European Digital Media Observatory

SCHOOL OF TRANSNATIONAL GOVERNANCE

European Digital Media Observatory

Literature review on actors of disinformation in the European Union

Authors

Konrad Bleyer-Simon, Minna Aslama Horowitz, Madalina Botan, Mato Brautovic, Elda Brogi, Ianis Bucholtz, Eileen Culloty, Beáta Gavurová, Socrates Ioakem, Jan Erik Kermer, Keith Kiely, Pantelitsa Leonidou, Raul Magallon Rosa, Megan Mallia, José Moreno, Iva Nenadić, Miguel Paisana, Marie Palmer, Urbano Reviglio, Nikolas Salamanos, Maria Giovanna Sessa, Thanos Sitistas, Jana Soukupová, Sten Torpan, Teresa Weikmann

Edited and coordinated by Konrad Bleyer-Simon

Literature review on actors of disinformation in the European Union

The European Digital Media Observatory has received funding from the European Union under contract number LC-01935415

Abstract

This report is a first attempt at mapping the different kinds of actors behind disinformation in the 27 EU member states. The categories assessed are **a)** domestic actors, **b)** foreign information manipulators, **c)** cognate actors that enable spillovers from other countries, **d)** the state, **e)** politicians, **f)** mainstream media and **g)** fringe media. While, in one way or another, local actors are active in all EU member states, foreign operations are not documented everywhere – even if there are indications that the majority of the countries were impacted by them. The remaining categories show a great divergence across countries – thus implying that the composition of the groups and actors behind false narratives and information manipulation is unique in every country.

Introduction

Disinformation is spread by a multitude of different actors. In many cases, they are local, such as political parties, fringe political movements, conspiracy theorists, clickbait news media, or, in some cases, also mainstream media, including offline media, such as certain television stations. In a number of countries, politicians are considered to be sources of widely shared untrue statements. In certain cases, even the government or the state can spread or amplify disinformation. Foreign actors also play a role in compromising information integrity. Russian influence was documented in many countries, even if the country itself doesn't have strong ties to Russia. In particular, there is a relatively large prevalence of Russian disinformation actors in countries bordering Ukraine or Russia. In some cases, information operations of other countries, such as China, were also documented.

This is a first attempt to summarise the evidence collected through studies and investigations regarding the most prevalent disinformation actors in the EU member states. We cover 27 countries in this report – all the EU member states. The report is based on input from researchers of EDMO Hubs, as well as a review of secondary sources, such as the country reports of the Media Pluralism Monitor 2024, the country fact sheets and reports of EU Disinfo Lab, as well as reports published by the EU's External Action Service and other relevant organisations. Given that there is no systematic analysis of this topic, the present report does not have the ambition to present a comprehensive mapping of relevant actors in each country[1].

For the purposes of the present report, disinformation is broadly defined as fabricated, harmful content that is distributed across a multitude of channels, with a possibility of undermining political processes or posing threats to a democratic society. Following the definition of Wardle and Derakhshan (2017), we consider disinformation to be intentionally spread harmful and misleading content. However, we also partly cover actors behind certain forms of information manipulations, such as hack and leak attacks, and some forms of misinformation – the latter refers to false or misleading content that is spread without the intent to harm (Wardle and Derakhshan, 2017).

We focus mainly on disinformation content that is political in its topics, as certain forms of specialised disinformation, such as health and climate disinformation might mobilise different disinformation actors. To be transparent on the sources of information and the ways in which we determined whether certain actors are considered active in a given country, we provide an explanation of sources and examples of actors per category, based on the following table of methods and disinformation actors.[2] In order to get a complete picture, this report should be read in conjunction with EDMO's reports on the disinformation policy landscape in the EU member states.

---

[1] In the literature, the main identified suppliers of mis- and disinformation are (1) political actors, (2) media actors, and (3) citizens; key motives are political and financial. See, for example Lecheler, S., & Egelhofer, J. L. (2022). Disinformation, Misinformation, and Fake News: Understanding the Supply Side. In J. Strömbäck, Å. Wikforss, K. Glüer, T. Lindholm, & H. Oscarsson (Eds.), *Knowledge Resistance in High-Choice Information Environments*. Routledge.

[2] When providing the comparative table of countries, we use the ISO-3166-2 2 two-letter country codes for the EU member states.

