



European Digital Media Observatory

FIFA WORLD CUP 2026: HOW DISINFORMATION PLAYS ON OUR DEEPEST INSTINCTS

Monthly Report no. 1 - EDMO fact-checking network

Published on 23 July 2026

A NEW BEGINNING

After five years and 60 editions, the EDMO Monthly Briefs are evolving into Monthly Reports, starting with this issue. The main changes include an expanded geographical scope - from the EU Member States and Norway to a broader range of non-EU countries - and the introduction of a new section on Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI), curated by GLOBSEC. The existing sections of the Monthly Briefs, such as the quantitative monitoring of disinformation and the analysis of disinformation narratives, will remain in place and, where possible, be further expanded thanks to the additional information available.

The new Monthly Reports are designed to provide greater situational awareness of the disinformation and influence operations circulating across Europe and affecting the EU. They are informed by a monthly questionnaire distributed to more than 70 fact-checking organisations that are members of the EDMO fact-checking network.


The Monthly Reports will be structured into four sections. The first section will be dedicated to the European countries covered by EDMO network organisations that provided information through the questionnaire. It will include a general introduction (which, in this issue, consists of this brief explanatory note) and a map showing the distribution across countries of particularly widespread false claims across countries. The second section will focus on the European Union and Norway, and will include quantitative monitoring of the main disinformation topics and AI-generated disinformation, an analysis of the main disinformation narratives identified during the reporting period, and a selection of the most significant disinformation stories at the national level. The third section will be dedicated to non-EU countries and will include an analysis of the main disinformation narratives identified, together with a selection of the most significant disinformation stories reported at the national level. The fourth section will be about Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI), and will offer a more targeted, actor- and TTPs-centred perspective. It will set out the main actors and techniques observed during the reporting period with additional case studies on influence operations, contributing thus to a better situational awareness. The section will also include a recurring overview of known FIMI networks (eg. Pravda News/ Portal Kombatt) actively monitored across editions covering which fact-checking organisations reported encountering accounts or content linked to them, and any notable developments in how these networks operate, including changes to their distribution, amplification methods or observed new campaigns.

EU-based organisations that contributed to the report: AFP, Austria Press Agency (APA), CORRECTIV, Delfi Lithuania, Delfi Estonia, Demagog.org.pl, Demagog.cz, Demagog.sk, EFE Verifica, Ellinika Hoaxes, Fact Check Cyprus, Factcheck Vlaanderen, Faktisk.no, Faktograf, Factual.ro, Greece Fact Check, INFOVERITAS, Källkritikbyrå, Lakmusz, Maldita.es, Newtral, Oštro, Pagella Politica/Facta, Polígrafo, Pravda Association Poland, Media Provereno, Re:Baltica, The Journal FactCheck, TjekDet, VerificaRTVE, Verificat, 15min.

Other European organisations that contributed to the report: AFP, Belarusian Investigative Center, Doğruluk Payı, Faktoje Albania, FakeNews Tracker, Geofacts, Hibrid.info, InternewsKosova, Istinomer.rs, Istinomjer.ba, Metamorphosis Foundation, Myth Detector, Raskrinkavanje.me, Teyit, Vox Ukraine.

THE FIVE FALSE STORIES WITH THE WIDEST CIRCULATION IN EUROPE

- AI-generated videos sexualizing women football fans at the World Cup
- AI or out-of-context content targeting Pride parades during Pride month
- ▲ Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky was killed in a Russian raid
- ◆ Out of context images and videos on protests organized against the real estate project in Albania by Jared Kushner
- ★ Ebola outbreak in the Democratic Republic of the Congo is caused by gold extraction



DISINFORMATION DETECTED IN THE EU*

**Including Norway, that was already in the geographical scope of the Monthly Briefs*


THE WAR IN UKRAINE AND IMMIGRATION: THE TOPICS MOST TARGETED IN JUNE IN THE EU

The 32 organisations that are part of the EDMO fact-checking network in the European Union and Norway, and that contributed to this report, published a total of 1.361 fact-checking articles in June 2026. Of these articles, 134 (10%) focused on disinformation related to immigration; 131 (10%) on Ukraine-related disinformation; 106 (8%) on health-related disinformation (excluding COVID-19 - this is a new category that was added starting this month); 69 (5%) on disinformation related to the EU; 51 (4%) on climate change-related disinformation; 30 (2%) on the crisis in Palestine; 23 (2%) on disinformation about LGBTQ+ and gender issues; 21 (1%) on COVID-19-related disinformation; and 18 (1%) on the war between Israel/USA and Iran.

