinced they are defending their country from “ethnic replacement”, Islamic extremism, or a perceived migrant “invasion”, driven by a belief that society has already crossed a point of no return. The belief that “civil war” in the UK, as Elon Musk wrote in a post on X after the facts of Southport, “is inevitable” is widely shared online. Yet the data paints a far less apocalyptic picture. Over the same period in which the share of foreign-born residents in the United Kingdom has increased significantly since the mid-1990s, crimes have generally declined. Correlation is not causation, of course, but there is no clear evidence of an increase in violent crime as a consequence of rising immigration.
The question, then, is why these eruptions of violence occur at all. There is no single, definitive answer. The reality is complex and multi-layered. Still, it is difficult to ignore the role of social media platforms in shaping perceptions of reality, amplifying emotionally charged, violent and polarising content through engagement-driven algorithms, often with limited safeguards against misinformation or manipulation.
In this already highly charged environment, a range of actors (driven by ideology, political strategy, or profit) pour fuel on volatility. Elements of the domestic far right, like Tommy Robinson, Conor McGregor and Nigel Farage, are often stoking grievances to mobilise support. Parts of the wider MAGA ecosystem in the United States also intervene in UK and Irish political debates, both because a shared language makes cross-border influence easier and because domestic polarisation can be exported as part of a broader ideological struggle. Elon Musk and his online following have likewise played a visible role in amplifying disinformation, narratives and disputes relating to the UK and Ireland, at times using them to escalate wider ideological confrontations over online regulation and free speech.
Foreign interference further complicates the picture. The US administration, which under Donald Trump has a difficult relationship with London about foreign policy issues – like the Greenland crisis, the Israel-US war against Iran and the war in Ukraine – has frequently engaged in commentary on British domestic politics with strong and questionable statements. Russian disinformation, meanwhile, has long been exploiting and amplifying internal divisions within Western democracies to weaken them, often finding willing or unwitting amplifiers in local political actors (notably, Tommy Robinson travelled to Moscow in June and has repeatedly expressed admiration for Russia).
To this cascade of fuel being poured onto the fire for ideological reasons, there is a further layer added for economic gain: polarising, often hateful and frequently misleading content is rewarded by platform algorithms through higher engagement, and a large number of “influencers” are willing to exploit this dynamic without scruples. One of the most well-known cases – but definitely not the only one – is that of Geeth Sooriyapura, a citizen of Sri Lanka, who describes himself as the “king of Facebook advertising”, and who has built an extensive network of English-language Facebook groups that reach millions of followers in Great Britain with xenophobic and racist content, and not infrequently outright false information, all for the purpose of generating and monetising engagement.
A solid democracy such as the British one thus appears to be the victim of a multiplicity of toxic phenomena. And, even worse, it seems surrounded by arsonists whose names, out of convenience or fear, are often not even spoken out loud.
ZOOM-IN
A Closer Look at Cases Detected by the EDMO Network
Recent civil unrest in Belfast was largely incited online. On June 10, Ofcom wrote an open letter to online service providers operating in the UK about the increased risk of their platforms being used to stir up hatred, provoke violence and commit other offences under UK law. As stressed by Ofcom, “previous crises have shown how a sudden increase in the amount of illegal content circulating online can manifest in hate crime and violence in the real world. Such crises are exceptional, and this means that online service providers’ usual content moderation systems and processes may not be sufficient in such circumstances. This is why it is important that service providers have and, where relevant enact, plans for dealing with crisis situations”.
Such a warning should resonate also in the EU, where false narratives around crime and migration are on the rise in many Member States. Our Weekly Pulse of 21 May delved already into this worrying phenomenon, but more stories have surfaced in recent days across Europe, as illustrated by the following examples.
Third-Country Nationals Falsely Portrayed as Criminals in Latvia