AT	BE	BG	HR	CY	CZ	DK	EE	FI	FR	DE	GR	HU	IE	IT	LV	LT	LU	MT	NL	PL	PT	RO	SK	SI	ES	SE
Local actors																										
x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Foreign information interferences and a visibly active role of international actors																										
	x	x	x			x	x	x	x	x	x		x	x	x	x	x		x	x		x			x	x
Spillovers from neighbouring countries (or countries with the same language)																										
x	x		x	x		x		x		x			x				x				x			x		x
State/government and state-sponsored actors (local)																										
		x										x						x								
Political parties and politicians (not government)																										
x		x	x		x		x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x		x		x	x	x	x	x	x	
Mainstream media																										
x		x	x	x	x						x	x		x	x			x		x		x	x	x		
Fringe media																										
x	x		x		x		x	x	x	x		x	x	x	x			x				x	x	x	x	

Local actors

Local actors play a role in every country of the EU – disinformation cannot be seen simply as a product of foreign manipulations. The kinds of local actors might, however, differ from country to country. In this category, we look at "local" actors broadly: we assess whether there are actors originating from EU member states focusing (at least in part) on audiences in their own countries. Country reports on disinformation (such as the EU Disinfo Lab country profiles) and media pluralism (such as the Media Pluralism Monitor country reports) show that there are local purveyors of disinformation, such as conspiracy theorists, extremists, unstructured groups of social media users or popular influencers in every country. There are also cases in which the local actors are the state, political parties, mainstream or fringe media – we will look at these different categories in more detail in the next chapters (below, under "State/Government and state-sponsored actors", "Political parties and politicians", "Mainstream media" and "Fringe media").

Foreign actors

The activities of foreign actors are looked at mainly in the form of FIMI – Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI). The European External Action Service (EEAS) found signs of foreign information attacks in several EU member states. The Doppelgänger operation, for instance, created websites mimicking existing mainstream websites in France, Germany, Italy, Poland and Spain (EUvsDisinfo, 2024) but possibly targeted other countries as well. Between late 2022 and late 2023, high numbers of foreign information attacks were recorded in Poland, Germany and France (more than 20 per country). Some attacks (between 1 and 5) were registered in Spain, Italy, Croatia, Romania, Bulgaria, Greece, Belgium, the Netherlands, Ireland, Lithuania, Latvia, Denmark, Sweden, and Finland (EEAS, 2024). In its previous report, the EEAS highlighted that foreign disinformation was spreading in 16 EU languages (EEAS, 2023): in addition to the countries/languages already mentioned, the list includes Portuguese (however, based on the information available, the focus of these campaigns can also be Brazil rather than Portugal).[3]

Although interference by foreign agents is not significant in Portugal, the general election of March 2024 revealed a disinformation campaign being spread through YouTube ads, with covert foreign origin connected to South American and Brazilian actors (Cardoso et al. 2024). From EDMO investigations it transpired that in the span of one week (20-26 March 2024), the Pravda network (initially identified by VigiNum, 2024) was active in 19 EU countries: Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Denmark, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Bulgaria, Romania, Finland, Sweden, Portugal, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Cyprus, Ireland, Slovenia (Sitistas et al., 2024). At the time of finalising this report, analyses by members of the EDMO Network

[3] 16 of them are EU official languages (Bulgarian, Czech, German, Greek, Danish, Dutch, English, French, Italian, Latvian, Lithuanian, Polish, Portuguese, Romanian, Spanish, Swedish).

detected foreign interference related to the Romanian Presidential elections on 24 November and 8 December as well as the Parliamentary elections on 1 December 2024 (Checkfirst, 2024, European Commission, 2024). Indeed, the results of the first round of the Presidential election were annulled by the Constitutional Court (Sarbu & Tanno, 2024).

A special case is Croatia, where a major source of disinformation is neighbouring Serbia (Brautović, 2022 & Brautović, 2023), while in the other cases, disinformation predominantly originates from Russia (or Belarus, in the case of Poland). China is also considered a threat, but there are less documented cases of interference. In February 2024, CitizenLab unveiled an information operation named “Paperwall”. This Chinese-originated influence operation has built a network of 123 dummy media outlets worldwide, with a strong presence in Europe. The exposed assets included a Belgian and a Luxembourg website (Alaphilippe, 2024). Iran has also targeted Western European countries with disinformation campaigns (Office of Public Affairs, 2020). In Sweden, a disinformation campaign was driven by foreign actors from Arabic-speaking countries (Giandomenico & Linderstål, 2023).

Even if a country is not the direct target of foreign disinformation actors, this does not mean that local audiences are not exposed to narratives of foreign origin – in Hungary, for example, many government-aligned media outlets use Russian state-controlled media as information sources and amplify their messages (Kapronczay, 2022; Urbán et al. 2023). There are also cases in which the activity of foreign actors cannot be clearly established. Taxitary (2024) mentions that anti-Ukrainian narratives in Cyprus might be amplified by Russian actors – as the country is popular amongst Russian investors. Thus, there is a chance that Cyprus is also impacted by foreign information manipulation, despite not being flagged in other assessments of foreign information manipulation. Actors based in Ukraine were also mentioned behind certain disinformation campaigns (EU Disinfo Lab, 2021a).