During the month of June, following the trend of previous months, the most targeted topics by disinformation were immigration and the war in Ukraine. Detected disinformation related to immigration rose by three percentage points, while Ukraine-related disinformation remained stable. As is often the case in summer, disinformation on climate change increased (this year only slightly, by one percentage point); false content targeting the LGBTQ+ community also rose by one percentage point, likely due to Pride Month celebrations.


Meanwhile, disinformation on Covid-19 decreased by three percentage points; a similar trend was recorded for disinformation on the war between the USA, Israel and Iran, which diminished by two percentage points.

The share of disinformation on the other topics monitored by these briefs remained stable, with only minor fluctuations.




AI-GENERATED DISINFORMATION QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS IN THE EU

After the drop recorded in May, the share of disinformation created or manipulated using AI has increased again by four percentage points. Out of 1.361 fact-checking articles, 210 focused on this type of content, representing 15% of the total.



The increase in AI-generated content is probably due to the viral trend of creating AI-generated fan cams - often hypersexualized - for the FIFA Men's World Cup (see slide n.7). Among these, a viral video showed a fan dressed as Adolf Hitler while watching a Germany match. AI was also used to spread islamophobia, depicting a Danish school class taking part in a Muslim prayer, and anti-immigration sentiment, with a street allegedly vandalised by migrants following celebrations of Paris Saint-Germain (PSG)'s victory in the Champions League final. The war in Ukraine was also targeted by AI-generated disinformation, with claims providing doctored "proof" of Ukraine staging attacks and an image of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky mimicking a pose of Hitler.



DISINFORMATION NARRATIVES' ANALYSIS:

1) FIFA MEN'S WORLD CUP 2026 USED TO SPREAD RACIST, SEXIST AND POLITICAL DISINFORMATION

As the FIFA Men's World Cup began on June 11, disinformation actors started leveraging the international resonance of the competition to spread false news. As mentioned in slide n.6, AI was widely used to create (and monetise) sexualised videos and images of women in the stadiums, but also to alter the words of match commentators, inserting racist remarks. The LGBTQ+ community was also targeted by disinformation surrounding the World Cup, with claims that the captain of the Croatian national team, Luka Modrić, would not wear a rainbow-colored armband at the tournament (a similar story circulated in Serbia, featuring tennis player Novak Djokovic at the French Open).

Politics also became a frequent theme in false stories surrounding the football tournament and its participants. Posts appeared online claiming that the Polish flag was featured on the Haiti national football team's jerseys to honour the Polish Legions' participation in the Haitian Revolution. Swedish football player Lucas Bergvall was the subject of a highly political story linked to the Great Replacement theory, as false news circulated that he invited "every woman who has a crush on me to stop voting for mass migration, or my people will not exist anymore." The captain of the French team Kylian Mbappé also featured in a false story likely spread by pro-Russian disinformation, according to which he revealed to have left PSG for Real Madrid because of French President Emmanuel Macron.



2) THE HEATWAVE FUELS CLIMATE DENIALIST DISINFORMATION

As is often the case in the summer months and after extreme weather events, climate-related disinformation and climate change denialist claims spread on social media throughout the EU. One of the most viral claims is an evergreen and it involves the comparison of two weather forecast maps of Europe across different time periods to suggest global warming is a scam: according to this narrative, which was also fueled by AI-generated content, the current “mainstream” media spreads overly dramatic reports and fabricates heat-related deaths. Another climate change denialist story was also shared by US President Donald Trump, claiming that even the UN admitted its own errors in climate change projections.

