IN THIS EDITION
ON THE RISE
Weekly Watch of Emerging Disinformation Risks
Europe Caught in the Crossfire of NATO-related Disinformation
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) now finds itself in a Schrödinger’s cat-like situation on the eve of the Ankara summit on 7–8 July: it may be alive, or it may be dead. The only way to find out would be to open the box: that is, to invoke Article 5 and see whether the collective defence commitment still holds with Donald Trump back in the White House. That is a nightmarish prospect.
The past few years have been quite a rollercoaster for the Alliance. In 2019, after years of uncoordinated actions from different NATO countries in the Middle East, the French president Emmanuel Macron stated the Alliance was “brain dead”. In 2022, when Russia invaded Ukraine, NATO came to be seen once again as an effective shield for Europeans against foreign aggression, and Finland and Sweden decided to join the Alliance. But when Trump came back into office in 2025, NATO quickly started to crumble: the United States threatened NATO members, such as Canada or Denmark (about Greenland), spread disinformation about its own contribution to the Alliance, criticized its allies for their refusal to join the U.S. military campaign against Iran and threatened to withdraw U.S. troops from Europe, and more broadly raised doubts that Washington would honour its commitment to defend other NATO countries in the event of an attack.
The current uncertainty provides fertile ground for the dissemination and growth of disinformation. Let’s be clear: many Europeans have harsh opinions about the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and its past actions, and different political parties, groups and individuals legitimately criticize the Alliance in the public debate. At the same time, it is undeniable that NATO is also a target of specific disinformation narratives (see the EDMO definition and methodology) pushed by different states for their own interest.
The disinformation consistently spread by the United States president about NATO expenditure, if and when it’s rational, can be seen as an attempt by Washington to force its European allies to spend more for their own defence. Or, more darkly, to shake off the constraints of an international order loosely based on some shared rules and create a new order purely based on transactionalism and balance of power.
But the primary spreader of disinformation against NATO is obviously its main adversary, Russia. The main disinformation narratives are not new, but the war in Ukraine boosted them significantly. First, NATO expansion in Eastern European countries is used as a justification for the aggression against Kyiv. Second, Russia’s difficulties in Ukraine are somehow justified with baseless allegations that NATO is actively fighting in the country. Third, this alleged involvement of NATO countries is used to disseminate fear of an escalation, of a World War III, in many European countries (sometimes in the context of political debates before elections).
In the end, this is the scenario Europe is moving in: NATO’s most powerful member, the United States, and its main adversary, Russia, are both working now to weaken the Alliance that protected its members for almost 80 years. To do so, among other things, they spread disinformation. Countering such disinformation is unlikely to reverse the course of history. It can, however, help Europeans gain a clearer understanding of the situation: what NATO really is and does, how it works, can it survive without the U.S., and what European countries should do – and how much should they pay – to achieve strategic autonomy.
This article is current as of July 6, 2026
ZOOM-IN
A Closer Look at Cases Detected by the EDMO Network
As noted by Nate Reynolds, senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, “the NATO summit comes at a pivotal moment in Russia’s war against Ukraine. Moscow’s offensive has stalled, and Ukraine is using drones to disrupt Russian logistics, threaten Crimea, and strike energy and industrial infrastructure hundreds of miles from the front. But Russian President Vladimir Putin is not relenting, and no one should expect the war to end soon”.
While European leaders will again try to persuade Trump that squeezing Moscow is the way to end the war, Russian disinformation machine is seeking to weaken political cohesion among allies. False or misleading narratives—such as claims that Ukraine attacks allied countries, diverts Western aid, or relies on vast numbers of foreign mercenaries—are used to erode public support for military assistance and amplify disagreements within NATO.
Ukraine does not attack allies with drones
Since August 2025, Ukraine has begun using a new strategy in its fight against Russia – drone strikes on the aggressor’s strategic assets, i.e. oil refineries, pumping stations, oil storage depots and export terminals. Military experts explain that Kiev has had such an idea for a long time, but the thoughts quickly turned into actions after US President Donald Trump came to power. As pointed out in EDMO Weekly Pulse of 11 June, while Ukraine targets military and energy-related facilities inside Russia as part of its self-defense, drones sometimes end up in neighboring countries and generally do so after being diverted by Russian electronic warfare systems. The Kremlin has systematically exploited such events to reinforce one of its core propaganda messages: the risk of an uncontrolled escalation of the war in Ukraine, one that will gradually draw European countries into the conflict and ultimately lead to nuclear catastrophe.