Spillovers from neighbouring countries

Pieces of content and narratives can easily make it into the social media feeds of users in neighbouring countries, especially if they share a language – thus creating a spillover of disinformation. Content creators who are familiar with multiple cultures (we can call them cognate actors) can adapt these narratives to the local conditions. Spillovers happen in Belgium, Luxembourg (Gentil & Sessa, 2024a&b), Ireland (Culloty, 2023), Cyprus, and Austria. At the same time, there are also indications that Austrian disinformation influences German audiences (Reveland & Siggelkow, 2023). Croatia and Slovenia see significant spillovers from other former Yugoslav republics, due to the similarity of the languages spoken (see, for example, Brautovic, 2022, 2023 & 2024). The work of the EDMO hub NORDIS (Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden) has shown that cultural proximity allows the circulation of disinformation, propaganda, and hoaxes in Scandinavia (NORDIS, 2024). Portugal experiences a spread of Portuguese-language disinformation that originates from the Brazilian

discourse. Additionally, the last European election in Portugal, in June, also registered an increase in anti-immigration disinformative discourse by the far-right party Chega, in some instances suggesting coordination with the far-right party Vox in Spain on that subject (Cardoso et al., 2024b). The effect of Russian disinformation on neighbouring countries with Russian-speaking populations should be considered an example of foreign influence operation.[4] There has been no research so far on whether there have been significant spillovers of Hungarian disinformation narratives to the neighbouring countries with sizable Hungarian-speaking populations.

State/government and state-sponsored actors

The State, the government and state-sponsored actors play a role only in a handful of countries. This is especially the case in countries where the institutions of the state are captured by a powerful interest group, such as Hungary. In Poland, this was the case under the PiS government, as well as in Slovenia under the SDS government. In Malta, the researchers reported that state-sponsored/state-sanctioned "trolls" are a major factor in spreading disinformation. A 2018 investigation by a local media outlet (*The Shift News*) revealed the activities of several pro-Labour Party private Facebook groups, which included coordinated attacks on anti-corruption activists and family members of investigative journalist Daphne Caruana Galizia. Malta's then-prime minister and several of his senior staff, as well as Malta's then-president, were members of these groups (The Shift News, 2018). Furthermore, the public inquiry set out to establish whether and how far the state is responsible for the circumstances that led to Daphne Caruana Galizia's assassination unveiled evidence of a state-orchestrated campaign aimed at dehumanising and discrediting Caruana Galizia, which contributed to the climate of hostility that made her assassination possible (Daphne Caruana Galizia Foundation, 2021). The Hungarian example shows that proxies of the state, such as groups of influencers can also play a role in amplifying fake narratives in favour of state actors (HDMO, 2024).

Political parties and politicians (not government)

"[P]oliticians are particularly evident disinformation spreaders, thanks to their visibility, the possibility to [...] engage the public, and shape discussions on societal topics. Through politicians, disinformation narratives enter mainstream information circulation," write Dubóczi & Ružičková (2023) in their profile of Slovakia. In EU member states, evidence shows that far-right and populist parties are often sources of disinformation. Examples are the Slovenian Democratic Party, Chega in Portugal

[4] In Estonia, for example, a portion of the Russian-speaking minority still has access to Russian state-backed propaganda channels through Telegram, VKontakte and domain proxies (Avaliku arvamuse seireuuring, 2024 and Eesti elanike meediakasutus ja usaldus meedia vastu, 2023).

(Pardal, 2023), Fidesz and Mi Hazánk in Hungary. Far-right parties are also mentioned in Finland (Dragomir et al., 2024), Greece (Dimitriadis, 2023), Romania (Cucu, 2023), Germany, Italy and France (France24, 2024) – according to an analysis of the EU DisinfoLab, the first debunked narratives during the 2022 presidential election came from politicians (Hénin, 2022). In Austria, in addition to the far-right FPÖ, there is also a party founded by the anti-vaxxer community, called MFG – Menschen-Freiheit-Grundrechte (Schäfer, 2023). Mainstream politicians are mentioned in the Czech Republic and Bulgaria (Wesolowsky, 2024), as well as in Croatia (Faktograf.hr, 2024). In Sweden, a new political party, called Nyans, has picked up the narrative on social services kidnapping the children of immigrants (Giandomenico & Linderstål, 2023). Puriņa (2024) mentions a number of political actors in Latvia, not just populists, that disseminate false information. Her report also highlights that in Lithuania, populist politicians were spreading rumours to delegitimise the country's presidential elections, while in Estonia, the EKRE party (Conservative People's Party of Estonia) claimed that elections were unfair.

