



European Digital Media Observatory

EARLY WARNINGS ABOUT THE WAR IN UKRAINE

10/06/2022 to 16/06/2022

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EARLY - WARNING 1

Russian blockade of Ukrainian ports and famine



With Russia blocking Ukrainian ports on the Black Sea, it is no longer possible for Ukraine to export wheat by sea. Africa and the Middle East are heavily dependent on these exports. The shortage of wheat and the threat to the food security of these regions could lead to widespread disinformation blaming [Ukraine](#) and/or the EU and other supporters of Ukraine (see [here](#) & [here](#)).

Blocco russo dei porti ucraini e carestia



In seguito al blocco russo dei porti ucraini sul Mar Nero, l'Ucraina non può più esportare grano via mare. L'Africa e il Medio Oriente dipendono fortemente da queste esportazioni. La carenza di grano e la minaccia alla sicurezza alimentare di queste regioni potrebbero portare a una diffusa disinformazione che incolpi [l'Ucraina](#) e/o l'UE e altri sostenitori dell'Ucraina (es: [qui](#) & [qui](#)).

Blocus russe des ports ukrainiens et famine



La Russie bloquant les ports ukrainiens de la mer Noire, il n'est plus possible pour l'Ukraine d'exporter son blé notamment vers l'Afrique et le Moyen-Orient, qui dépendent largement de ces exportations. La pénurie de blé et la mise en péril de la sécurité alimentaire de ces pays rend favorable l'apparition de désinformation blâmant [l'Ukraine](#) et/ou l'UE et les autres soutiens de l'Ukraine comme responsables (ex: [ici](#) & [ici](#)).

Russische Hafensperre in der Ukraine und Hungersnot



Durch die russische Blockade der ukrainischen Häfen am Schwarzen Meer ist es der Ukraine nicht mehr möglich, Weizen auf dem Seeweg zu exportieren. Afrika und der Nahe Osten sind in hohem Maße von diesen Ausfuhren abhängig. Die Verknappung des Weizens und die Bedrohung der Ernährungssicherheit dieser Regionen könnte zu einer weit verbreiteten Desinformation führen, die der [Ukraine](#) und/oder der EU und anderen Unterstützern der Ukraine die Schuld gibt (z.B. [hier](#) & [hier](#)).

EARLY - WARNING 2

Decrease of Gazprom gas deliveries in the EU



Claiming technical problems with the Nord Stream pipeline, the Russian giant Gazprom is significantly reducing its gas deliveries to European countries ([Germany](#), [Italy](#)). This situation suggests the development of false narratives around this decrease, about the responsibility of European powers supporting Ukraine and future winter gas shortages (e.g.: [here](#)).

Diminuzione delle consegne di gas di Gazprom nell'UE



Adducendo problemi tecnici al gasdotto Nord Stream, il gigante russo Gazprom sta riducendo significativamente le sue consegne di gas ai Paesi europei ([Germania](#), [Italia](#)). Questa situazione suggerisce lo sviluppo di false narrazioni attorno a questa diminuzione riguardo alla responsabilità delle potenze europee che sostengono l'Ucraina e sulle future carenze invernale di gas (es: [qui](#)).

Réduction des livraisons de gaz de Gazprom en UE



Prétextant notamment des problèmes technique sur le gazoduc Nord Stream, le géant russe Gazprom diminue largement ses livraisons de gaz vers les pays européens ([Allemagne](#), [Italie](#)). Cette situation laisse présager le développement de fausses narrations de cette diminution, de la responsabilité des puissances européennes soutenant l'Ukraine et de futures pénuries hivernales (ex : [ici](#)).


Verringerung der Gaslieferungen von Gazprom in die EU




Unter Behauptung technischer Probleme mit der Nord-Stream-Pipeline hat der russische Energiegigant Gazprom seine Gaslieferungen an europäische Länder ([Deutschland](#), [Italien](#)) erheblich reduziert. Diese Situation legt die Entwicklung falscher Narrative rund um diesen Rückgang nahe, über die Verantwortung der europäischen Mächte, die die Ukraine unterstützen, und über zukünftige Gasversorgungsengpässe im Winter (z.B.: [hier](#)).