As the heatwave swept across Europe, false content was shared claiming to show its effects: e.g. traffic lights on the streets of Germany and Italy melted due to the heat. Meanwhile, such a disinformation environment contributed to the spread of false news on renewable energy, e.g. the construction of solar power plants is more harmful to the environment than coal-fired power stations.



3) DISINFORMATION ON IMMIGRATION AND THE WAR IN UKRAINE



In June, disinformation on immigration increased, likely linked to the stabbing of a 40-year-old man that led to rioting in Belfast, Northern Ireland (a recurring issue in the past years across the UK and Ireland). False news spread in Ireland that a woman had been drugged by touching a business card given to her by “foreign nationals”. In Germany, false claims circulated that former German chancellor Angela Merkel admitted that she “deliberately flooded” her country with “immigrants from the Third World” to curb the far right. In the Netherlands, a mannequin was allegedly seized by police because Pakistani people found its clothing indecent. Moreover, recurring claims alleged that churches have been burned by Muslim people across Europe and that 250,000 girls in the UK have been sexually abused by groups with an immigrant background.



In June, anti-Ukraine disinformation was boosted by the words of the then-U.S. Director of National Intelligence, Tulsi Gabbard, about secret laboratories to create biological weapons in Ukraine. Pro-Russian disinformation channels also disseminated the false story that the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague acknowledged Russia's sovereignty over Crimea. Meanwhile, false claims exaggerating the economic support of EU countries to Ukraine also spread, e.g. that Germany is investing 233 million euros in housing construction in Ukraine, and Czech President Petr Pavel asked that his donated blood be sent to Ukraine. Well-known disinformation narratives about corruption of Ukrainian elites also circulated throughout the EU, e.g. that Ukrainian officials are about to buy superyachts.

An interesting case of cross-topic disinformation also claimed that Ukraine plans to bring in 4.5 million workers from Asia and Africa over the next decade, who would be granted freedom of movement within the EU if Ukraine were to join.

THE MOST SIGNIFICANT DISINFORMATION STORIES AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL:



A teenager was trafficked and murdered by the Norwegian child protective services.



Prime Minister Péter Magyar showing the middle finger to people protesting against the Migration Pact of the EU.



2011's Mari naval base explosion was not an accident but rather a deliberate act of foreign or domestic sabotage.



President Petr Pavel reportedly said that "the Czechs will fight for Ukraine".



DISINFORMATION IN EUROPE* OUTSIDE THE EU

**Europe refers to the countries of the Council of Europe,
plus Kosovo, Belarus and Russia*

DISINFORMATION NARRATIVES' ANALYSIS:

1) PRO-RUSSIAN AND ANTI-EU DISINFORMATION SPREADS IN BELARUS AND UKRAINE



In Ukraine, several pro-Russian disinformation narratives were detected in June. False stories continued to promote the narrative that mercenaries from EU countries are fighting in the country, with one particular variation focusing on Polish mercenaries in the UAF, who were allegedly suffering the highest casualties due to internal conflicts within the army. Together with other false stories targeting Poland, this narrative aimed to exacerbate tensions between Warsaw and Kyiv, which had worsened following disputes over the naming of a military unit after the Ukrainian Insurgent Army. Pro-Russian propaganda also attempted to reframe some recent military events (e.g. the Ukrainian drone attack on Moscow or the Russian drone crash in Romania) in a way that was more favourable to the Kremlin. It also targeted the EU with the misleading claim that EU countries had decided to refuse temporary protection to Ukrainian men subject to military service obligations and would soon begin deporting them, as well as the Ukrainian leadership with false stories portraying it as cowardly and applying double standards.



Anti-EU disinformation circulated in Belarus, aiming to depict EU countries as morally corrupt and helpless, and the people living there as poor and disadvantaged: e.g. a false claim that the situation of undernourishment in the EU is worsening. Pro-Russian disinformation also spread false claims that the number of Ukrainians who support the withdrawal of the Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF) from Donetsk Region in order to end the war is growing by 5–6 percentage points every month.