Mainstream media

The role of mainstream media is not always clear when it comes to assessing countries' disinformation landscapes. They are often mentioned as disseminators of disinformation – but the way and the extent to which disinformation is published in these outlets can differ. In certain countries, sensationalism can lead to a disregard of facts, in other cases missing standards or weak journalistic self-regulation leads popular media outlets to quote false or fabricated statements. Tsfati et al. (2020) mention that news media are at risk of disseminating untrue narratives by accident, as they don't recognise certain information as false – however, we do not consider those cases in this report, as long as there is no reckless disregard for the truth, and the outlets are transparently rectifying misinformation. There are also cases in which captured media outlets deliberately falsified their reporting. Examples of tabloid media under scrutiny are the *Kronen Zeitung* in Austria (Schäfer, 2023) or *Parlamentní Listy* in the Czech Republic (Schultheis, 2017). In Romania, Hungary, Poland, Slovenia and the Czech Republic, media outlets captured by political or other interest groups (see Dragomir, 2019) can be sources of such content. In Slovenia, a major source of disinformation is the news outlet *Nova24tv.si,* which is owned by investors close to the Hungarian governing party (Bulatović, 2022).

In some other countries, reports mention that disinformation often originates from mainstream media, such as in Bulgaria (Wesolowsky, 2024) and Croatia (Tardáguila, 2019). In the case of Greece, Dimitriadis mentions that "fact-checkers routinely flag some of the country's most popular news websites." Taxitary (2024) mentions that disinformation narratives related to immigration and the LGBTQ+ community were published even in major news media. In Malta, the two main political parties own their own television stations, radio stations, newspapers and news sites, each moulding or omitting stories to serve the interests of their respective parties, shaping the perception of a large proportion of the population in the process. Similarly, the state broadcaster

tends to favour the ruling party (Vassallo, 2023). Occasional cases of publishing disinformation through mainstream media can happen in many other countries, including those not highlighted in the table – in Germany, for example, the tabloid *Bild* is on the radar of many watchdog organisations (Laschyk, 2018) and the magazine *Focus* was recently implicated in a related scandal: reportedly, the outlet's management asked editors to publish an article (without disclosing the author) that claimed that the SPD was planning a dirty campaign, based on only one source, an unnamed member of another party, the CDU (Rosenkranz, 2024). In addition, some news sites that claim to be legitimate outlets have been publishing disinformation if that helps advance their economic interests. For example, in Latvia, two such media outlets have published a story claiming that the climate crisis does not exist. The story was based on a document allegedly signed by many scientists, although most signatories have little to do with climate science. These media outlets ignored the document's falsehoods and the fact that its authors are associated with the fossil fuel industry (Siliņš, 2023).

Fringe media

Fringe media are often operated by conspiracy theorists, far-right actors or far-right sympathisers. In Austria, for example, sympathisers of the FPÖ and MFG parties operate the website *AUF1* and the regional television channel *RTV* (Schäfer, 2023). Other fringe media in Austria include *unzensuriert.at* and *wochenblick.at* (Heigl, 2021). In Slovenia, fringe media are connected to the right-wing populist Slovenian Democratic Party (Milosavljević & Biljak Gerjevič, 2024). Brautović (2022, 2023, 2024) identified fringe media at the centre of Croatian and Serbian disinformation hubs. In Finland, alternative media outlets are run by people who refer to themselves as the "truth seekers" (Moilanen, Hautala & Saari, 2023). In addition, fringe media outlets were also listed in Slovakia (Dubóczi & Ružičková, 2023), Germany (de la Brosse et al., 2019), Italy (Rone, 2021) and France as sources of disinformation (Fletcher et al., 2018). Similar assessments were made about the French *France Libre 24*,the Spanish *Tierre Pura* (EU DisinfoLab, 2021a), the Dutch *Bonanza Media*, as well as the Italian *Gasp.news* and *Oltre.tv* (EU Disinfo Lab, 2021c). *FranceSoir* used to be a respected media outlet with decades-long history but was taken over by a group of conspiracy theorists (EU DisinfoLab, 2021c).

Culloty (2023) writes that in Ireland a "small network of alternative right-wing media has emerged in the form of news and opinion websites, YouTube channels, and even a physical newspaper". In Estonia, among others, *UUED UUDISED* can be considered a source of disinformation (Vunš, 2024). Tkáčová & Šefčíková (2023) mention, among others, *Incorrect, Rádio Universum* and *AC24* as Czech fringe disinformation outlets that manage to generate revenues. In Belgium, the "pay-to-play media called *EU Reporter*" can be utilised to spread fabricated messages, according to Adamczyk, R. & Alaphilippe, A. (2023). In the German case, the fringe media outlet *Tichy's Einblick* was mentioned together with a climate denialist EIKE organisation, as spreading fake narratives of a massive blackout in Germany (Miguel Serrano, 2023) – thus, in the

future, alternative think tanks, non-profits or civil society organisations could also be considered in such a mapping of actors. We don't include *RT*, *Sputnik* and other foreign-origin media in the assessment of (fringe or mainstream) domestic media actors.