EARLY - WARNING 3


European leaders' visit to Kiev

 Emmanuel Macron (France), Olaf Scholz (Germany), Mario Draghi (Italy) and Klaus Iohannis (Romania) arrived in Kiev on 16 June. The goal of this visit is to express Europe's solidarity with Ukraine and discuss weapons deliveries. The four leaders support granting Ukraine a candidate country status by the EU. In this context, disinformation linked to this visit and its outcomes is likely to grow (e.g. [here](#)).


Visita dei leader europei a Kiev

 Emmanuel Macron (Francia), Olaf Scholz (Germania), Mario Draghi (Italia) e Klaus Iohannis (Romania) sono arrivati a Kiev il 16 giugno. L'obiettivo della visita è esprimere la solidarietà dell'Europa nei confronti dell'Ucraina e discutere delle forniture di armi. I quattro dirigenti sono favorevoli a concedere all'Ucraina lo status di candidato all'UE. In questo contesto, la disinformazione legata a questa visita e ai suoi risvolti è presumibilmente destinata a crescere (es: [qui](#)).

Visite des leaders européens à Kiev


 Emmanuel Macron (France), Olaf Scholz (Allemagne), Mario Draghi (Italie) et Klaus Iohannis (Roumanie) sont arrivés à Kiev le 16 juin. Le but de cette visite est d'exprimer la solidarité de l'Europe avec l'Ukraine et de discuter des livraisons d'armes. Les quatre dirigeants sont favorables à l'octroi à l'Ukraine du statut de pays candidat à l'UE. Dans ce contexte, la désinformation liée à cette visite et à ses aboutissements est susceptible de se développer (ex: [ici](#)).

Besuch der europäischen Spitzenpolitiker in Kiev


 Emmanuel Macron (Frankreich), Olaf Scholz (Deutschland), Mario Draghi (Italien) und Klaus Iohannis (Rumänien) trafen am 16. Juni in Kiev ein. Ziel des Besuchs ist es, die Solidarität Europas mit der Ukraine auszudrücken und über Waffenlieferungen zu diskutieren. Die vier Regierungschefs befürworten, dass die Ukraine den Status eines EU-Beitrittskandidaten erhält. In diesem Zusammenhang werden Desinformationen im Zusammenhang mit diesem Besuch und seinen Auswirkungen wahrscheinlich zunehmen (z. B. [hier](#)).

EARLY - WARNING 4


Ownership of the Island of Gotland

 [Swedish sources](#) indicate that Russian national television is introducing the idea that the Swedish island of Gotland is Russian. The island is located 350 kilometers from Russia and has been a [strategic point](#) between the two countries for centuries. This kind of disinformation about the so-called Russian ownership of other strategic territories is likely to increase.


Proprietà dell'isola di Gotland

 [Fonti svedesi](#) indicano che la televisione nazionale del Cremlino sta introducendo l'idea che l'isola svedese di Gotland sia russa. L'isola si trova a 350 chilometri dalla Russia ed è stata per secoli un [punto strategico](#) tra i due Paesi. Questo tipo di disinformazione sulla cosiddetta proprietà russa di altri territori strategici risulta in procinto di aumentare.

Appartenance de l'île de Gotland

 Des [sources suédoises](#) indiquent que la télévision russe introduit l'idée que l'île suédoise de Gotland est russe. L'île se situe à 350 kilomètres de la Russie et constitue un [point stratégique](#) depuis des siècles entre les deux pays. Ce genre de désinformation sur la soi-disant appartenance russe d'autres territoires stratégiques est susceptible de se multiplier.