2) DISINFORMATION FUELS DIVISIONS IN THE BALKANS, TARGETS ELECTIONS IN KOSOVO AND PROTESTS IN ALBANIA



In the Balkans, disinformation mostly aimed to fuel divisions and hatred among countries. In Serbia, false news circulated that citizens in Montenegro would face prison sentences for saying that “Serbs are not a genocidal people”. In North Macedonia, disinformation claimed that a new rulebook imposed by "DUI commanders" (leaders of the former Albanian guerrilla group from 2001) allows "bearded Wahhabis" and "UÇK members" to patrol and identify citizens. In Montenegro, claims spread that the President of Croatia Zoran Milanović recently arrived in Tivat aboard a Croatian military ship. Anti-EU/NATO disinformation also leveraged local divisions: e.g. a “Western project” aims to dismantle North Macedonia, which would be partitioned by its neighbours, and NATO’s KFOR in Kosovo is a threat to the Serbian community.



Ahead of Kosovo’s elections on June 7, disinformation targeted the sexual orientation and personal identity of Osman Musliu (see slide n.15), an imam and candidate for the Vetëvendosje Movement (LVV). Meanwhile, Serbian and Russian media outlets intensified the divisive, and false, narrative that the Serbian List was the only legitimate political representative of the Serbian community in Kosovo.



Another focus of disinformation in the Western Balkans, and in the whole Europe as well (see slide n.3), were the protests in Albania against a controversial luxury tourism development project by Jared Kushner's investment group on protected coastal land that expanded into a broader anti-government movement. AI-generated or out-of-context images and videos circulated, to convey the message that there was foreign involvement in the protests, to link the protests to communism, to exaggerate their dimension, or to prove that Albania is selling land to Israel.

3) ARMENIAN ELECTIONS LEVERAGED FOR SPREADING ANTI-EU SENTIMENT IN GEORGIA



In Georgia, disinformation aimed to depict EU countries as disadvantaged and in poor condition: e.g. a video was shared purportedly showing a neighbourhood in London with many homeless people living in difficult living conditions, and disinformation questioned the amount of pension in Germany, comparing it to Georgian pension. Another narrative targeting the EU in Georgia also involved Moldova, which is allegedly less democratic but nonetheless favored by the EU while Georgia is “punished” for refusing to open a so-called “second front” against Russia.

Disinformation also leveraged parliamentary elections in Armenia on June 7 to spread anti-EU sentiment. A claim was spread that French President Emmanuel Macron had made the following statement: “If it is pro-European, it is democracy. If it is pro-Russian, it is foreign interference.” Within this narrative, another claim circulated that Janez Lenarčič, OSCE’s head of election observation mission in Armenia, said that the country’s elections were conducted under unprecedented internal pressure, as well as external sanctions and threats, while in reality he was talking about foreign interference from Russia.



In Turkey, internal political disinformation targeted opposition leader Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu (see slide n.15); meanwhile, a video was also shared allegedly showing a rally organised by him. False news also related to international conflicts happening in nearby Western Asia, with AI-generated contents showing the Iranian army shooting down a US helicopter and Israeli soldiers destroying a church in Lebanon.

THE MOST SIGNIFICANT DISINFORMATION STORIES AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL OUTSIDE THE EU



Opposition leader Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu was booed at actor Kadir İnanır's funeral.




Manipulated image of Prime Minister Albin Kurti and imam Osman Musliu wearing LGBTQ+ symbols.



President Volodymyr Zelenskyi took his family abroad with forged documents before Russia's full-scale invasion.



Former President Salome Zourabichvili stated: "if not for the regime governing Georgia, Georgia would be standing alongside Ukraine."