Discussion and conclusion

This report is a first attempt at mapping the different kinds of actors behind disinformation in the 27 EU member states – as such, it delineates categories of entities that are in many countries the creators, spreaders or amplifiers of fabricated narratives or misleading content that relies on doctored media. The categories assessed are a) domestic actors, b) foreign information manipulators, c) cognate actors from other countries (neighbours or culturally similar states), d) the state or government of the country where the disinformation spreads, e) local politicians and parties, f) mainstream media and f) fringe media. While, in one way or the other, local actors are active in all EU member states, foreign operations are not documented everywhere – even if there are indications that the majority of the countries was impacted by information manipulations that were initiated by foreign state-connected actors. In this category, Russia was the dominant actor, though not the only one. Reports mention China, Iran or Arab countries as well. The remaining categories show a great divergence across countries – thus implying that the composition of the groups and actors behind false narratives and information manipulation is unique in every country. Cultural closeness can often trigger spillovers between countries, especially if they are close both geographically and linguistically.

The state as a source of disinformation is currently only considered in three countries, but this category can show changes over time, as new governments might impact how the state apparatus relates to information integrity. Political parties are relevant actors in many countries – especially those on the far-right spectrum, but reports show that in some countries the political culture evolved in a way that a wide spectrum of political groupings, even those of the mainstream, can be considered as sources of disinformation. Finally, the categories of mainstream and fringe media show that professional or semi-professional content creators can also be considered a threat to the integrity of the information environment. Fringe media include outlets run by political interest groups or conspiracy theorists, while the mainstream media outlets that came up in the literature are tabloids that build their business models around sensationalism and outrage or long-standing news media that were captured by vested interests. In certain cases, weak journalistic institutions, failing business models and lacking traditions can also mean that respected or trusted media – at times even unwittingly – (re)publish fake stories.

The list of actors is not exhaustive due to limited information and a lack of documentation. There are also indications that additional actors could also be added to the list of purveyors of disinformation – these are, for example, influencers (including or complemented with political influencers, as described by Demény et al., 2024),

academics (Romero-Vicente, 2023), alternative fact-checking organisations (EU Disinfo Lab, 2021b), associations (Puriņa, 2024), civil society, think tanks and other organisations (see Miguel Serrano, 2023), PR agencies (Andrzejewski, 2023) or even foreign experts and think tanks operated by EU member states governments (Bleyer-Simon, 2024). The actors focusing on specific topics, such as health or climate disinformation would also merit investigation. The mapping of techniques, technologies and practices may allow the creation of new technical categories, such as artificial intelligence (Hunter et al., 2024). In addition, future assessments could also aim at assessing the extent to which the different categories of actors are relevant in a given country, as the questions regarding the existence of certain disinformation actors cannot be simply answered with a “yes” or a “no”.

References

Adamczyk, R. & Alaphilippe, A. (2023). The US anti-vax group Children's Health Defense's expansion to Europe. *EDMO Belux.* https://belux-edmo.s3-accelerate.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/02/20230131-Childrens-Health-Defense-Europe.pdf

Alaphilippe, A. (2024). PAPERWALL: Chinese information operation targets Belgium and Luxembourg. *EU Disinfo Lab.* https://www.disinfo.eu/paperwall-chinese-information-operation-targets-belgium-and-luxembourg

Andrzejewski, C. (2023). "Team Jorge": In the heart of a global disinformation machine. *Forbidden Stories*. https://forbiddenstories.org/team-jorge-disinformation/

Avaliku arvamuse seireuuring (2024). *Avaliku arvamuse. Seireuuring. 20. seire. Küsitlus 15a. ja vanema elanikkonna seas.* 25. – 30. sept 2024. https://www.riigikantselei.ee/sites/default/files/documents/2024-10/2024%2009%20AA%2020%20seire%20raport.pdf

de la Brosse, R., Haller, A. & Kristoffer, H. (2019). The "Other" Alternatives: Political Right-Wing Alternative Media. *Journal of Alternative & Community Media* 4(1).

Bleyer-Simon, K. (2024). Whitewashing Orbán's Image and Ideas in Brussels. *Heinrich Böll Stiftung.* https://cz.boell.org/en/2024/08/08/whitewashing-orbans-image-and-ideas-brussels

Brautović, M (2022). *Mapping Covid-19 Disinformation Ecosystem in Croatia.* https://pro-fact.gong.hr/wp-content/uploads/2022/06/Mapping-COVID-19-Disinformation-Ecosystem-in-Croatia.pdf

Brautović, M (2023). Mapping Ukraine War Disinformation Ecosystem in Croatia and Slovenia. *ADMO* https://admohub.eu/en/research/mapping-ukraine-war-disinformation-ecosystem-in-croatia-and-slovenia/

Brautović, M. (2024). Mapping climate disinformation ecosystem in Croatia and Slovenia. *EDMO.* https://edmo.eu/wp-content/uploads/2024/03/ADMO_Mapping-climate-disinformation-ecosystem-in-Croatia-and-Slovenia.pdf