Re:Baltica article reviews several incidents cited by pro-Kremlin accounts, unveiling persistent disinformation activities on Facebook aimed at creating informational uncertainty, sawing divisions among NATO allies, and increasing polarisation in societies. It explains that a drone explosion in Romania was acknowledged by Ukraine as a loss of control, with Romanian officials attributing the likely cause to Russian electronic interference. It also notes that attacks on ships carrying fuel, military supplies, or allegedly stolen Ukrainian grain occurred in occupied or Russian-controlled areas, making them, according to Ukraine, legitimate military targets. Claims about Finland and Bulgaria are similarly presented as lacking critical context. Overall, the article argues that these incidents are being selectively framed to support a false narrative that Ukraine is intentionally attacking its allies, when the available evidence does not support that conclusion.
No, the BBC did not reveal that “70,000 French mercenaries” are fighting in Ukraine
EDMO Belux debunks a viral claim that the BBC revealed 70,000 French mercenaries were fighting alongside Ukraine and that the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs had acknowledged at least 22,000.
Investigators found no evidence that the French Foreign Ministry or the BBC ever made such statements. Searches of official government websites and social media accounts produced no matching announcements, while both the French Ministry of the Armed Forces and the BBC explicitly denied the claims. The ministry also noted that mercenary activity is prohibited under French law, making it highly unlikely that French authorities would describe their own citizens as “mercenaries.” The article also shows that the misleading posts used a forged video carrying the branding of the French magazine Le Point. The publication confirmed that its logo and visual style had been impersonated and reported the fake content to online platforms. The video first appeared on Russian-language Telegram channels associated with known Kremlin disinformation networks before spreading across multiple social media platforms in several languages.
Finally, the fact-check explains that while a small number of French volunteers have joined Ukraine’s armed forces since 2022, publicly available evidence suggests the figures are in the hundreds – not tens of thousands. The article concludes that the false claim is another example of recurring Russian information operations designed to exaggerate foreign military involvement in Ukraine and undermine support for Kyiv.
Is support for Ukraine undermining social housing investments in Germany ?
Misleading narratives exaggerating the social and economic costs of allies’ aid to Ukraine are often pushed on social media in many EU member states to undermine European solidarity and weaken governmental action against Russia’s war of aggression.
GADMO’s article examines a widely shared social media claim that German Chancellor Friedrich Merz allocated €233 million exclusively for housing construction in Ukraine while Germany itself faces a shortage of 1.4 million homes. The figure of €233 million does appear in the German government’s April 2026 strategic partnership agreement with Ukraine. However, the money is intended for a broad package of development cooperation measures rather than solely for housing. According to Germany’s Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ), only €25 million of the total is earmarked for social housing. The remaining funds support areas including industrial cooperation, energy resilience, workforce training for reconstruction, local governance, anti-corruption initiatives, and Ukraine’s preparation for EU membership.
The article also addresses the comparison with Germany’s housing shortage. While the estimate of a 1.4 million-home deficit is based on a legitimate housing study, the German government argues that domestic housing investment continues independently of aid to Ukraine. Berlin plans to provide €23.5 billion in federal funding for social housing through 2029.
ELECTION BEAT
Tracking electoral disinformation through EDMO Hubs
AI Video Invents Verdict on Fabricated Election Law
A video circulating on TikTok claims that Alice Weidel (Member of the German Parliament, AfD) has filed a complaint with the Federal Constitutional Court regarding a reform of Bundestag electoral law. This law guarantees every German citizen aged 18 or over, the right to vote and stand for election to the German Federal Parliament.
The video further claims that the court has already issued a ruling declaring the law unconstitutional and therefore void. However, these claims are false. While the current German government has been seeking to introduce reforms to the electoral law, no such reform has been officially adopted, and the Federal Constitutional Court has not issued any ruling on the matter.
This content is similar to many other AI slop videos, which often seek to undermine the legitimacy of elections and democratic processes in countries around the world.
How the Romanian Governmental Crisis Was Coordinately Amplified on Facebook
A report by Funky Citizens, a BROD partner, highlights coordinated Facebook activity between June 8-22, a period when Romania had no fully empowered government.