FOREIGN INFORMATION MANIPULATION AND INTERFERENCE ANALYSIS

SUMMARY

This report provides a comprehensive overview of the information manipulation landscape in June 2026, highlighting persistent challenges and emerging trends impacting the European information environment. Key findings indicate a continued reliance on established actors and narratives, alongside a notable evolution in operational tactics, particularly the sophisticated integration of commercial objectives with ideological influence. The report identifies the widespread **reuse and re-contextualization of authentic media** as a dominant cross-border pattern, alongside the increasing deployment of **AI-generated visual assets** to scale and diversify malign online campaigns. Two detailed case studies further illuminate these dynamics: a Sweden-based network seamlessly blending political polarization with commercial monetization, and the cross-border amplification of LGBT-related content originating from local European incidents, demonstrating complex Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI) vectors. followers.

ANALYSIS OF ACTORS AND OPERATIONAL MODALITIES

The information environment in June 2026 was to be shaped by a diverse array of actors employing varied operational modalities. A significant observation is the **persistence of known entities**, with most named sources having been previously identified by fact-checking organizations and researchers. This suggests a resilient ecosystem of actors capable of adapting and sustaining their influence operations over time. These actors can be broadly categorized as follows:

Recurring Pro-Kremlin Sources and Amplifiers	These entities consistently engage in the publication and amplification of narratives critical of Ukraine, NATO, and the European Union, often aligning with Russian geopolitical interests. Their activities demonstrate a sustained effort to shape public opinion and sow discord within the European sphere.
Synthetic Local Personas	A growing trend involves the creation of artificial online identities, often utilizing AI-generated profile imagery. These personas produce fluent local language political content and engage in mutual sharing, suggesting coordinated efforts to create an illusion of organic grassroots support for specific narratives.
Public and Partisan Figures	Established individuals within political or public life continue to serve as conduits for misleading claims. Their existing platforms lend a veneer of credibility to problematic content, particularly on sensitive topics such as migration, public policy, and vaccination.
Commercial Clickbait and Fraud Networks	A substantial portion of observed activity is driven by financial incentives. These networks employ fabricated news, emotionally charged stories, or impersonation tactics to generate clicks, advertising revenue, or facilitate fraudulent schemes. This highlights the convergence of false information with profit-driven motives.
Coordinated Multi-Account Activity	Instances of coordinated dissemination, such as large clusters of social media accounts acting in concert, underscore the organized nature of some influence operations, even when a common sponsor or explicit coordination is not immediately apparent.

These actor types, while distinct in their primary motivations or operational styles, frequently intersect and leverage similar tactics to achieve their objectives. The enduring presence of these actors necessitates continuous monitoring and adaptive countermeasures.

DISSEMINATION PATTERNS AND STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS

Malign information campaigns in June 2026 exhibited several discernible dissemination patterns, each carrying significant strategic implications for the integrity of the information space:


Reuse and Relabelling Across Countries	A consistently observed cross-border pattern involves the re-contextualization of authentic footage, photographs, maps, and documents. Content originally produced for one event or location is frequently stripped of its original context and re-applied to new political or geographical narratives, thereby manipulating perception without resorting to outright fabrication.
Persistence of Known Assets	The high recurrence rate of identified accounts, channels, public figures, and outlets indicates a robust and persistent infrastructure for dissemination of the problematic content. This resilience allows actors to maintain relevance across diverse topics and reporting cycles, posing a continuous challenge to detection and mitigation efforts.
Authority-Based Distribution	A key tactic involves the strategic use of perceived authority to lend credibility to misleading claims. This includes the deployment of fabricated experts, impersonated media brands, and synthetic professional personas, designed to exploit trust mechanisms within the information ecosystem.
Commercial and Ideological Incentives	Malign information operations are often driven by a dual motivation: the pursuit of political or geopolitical influence, and the generation of financial gain through clicks, advertising income, or fraudulent conversions. While these incentives may differ, they frequently employ similar high-emotion content formats, blurring the lines between propaganda and profit.

CASE STUDY: SWEDEN-BASED INFLUENCE AND COMMERCIAL NETWORK

An in-depth investigation conducted by GLOBSEC in cooperation with EDMO Ireland identified a sophisticated cross-platform network that illustrates the convergence of ideological influence and commercial monetisation. The network appears to use highly polarising narratives to attract attention and systematically direct users towards commercial websites.