Eigentum an der Insel Gotland

 Nach [Schwedischen Quellen](#) verbreitet das russische Staatsfernsehen die Idee, dass die schwedische Insel Gotland russisch ist. Die Insel liegt 350 Kilometer von Russland entfernt und ist seit Jahrhunderten ein [strategischer Punkt](#) zwischen den beiden Ländern. Diese Art der Desinformation über den angeblichen russischen Besitz anderer strategischer Gebiete wird wahrscheinlich zunehmen.

Alleged FSB leak matches EDMO findings


The Ukrainian Security Service (SBU) published a document allegedly belonging to the Russian Security Services (FSB) on 5 June 2022, that contains – among other propaganda indications – the guidelines on what influence operations Russia should carry out in the European Community. The stated goal is to create internal social and political divisions within countries supporting Ukraine, based on 3 main topics:

1. Forecast shortage in energy supplies and rising poverty in the EU as a result of supporting Ukraine at the cost of European taxpayers.
2. Ukrainian refugees are going to arrive in high numbers, fragilising so the socio-economic situation of the host countries.
3. Spotlighting the affiliation of Ukraine with Nazism, rendering so any support to the country hard to justify.

⇒ EDMO cannot independently verify the nature of the document, but it is a fact that in the past months it detected recurrent disinformation narratives matching the recommendations outlined in the document: in periodic insights and early warnings on the war in Ukraine, in investigations and fact-checking briefs.

Relevant material from EDMO

publications since the beginning of the conflict matching the alleged FSB leak

Alleged FSB plan	Detected by EDMO	Periodic publications	Investigations	Fact-checking briefs
1. Energy supplies and rising poverty		Weekly Insight 3 (24.03-31.03): early warning 2 Weekly Insight 4 (31.03-07.04): trend #5 Weekly Insight 6 (20.04-27.04): early warning 1 Weekly Insight 7 (27.04-12.05): early warning 3 Early Warnings (12.05-19.05): early warning 3 Early Warnings (27.05-02.06): early warning 2	Disinformation in Russian language (May 22) How Covid-19 conspiracy to pro-Russian hoaxes (March 22)	April 2022 May 2022
2. Negative socio-economic impact Ukrainian refugees		Weekly Insight 1 (10.03-17.03): trend #4 EW 1 Weekly Insight 2 (18.03-24.03): trend #3 Weekly Insight 3 (24.03-31.03): trend #3 Weekly Insight 4 (31.03-07.04): trend #6 Weekly Insight 5 (08.04-20.04): trend #5 Weekly Insight 6 (20.04-27.04): trend #6 Weekly Insight 7 (27.04-12.05): trend #5 Bi-weekly Insight 8 (12.05-26.05): trend #3 Bi-Weekly Insight 9 (26.05-09.06): trend #2	5 disinformation narratives about the war (March 22) Ukrainian refugees & disinformation (April 22) Disinformation in Russian language (May 22) Misinformation on foreigner crime (June 22)	April 2022 May 2022 June 2022
3. Ukrainian and Neo-Nazism		Weekly Insight 1 (10.03-17.03): trend #5 Weekly Insight 2 (18.03-24.03): trend #4 Weekly Insight 3 (24.03-31.03): trend #4 Weekly Insight 4 (31.03-07.04): trend #3 Weekly Insight 5 (08.04-20.04): trend #4 Weekly Insight 6 (20.04-27.04): trend #3 Weekly Insight 7 (27.04-12.05): trend #1 Bi-weekly Insight 8 (12.05-26.05): trend #2	5 disinformation narratives about the war (March 22) Covid-19 conspiracy to pro-Russian hoaxes (March 22) Pro-Russian bot network amplifies disinfo about war (April 22) Far-right amplifiers (April 22) Ad-Funded Disinformation on the Ukraine Conflict (April 22) Disinformation in Russian language (May 22) Lavrov's false claims on Italian Television (May 22)	April 2022 May 2022 June 2022

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Main editor: Louise Carnapete, EDMO/School of Transnational Governance.

For further information: edmo@eui.eu



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