Cardoso, G., Moreno, J., Casquinho, M., Palma, N., Vasconcelos, A., Paisana, M., & Pinto-Martinho, A. (2024). General Elections 2024 - Amplification of political speech and disinformation during the March 2024 Portuguese general election. *OberCom - Observatório da Comunicação: Lisboa*. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.14045036

Cardoso, G., Moreno, J., Casquinho, M., Vasconcelos, A., Palma, N., Paisana, M., & Pinto-Martinho, A. (2024b). European Elections 2024 - Amplification of political speech and disinformation in Portugal. *OberCom - Observatório da Comunicação: Lisboa.* https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.14044758

Checkfirst (2024). Ads, Influence, and Democracy: Meta's Role in Romania's 2024 Presidential Election. https://checkfirst.network/research-note-metas-role-in-romanias-2024-presidential-election/

Cucu, C. (2023). Disinformation Landscape in Romania. *EU Disinfo Lab.* https://www.disinfo.eu/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/20230919_RO_DisinfoFS.pdf

Culloty, E. (2023). Disinformation landscape in Ireland. *EU Disinfo Lab.* https://www.disinfo.eu/wp-content/uploads/2023/05/Ireland_DisinfoFactsheet.pdf

Daphne Caruana Galizia Foundation (2021). *Courtesy translation of public inquiry report.* https://www.daphne.foundation/en/2021/11/20/public-inquiry-translation

Demény, R., Surányi, R. & Krekó, P. (2024). Disinformation blitz in the 2024 European election campaign. *Hungarian hub against disinformation LAKMUSZ-HDMO*. https://edmo.eu/wp-content/uploads/2024/08/hdmo_wp4_pc_tanulmany_5_20240731.pdf

Dimitriadis, D. (2023). Disinformation landscape in Greece. *EU Disinfo Lab.* https://www.disinfo.eu/wp-content/uploads/2023/06/20230623_GreeceDisinfoFS.pdf

Dragomir, M., Rúas-Araújo, J., & Horowitz, M. (2024). Beyond online disinformation: assessing national information resilience in four European countries. *Humanities and Social Sciences Communications*, 11(1), 1-10.

Dragomir, M. (2019). Media Capture in Europe. *Media Development Investment Fund.* https://www.mdif.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/MDIF-Report-Media-Capture-in-Europe.pdf

Dubóczi, P. & Ružičková, M. (2023). Disinformation landscape in Slovakia. *EU Disinfo Lab.* https://www.disinfo.eu/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/20230919_SK_DisinfoFS.pdf

EEAS (2023). *1st EEAS Report on Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference Threats. Towards a framework for networked defence.* https://www.eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/documents/2023/EEAS-DataTeam-ThreatReport-2023..pdf

EEAS (2024). *2nd EEAS Report on Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference Threats. A Framework for Networked Defence. January 2024.* https://www.eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/documents/2024/EEAS-2nd-Report%20on%20FIMI%20Threats-January-2024_0.pdf

Eesti elanike meediakasutus ja usaldus meedia vastu (2023). *EIM 2023 lisa 1:Eesti elanike meediakasutus ja usaldus meedia vastu.* https://www.kul.ee/sites/default/files/documents/2024-03/EIM%202023%20LISA%201_kvalitatiivuuringu%20aruanne_0.pdf

EUvsDisinfo (2024). *Doppelganger strikes back: FIMI activities in the context of the EE24.* https://euvsdisinfo.eu/uploads/2024/04/EEAS-DataTeam-TechnicalReport-FINAL.pdf

EU DisinfoLab (2021a). *How inaction or partial action by social media platforms enables the continuous spread of disinformation (and what we can do about it).* https://www.disinfo.eu/publications/overcoming-obstacles-to-exposing-disinformation-actors/

EU DisinfoLab (2021b). *Antagonising fact-checkers: the misappropriation of fact-checking to polarise the Spanish informational landscape.* https://www.disinfo.eu/publications/antagonising-fact-checkers-the-misappropriation-of-fact-checking-to-polarise-the-spanish-informational-landscape/

EU DisinfoLab (2021c). *The role of "media" in producing and spreading disinformation campaigns.* https://www.disinfo.eu/publications/the-role-of-media-in-producing-and-spreading-disinformation-campaigns/

European Commission (2024). *Commission, online platforms and civil society increase monitoring during Romanian elections.* https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_24_6243

Faktograf.hr (2024). What Is the Status of Croatian Politicians on TikTok in the Lead-Up to a Critical Election Year. *SEE Check.* https://seecheck.org/index.php/2024/01/23/what-is-the-status-of-croatian-politicians-on-tiktok-in-the-lead-up-to-a-critical-election-year/

France24 (2024). Far-right parties wage disinfo war ahead of EU vote. *France24.* https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20240506-far-right-parties-wage-disinfo-war-ahead-of-eu-vote

Gentil, I. & Sessa, M. G. (2024a). Disinformation landscape in Belgium. V2. *EU Disinfo Lab.* https://www.disinfo.eu/wp-content/uploads/2024/11/20241031_Disinfo-landscape-in-Belgium_V2.pdf