Analyzing 571,565 posts, the report finds domestic politics made up just 12.4% of volume but drove 27.8% of engagement, nearly triple any other topic. The same topic was also the target of the largest coordinated network identified: 402 accounts generated 73,987 coordination events, focused on Nicușor Dan, Adrian Veștea, and Ilie Bolojan. A clickbait story about Dan’s alleged “dismissal” was posted verbatim by 118 pages with a combined 91.6 million followers, while 16 religious- and patriotic-named pages posted an identical line about Bolojan seconds apart, an example of “sliding window” coordination. These pages don’t present as political, instead building audiences under religious, patriotic, or entertainment branding before pivoting to sensationalist content.
The report notes that less two years after the presidential election was annulled for coordinated amplification in favour of a candidate, Romania is confronted with a new episode of coordinated manipulation of public discourse, this time without an identifiable external source and without any visible institutional consequence. Regardless of whether the purpose is attracting traffic through clickbait, amplifying political narratives, or influencing public conversation during periods of crisis, the main risk is the infrastructure that makes coordinated amplification possible – an infrastructure that, as this report shows, survives changes in political context, without visible intervention from the platforms concerned. This raises legitimate questions regarding compliance with the obligations set out in Article 35(1) of the EU Digital Services Act (DSA), which requires very large online platforms to implement effective measures for limiting coordinated inauthentic behaviour.
GLOBAL PULSE
Disinformation narratives shaping the world’s conversations
How Russia tries to deflect blame for the attack on the UNESCO World Heritage property Kiev Pechory Lavra
After Russian forces fired a missile at the UNESCO World Heritage Site of the Pechory Lavra in Kiev in mid-June, pro‑Kremlin sources sought to deflect responsibility by claiming that Ukraine itself had attacked the site, using AI imagery. The Delfi fact‑check finds these allegations to be unsupported and based on misleading narratives rather than evidence.
The incident came amid a broader pattern of Russian attacks on Ukrainian cultural, religious and historical sites, which many observers view as part of a wider effort to undermine the country’s cultural identity and heritage. In an official statement, UNESCO condemned the 15 June strike on the World Heritage site, which is widely regarded as one of Ukraine’s most important spiritual and cultural landmarks.
The case illustrates a familiar tactic of wartime information manipulation: following attacks that attract international attention, alternative narratives are promoted to obscure responsibility and shape perceptions of accountability, even when supporting evidence is lacking.
No, the KGB did not create the Palestinian flag
A claim circulating online alleges that the Palestinian flag was invented by the Soviet KGB and adapted from Jordan’s flag. The ADMO/Oštro fact-check finds this to be historically false: the flag’s design traces back to the Arab Revolt of 1916–1917 and broader Arab nationalist movements that predated both the Soviet Union and the KGB.
Experts note that the flag’s red, black, white and green colours are pan-Arab symbols that have influenced the flags of several countries in the region, including Jordan, the UAE and Kuwait. The claim therefore reverses the historical timeline: rather than being a Soviet invention, the Palestinian flag emerged from political and cultural movements that existed decades before Soviet involvement in the region.
This example show how geopolitical debates can fuel misleading historical narratives, with symbols being recast as products of foreign manipulation rather than understood in their historical context.
RT finds a way back to X despite EU sanctions, getting 6 million views in five days
Just five days after its creation, the X account @RT_on_X had attracted roughly six million views, prompting concerns that Russian state broadcaster RT has found a new way to reach audiences despite EU restrictions on its content. According to analyses by Newsguard/IDMO, the account appears designed to bypass sanctions that were introduced following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
The development highlights the continuing challenge of enforcing sanctions in the digital space. Researchers have repeatedly documented efforts by RT and other Russian state-linked outlets to maintain their reach through alternative accounts, mirror sites and other distribution channels.
The rapid growth of the account raises broader questions about how effectively major platforms can identify and restrict sanctioned state media when they reappear under new branding.
ON A DIFFERENT NOTE
We found that Meta’s existing mitigation measures fail to prevent repeat disinformation offenders from accessing monetization programs.
(De)monetizing Repeat Disinformers”, Report by WHAT TO FIX
Paolo Cesarini, Editorial Director
Tommaso Canetta, Editor-in Chief
Editorial Staff include Elena Coden, Paula Gori, Elena Maggi
This edition draws in part on automated translation and reflects information available as of 8 July 2026. Later developments may not be included.