A claim that Latvia would be seeing the emergence of criminal groups composed of third-country nationals who would have taken control of drug distribution networks has been pushed online via NRA.lv portal by Austri Stankevics, a member of a youth organization affiliated with the National Alliance party. Amplified by local far-right politicians, the claim was found to be false by Re:Baltica. Latvia’s State Police explicitly denied having any information indicating that organized criminal groups of third-country nationals are forming in the country or that such individuals have taken over drug trafficking networks. Police representatives acknowledged only that such groups could potentially emerge in the future, not that they currently exist. The article argues that the statement misrepresents police comments and fits into a broader pattern of exaggerated claims about immigrants and crime. It also notes that previous fact-checks found third-country nationals are suspected of crimes less frequently than Latvian citizens.
The Image of a Street in Paris Destroyed “After the Passage of Hordes of Africans” Was Made With AI

“It looks like Ukraine after a bombing, but it’s not. It’s a street in Paris after hordes of Africans have passed through.” This is the claim made in viral messages circulating on social media alongside an image of a destroyed and seemingly burned street. According to Newtral’s analysis, however, the image does not depict a real location in Paris but was AI-generated. Investigators analysed the picture using AI-detection tools, including Hive AI, which assessed a 99.9% probability that the image was AI-generated. Additionally, reverse-image searches and checks of mapping services found no evidence that the depicted street exists in Paris. Nevertheless, the image spread widely on platforms such as X and Facebook and was also shared by a far-right Spanish Member of the European Parliament. The article concludes that the image is part of a wider disinformation campaign exploiting migration-related fears.
Images exaggerating the consequences of civil unrest are a common feature of fear-mongering narratives. For instance, in the case of the riots in Belfast, the footage of a gas pipeline explosion in Dagestan, Russia, was manipulated by adding a soundtrack of people chanting “send them home”, creating the false impression that the fire was linked to the Belfast unrest. The manipulated version was widely shared online by Telegram users. Delfi traced the original footage to Russian sources and confirmed the added audio was not authentic.
Disinformation About the Krakow Integration Centre Fits Into a Broader Xenophobic Narrative

A claim circulated on the NRA.lv portal by Austri Stankevics, a member of a youth organisation affiliated with the National Alliance party, alleged that criminal groups made up of third-country nationals were emerging in Latvia and had taken control of drug distribution networks. Amplified by local far-right politicians, the claim was found to be false by Re:Baltica. Latvia’s State Police said they had no information indicating that such groups are forming in the country or that third-country nationals have taken over drug trafficking networks. Police representatives noted only that such groups could potentially emerge in the future, not that they currently exist.
The article argues that the claim distorts police comments and fits a broader pattern of exaggerated narratives linking immigrants to crime. It also notes that previous fact-checks found third-country nationals are suspected of crimes less often than Latvian citizens.
ELECTION BEAT
Tracking electoral disinformation through EDMO Hubs
A Turkish Propagandist Fueling Russian Disinformation Ahead of Armenia’s Elections

A Turkish self-described journalist, Okay Deprem, has been identified as the source of roughly 40% of false claims circulating in Storm-1516, one of Russia’s most extensive influence operations targeting a foreign government. NewsGuard traced 17 of 43 fabricated narratives against Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan directly to Deprem, including allegations of corruption, family scandals, and constitutional manipulation.
Unlike Storm-1516’s usual playbook of fake news sites, Deprem publishes through real Turkish outlets — some among Turkey’s most-read — lending his content a credibility that eases its amplification across Armenian, Russian, and Azerbaijani media ecosystems. Stories have accumulated millions of views on X within months.
With Armenia now Russia’s top disinformation target, even surpassing Ukraine, the operation reflects a broader Kremlin strategy to halt Armenia’s European integration ahead of the June 7 vote. The 43% of undecided voters remains the key battleground.
Before the Vote: Latvia’s Fact-Checkers Gear Up as Misinformation Spreads