Gentil, I. & Sessa, M. G. (2024b). Disinformation landscape in Luxembourg. V2. *EU Disinfo Lab.* https://www.disinfo.eu/wp-content/uploads/2024/11/20241031_Disinfo-landscape-in-Luxembourg_V2.pdf

Fletcher, R., Cornea, A. Graves, L. & Kleis Nielsen, R. (2018). Measuring the reach of "fake news" and online disinformation in Europe. *Oxford Reuters Institute.* https://reutersinstitute.politics.ox.ac.uk/sites/default/files/2018-02/Measuring%20the%20reach%20of%20fake%20news%20and%20online%20distribution%20in%20Europe%20CORRECT%20FLAG.pdf

Giandomenico, J. & Linderstål, H. (2023). Disinformation landscape in Sweden. *EU Disinfo Lab.* https://www.disinfo.eu/wp-content/uploads/2023/05/Sweden_DisinfoFactsheet.pdf

HDMO (2024). In Hungary, sponsored disinformation ran rampant during the campaign for EU elections, and platforms made good money out of it. *EDMO.* https://edmo.eu/publications/in-hungary-sponsored-disinformation-ran-rampant-during-the-campaign-for-eu-elections-and-platforms-made-good-money-out-of-it/

Heigl, J. (2021). "Infodemie": Das sind die Treiber der Fake News zu Corona. *BR24.* https://www.br.de/nachrichten/netzwelt/infodemie-das-sind-die-treiber-der-fake-news-zu-corona,SNEEdL1

Hénin, N. (2022) What did disinformation look like during the 2022 French presidential election? An overview based on fact-checking articles. *EU disinfo Lab.* https://www.disinfo.eu/publications/what-did-disinformation-look-like-during-the-2022-french-presidential-election-an-overview-based-on-fact-checking-articles/

Hunter, L. Y., Albert, C. D., Rutland, J., Topping, K., & Hennigan, C. (2024). Artificial intelligence and information warfare in major power states: how the US, China, and Russia are using artificial intelligence in their information warfare and influence operations. *Defense & Security Analysis*, 40(2), 235–269. https://doi.org/10.1080/14751798.2024.2321736

Kapronczay, S. (2022). Complaint to the EC. *Political Capital.* https://www.politicalcapital.hu/pc-admin/source/documents/TASZ-PC_EC-complaint-PublicBroadcast_Russia_War.pdf

Laschyk, T. (2018). Die gefährlichsten Fake-News kommen immer noch von der BILD. *Volksverpetzer.* https://www.volksverpetzer.de/aktuelles/fake-news-bild/

Lecheler, S., & Egelhofer, J. L. (2022). Disinformation, Misinformation, and Fake News: Understanding the Supply Side. In J. Strömbäck, Å. Wikforss, K. Glüer, T. Lindholm, & H. Oscarsson (Eds.), *Knowledge Resistance in High-Choice Information Environments.* Routledge.

Margova, R. & Dobreva, M. (2023). Disinformation landscape in Bulgaria. *EU Disinfo Lab.* https://www.disinfo.eu/publications/disinformation-landscape-in-bulgaria/

Milosavljević, M. & Biljak Gerjevič, R. (2024). *Monitoring media pluralism in the digital era : application of the media pluralism monitor in the European member states and in candidate countries in 2023.* Country report : Slovenia. https://cadmus.eui.eu/handle/1814/77017

Miguel Serrano, R. (2023). Blackout disinformation: An attempt to leave the energy transition in the dark. *EU Disinfo Lab.* https://www.disinfo.eu/publications/blackout-disinformation-an-attempt-to-leave-the-energy-transition-in-the-dark/

Moilanen, P., Hautala, M. & Saari, D. (2023). Disinformation landscape in Finland. *EU Disinfo Lab.* https://www.disinfo.eu/wp-content/uploads/2023/05/Finland_DisinfoFactsheet.pdf

NORDIS (2024). *Here are the scammers behind fake health assessments in the Nordics.* https://www.nordishub.eu/here-are-the-scammers-behind-fake-health-assessments-in-the-nordics/

Office of Public Affairs, U.S. Department of Justice (2020). *United States Seizes Domain Names Used by Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.* https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/united-states-seizes-domain-names-used-iran-s-islamic-revolutionary-guard-corps

Puriņa, E. (2024). Old Cars, Immigrants and War – How EU Related Misinformation is Spread in the Baltics? *BECID.* https://edmo.eu/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/BECID-D2.5-OLD-CARS-IMMIGRANTS-AND-WAR-HOW-EU-RELATED-MISINFORMATION-IS-SPREAD-IN-THE-BALTICS.pdf

Reveland, C. & Siggelkow, P. (2023, 28 Apr). Desinformationen ohne Lizenz? *Tagesschau.* https://www.tagesschau.de/faktenfinder/auf1-oesterreichischer-rechtsalternativer-sender-101.html