The operation is primarily active on Instagram, where a cluster of accounts disseminates religious, anti-immigration and conspiratorial content. These profiles often present themselves as far-right, anti-Muslim or Christian-themed pages and rely on controversial, emotionally charged posts to generate high levels of engagement. This attention is subsequently converted into commercial traffic, with users directed to online stores such as **Sacredchristians.com**, which sells jewellery, and **Survival-hub.com**, which promotes survival products and health supplements, including products marketed through misleading claims related to vaccine “spike proteins”. The available evidence indicates that the network is likely coordinated by an individual based in Sweden who appears to manage or support multiple “faceless” social-media pages and use them as marketing funnels. The investigation also identified the use of AI-generated visual material in promotional content. Image metadata, prompt-like filenames and visual inconsistencies suggest that generative AI tools, including Google’s Nano Banana, were used to produce at least some of the marketing assets. These findings do not, however, establish that the advertised physical products themselves do not exist.

The investigation remains ongoing and will include coordination with relevant EDMO hubs, preparation of the findings for publication and the reporting of the identified network to the relevant social-media platforms. Collectively, the identified Instagram accounts have an audience of more than **4.5 million followers**.



Example of the Instagram profile belonging to the network of accounts.

CASE STUDY: LGBT-RELATED CONTENT AND CROSS-BORDER AMPLIFICATION


This case study examines the cross-border dissemination of a video relating to an LGBT march in Vilnius, Lithuania. It illustrates how a local incident can be removed from its original context, recirculated by influential foreign actors and subsequently amplified by networks in Europe to support broader ideological narratives.

The video originated from a legitimate report published by a Lithuanian media outlet on 12 June 2024. It showed a child stamping on a rainbow flag during an LGBT march in Vilnius. The original article noted that the footage had already circulated through Russian-language Telegram channels, where it was used to discredit LGBT communities and reinforce homophobic narratives about Europe.

Exactly two years later, on 12 June 2026, the video resurfaced on X through a US-based account promoting “America First” perspectives. It was shared without any indication that the footage was two years old or without the context provided in the original reporting. The timing was potentially significant, as the main Pride march in Warsaw took place the following day, creating a heightened information environment around LGBT-related issues in Poland.

On 18 June, the video was further amplified by a prominent US-based political influencer with substantial reach in conservative online communities. The account had previously gained visibility through its content being referenced in high-level US political communication. This amplification appears to have acted as a bridge between the US information environment and European audiences.

Following this intervention, the video was rapidly “re-exported” to Europe. Between 18 and 20 June, it was reposted more than 80 times by accounts located across Europe, with the largest concentration observed in Poland. Collectively, these posts generated more than **109,600 interactions** and over **3.3 million** views.



Visualisation of the dissemination pattern of the decontextualised video by tool GladiOS developed by Gerulata Technologies,

The case demonstrates how high-reach foreign influencers can accelerate the cross-border circulation of decontextualised content and activate downstream amplification by European accounts. The observed pattern displays characteristics associated with foreign information manipulation and information laundering - an older piece of content was strategically reintroduced into a politically sensitive context, stripped of relevant temporal information and amplified across national information spaces. However, the available evidence establishes the dissemination pathway rather than proving central coordination or direct political sponsorship.

PRAVDA NETWORK CROSS-REFERENCE

Analysis of collected data in June 2026 revealed direct and indirect links to the Pravda Network, particularly in Poland, Spain, and the Balkans, indicating its role in amplifying pro-Kremlin narratives across various European regions.

- **Poland:** The Demagog Association identified that the Telegram channel t.me/infokju had been cited by Pravda Poland. Additionally, four other Telegram channels: newsfactory_pl, ukr_leaks_pl, Olej_w_Glowie, and RuskiStatekCzat were identified as primary sources for the Polish Pravda subdomain, poland.news-pravda[.]com. Olej_w_Glowie is notably its most frequently used source.
- **Spain:** VerificaRTVE identified @pravdaescom as a pro-Russian Telegram channel that mirrors content published on the Spanish-language Pravda subdomain, spanish.news pravda[.]com. This highlights the importance of monitoring original content sources prior to their republication on Pravda News Telegram channels.
- **Balkans:** InternewsKosova reported that content produced by @balkanar, concerning the security of the Serbian community in Kosovo, was subsequently utilized and amplified by the broader Pravda network. This content has appeared across 68 Pravda News subdomains, with a particular prevalence on those focused on the Balkans and Serbia.