The campaign for Latvia’s parliamentary elections of next October officially opened on June 6. Re:Baltica, BECID partner, has outlined its election coverage plan: fact-checking politicians’ statements, monitoring social media, auditing MPs’ attendance and voting records, and tracking foreign interference. The outlet will also assess how governing parties fulfilled previous promises, and publish candidate profiles as lists are submitted — all funded through private foreign foundations and reader donations.
Already, the information environment is showing strain. The organisation has debunked a viral Facebook video falsely claiming Latvians may be unable to vote with an eID card and that pensioners must pay €50 for a passport. Both claims are false: the Central Election Commission confirms eID cards will be valid, and pensioner passport fees are significantly lower. If the online voter register, which has been under development since 2021, is not ready in time, passports would be issued free of charge as a contingency.
The episode illustrates precisely the dynamic Re:Baltica aims to counter: low-cost, emotionally resonant misinformation targeting procedural anxieties around voting, spreading through social media ahead of polling day.
GLOBAL PULSE
Disinformation narratives shaping the world’s conversations
“Dream Country” Iran? Viral Claims Collapse Under Fact Check

Posts portraying Iran as a “dream country” with no taxes, no unemployment and generous payments for everyone are false and misleading. The Delfi investigation shows these claims paint an unrealistic picture that ignores the country’s actual economic conditions. In reality, Iran does have taxes and a functioning tax system, with significant pressure falling on ordinary workers and consumers.
Unemployment is also a real issue: official rates exist, and independent analyses suggest the situation may be worse due to people dropping out of the labour market. While Iran offers some forms of social support – such as unemployment insurance and welfare programmes – coverage is limited and uneven, and far from universal.
More broadly, the country faces economic hardship, inflation and widespread poverty, contradicting the idea of a prosperous, care‑free system. The misleading narrative cherry‑picks or invents positive features, turning a complex and struggling economy into an oversimplified, and inaccurate, utopian image.
“More Speech and Fewer Mistakes”? Threats and Harassment Surge Against Politicians on Facebook

Hostile online behaviour toward politicians is rising sharply, particularly on Facebook. A recent analysis of millions of comments directed at US lawmakers found that violent threats, including calls for murder, have quadrupled, while harassment and abusive language have also increased significantly.
The spike is linked to changes in how Meta moderates content. After the company rolled back key moderation rules, researchers observed a surge in racist, sexist and violent comments, suggesting that weaker enforcement can allow more extreme content to spread.
Beyond individual attacks, the trend raises broader concerns. Experts warn that a more hostile online environment can normalize intimidation, discourage political participation, and ultimately weaken democratic debate, as harassment becomes an increasingly common feature of public discourse.
Argentina’s “Silicon Valley” Plans Raise Questions on Oversight and More

Argentina’s government is pushing tech‑focused reforms to attract investment, including proposals for AI‑run companies and blockchain‑based organisations (DAOs) that could operate with minimal human oversight. These ideas reflect a broader shift toward lighter regulation and more flexible rules for digital businesses.
While framed as innovation‑friendly, the plans raise issues relevant to disinformation and platform governance. Experts warn that reduced oversight could make it harder to track who controls digital entities, manage data responsibly, or enforce accountability, potentially creating loopholes similar to those already seen in parts of the online ecosystem.
In this sense, the proposals highlight a key tension: efforts to boost tech growth may also reshape how digital platforms and online actors are regulated, with implications for transparency, responsibility, and the wider information environment.
ON A DIFFERENT NOTE
In 2026 alone, Denmark has been attacked 247 times, according to the hacker groups NORDIS has been following. That is by far the highest number among the Nordic countries
This is how pro-Russian hackers operate in the Nordics, an investigation by NORDIS Hub and partners
Paolo Cesarini, Editorial Director
Tommaso Canetta, Editor-in Chief
Editorial Staff include Elena Coden, Paula Gori, Elena Maggi
This edition draws in part on automated translation and reflects information available as of 17 June 2026. Later developments may not be included.