Romero-Vicente, A. (2023). Don't stop me now: the growing disinformation threat against climate change in Belgium. *EU Disinfo Lab.* https://www.disinfo.eu/publications/dont-stop-me-now-the-growing-disinformation-threat-against-climate-change-in-belgium/

Rone, J. (2021). Far right alternative news media as 'indignation mobilization mechanisms': how the far right opposed the Global Compact for Migration. *Communication and Society* 25(4):1-18 DOI:10.1080/1369118X.2020.1864001

Rosenkranz, B (2024). Falschmeldung von ganz oben. Übermedien. https://uebermedien.de/100115/falschmeldung-von-ganz-oben-focus-online-daniel-steil/

Schäfer, C. (2023). Disinformation Landscape in Austria. *EU Disinfo Lab.* https://www.disinfo.eu/wp-content/uploads/2023/06/20230621_AustriaDisinfoFS.pdf

Schultheis, E. (2017). The Czech Republic's Fake News Problem. *The Atlantic.* https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/10/fake-news-in-the-czech-republic/543591/

Shift News (2018). *Investigating Joseph Muscat's online hate machine.* https://theshiftnews.com/2018/05/14/investigating-joseph-muscats-online-hate-machine/

Sitistas, T, Canetta, T., Panizio, E. (2024). Russian disinformation network "Pravda" grew bigger in the EU, even after its uncovering. *EDMO.* https://edmo.eu/publications/russian-disinformation-network-pravda-grew-bigger-in-the-eu-even-after-its-uncovering/

Sarbu, M & Tanno, S. (2024). Romania's top court annuls presidential election result. *CNN.* https://edition.cnn.com/2024/12/06/europe/romania-annuls-presidential-election-intl/index.html

Siliņš, R. (2023). Pasaules Klimata deklarācija nav uzticama; NRA un LA.lv nemin būtisku kontekstu. Re:Baltica. https://rebaltica.lv/2023/10/pasaules-klimata-deklaracija-nav-uzticama-nra-un-la-lv-nemin-butisku-kontekstu/

Taxitary, L. (2024). Disinformation Landscape in Cyprus. *EU Disinfo Lab.* https://www.disinfo.eu/wp-content/uploads/2024/11/20241118_Disinfo-landscape-in-Cyprus.pdf

Tkáčová, N. & Šefčíková, K. (2023). Disinformation as a Business: Business Models of the Czech Disinformation Landscape. *Prague Security Studies Institute.* https://mzv.gov.cz/file/5415941/Ceska_analyticka_studie__ENG_.pdf

Tsfati, Y., Boomgaarden, H. G., Strömbäck, J., Vliegenthart, R., Damstra, A., & Lindgren, E. (2020). Causes and consequences of mainstream media dissemination of fake news: literature review and synthesis. *Annals of the International Communication Association*, 44(2). https://doi.org/10.1080/23808985.2020.1759443

Urbán, Á., Polyák, G., Horváth, K. (2023). How Public Service Media Disinformation Shapes Hungarian Public Discourse, *Media and Communication,* 11(4), 62-72. doi:https://doi.org/10.17645/mac.v11i4.7148

Vassallo, L. (2023). Local Media for Democracy — country focus: Malta. *Centre for Media Pluralism and Media Freedom*. https://cmpf.eui.eu/local-media-for-democracy-country-focus-malta/

VigiNum (2024). *PORTAL KOMBAT. A structured and coordinated pro-Russian propaganda network.* https://www.sgdsn.gouv.fr/files/files/20240212_NP_SGDSN_VIGINUM_PORTAL-KOMBAT-NETWORK_ENG_VF.pdf

Vunš, M. (2024). FAKTIKONTROLL I Värske uuring ajaloolisest temperatuuri kõikumisest maapinnal ei paljasta „kliimapettust". Praegune kliimamuutus on inimtekkeline ja toimub väga kiiresti. *Eesti Päevaleht*. https://epl.delfi.ee/artikkel/120343370/faktikontroll-varske-uuring-ajaloolisest-temperatuuri-koikumisest-maapinnal-ei-paljasta-kliimapettust-praegune-kliimamuutus-on-inimtekkeline-ja-toimub-vaga-kiiresti

Wardle, C. & Derakhshan, H. (2017). *Information disorder: Toward an interdisciplinary framework for research and policymaking.* Strasbourg: Council of Europe.

Wesolowsky, T (2024, 6. April). 'Mushroom Websites' Spread A Deluge Of Disinformation In Bulgaria. *Radio Free Europe.* https://www.rferl.org/a/bulgaria-disinformation-mushroom-websites/32893788.html

EDMO

EUI SCHOOL OF TRANSNATIONAL GOVERNANCE

www.edmo.eu

The European Digital Media Observatory has received funding from the European Union under contract number LC-01935415