In June 2026, the Pravda Network published approximately 130,800 articles across subdomains targeting countries covered by the EDMO project¹. The volume of newly published content gradually declined over the course of the month, with recurring drops that generally coincided with weekends.



Number of articles published by Pravda Network subdomains targeting countries included in the June 2026 analysis.


¹ Countries included in the analysis: Albania, Austria, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Montenegro, Netherlands, North Macedonia, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, Ukraine, Selected Albania, Austria, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Montenegro, Netherlands, North Macedonia, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, Ukraine.

The 20 most frequently cited sources during the analysed period consisted primarily of Telegram channels and websites focused on Central and Eastern Europe, particularly Poland, Slovakia, Czechia, Bulgaria, Serbia and Greece.




Share of leading sources used by the Pravda Network in June 2026.

Several Telegram channels displayed apparent links to sources operating in other national information environments. For example, one Slovak-language channel (t.me/puchoviny) listed a @selskyrozum_bot Telegram bot as its contact, while a Greek-language channel (t.me/koinos_nous) linked to a contact associated with a Polish pro-Kremlin channel @Olej_w_Glowie_bot. These cross-references suggest that some apparently local channels may be connected to, supported by or operated within broader transnational pro-Kremlin ecosystems. The available evidence, however, is not sufficient on its own to establish common ownership or centralised control.



Pro-Kremlin Telegram channels listing contacts associated with known propaganda sources in other countries.

The highest volumes of content were published on subdomains targeting Serbia, Germany and Slovakia. The prominence of the Serbian subdomain is consistent with the Pravda Network’s broader structure, as it is among the network’s largest country-focused sections, following the subdomain targeting the United States.



Number of new articles published by each Pravda Network subdomain in June 2026.

SYSTEMATIC MIRRORING ON TELEGRA.PH

The most significant development identified in June 2026 was the systematic duplication of Pravda Network articles on Telegra.ph. Each newly published article appeared to include an alternative link in its source code, marked with the **rel="alternate"** attribute, directing users or automated systems to a mirrored version of the same content hosted on Telegra.ph.



The same article published on [Pravda News Poland](#) and mirrored on [Telegra.ph](#).



The same article published on [Pravda News Albania](#) and mirrored on [Telegra.ph](#).

The analysis indicates that this practice is applied across Pravda Network subdomains rather than being limited to individual country sections. While the immediate effect on audience reach may appear limited, the mechanism could have broader implications for content persistence, discoverability and automated information retrieval.

Mirroring content on a widely accessible, free and anonymous publishing platform may allow Pravda material to remain available even where the network's own domains are restricted, deprioritised or excluded from data collection. Blocking or filtering the entire Telegra.ph domain would be considerably more difficult because the platform also hosts legitimate, unrelated and, in some cases, counter-propaganda content.

This practice may therefore increase the likelihood that pro-Kremlin narratives are indexed, retrieved or incorporated into datasets used by search engines, automated monitoring systems and large language models. At this stage, the findings demonstrate a large-scale content-mirroring infrastructure that may strengthen the resilience and long-term visibility of Pravda Network material.

This analysis was created with the support of the tool GladiOS developed by Gerulata Technologies.

METHODOLOGY

The information contained in this brief was collected via a questionnaire sent to the fact-checking organizations belonging to the EDMO fact-checking network.

Reference period: 1-30 June 2026. Number of respondents: 46.

FIMI section was also created with the support of the tool GladiOS developed by Gerulata Technologies.

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Annexes to GLOBSEC's analyses: [Annexes June 2026](#) For further
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