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Weekly Pulse
05 November 2026
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Weekly Pulse
05 November 2026

IN THIS EDITION

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GLOBAL PULSE
Egypt launches AI fact-checking chatbot based on government-approved information ++ Artificial intelligence created new problems in the US election ++ No evidence for Trump’s claims of mass non-citizen voting

ON THE RISE

Weekly Watch of Emerging Disinformation Risks

Poland’s constitutional crisis: between foreign interference and genuine alignments

Poland’s deepening constitutional crisis is yet another example of how complex domestic dynamics are easily oversimplified by national and international actors fostering political polarization, how – in the resulting environment, particularly online – extremism and disinformation thrive, and how foreign actors try to exploit the situation for their own interest.

How did we get here?

The roots of the crisis go back to 2015, when President Andrzej Duda, backed by Law and Justice (PiS), took office. The outgoing Civic Platform (PO) majority attempted to appoint five Constitutional Tribunal judges instead of the three it was entitled to appoint. Duda refused to recognise any of them, while the newly elected PiS-majority parliament appointed five alternative judges, including replacements for three positions already lawfully filled. The Tribunal ruled that three of PO’s appointments were valid and two premature. PiS nevertheless proceeded with its own appointments and introduced legislation for the early re-election of the Tribunal’s President (Constitutional Tribunal ruling).

Although PO contributed to the initial dispute, PiS bears the principal responsibility for turning it into a systemic institutional crisis. In 2021, the European Court of Human Rights ruled in Xero Flor v. Poland that a panel including an improperly appointed judge was not a tribunal established by law. In December 2025, the Court of Justice of the European Union likewise found Poland in breach of EU law because of the Tribunal’s composition and rejection of fundamental EU principles (Case C-448/23).

Donald Tusk’s return to government in 2023 did not resolve the crisis. After initially refusing to recognise the Tribunal or publish its rulings, the Civic Coalition (KO) shifted course as judicial terms expired, creating opportunities to appoint new members. On 13 March 2026, the Polish parliament (Sejm) elected six judges, but President Karol Nawrocki, backed by PiS, accepted only two oaths, leaving the Tribunal with eleven members. The remaining four judges took their oaths in the Sejm on 9 April and formally transmitted them to the Presidential Chancellery, but Nawrocki and Tribunal President Bogdan Święczkowski continued to exclude them. In May, the European Court of Human Rights issued interim measures requiring the authorities not to obstruct the judges from exercising their duties (Dziurda and Others v. Poland).

On 13 October 2026, the Venice Commission clarified that the President has no discretion to review parliamentary appointments and that oaths may be taken without his physical participation if he refuses or delays the procedure (Opinion No. 1294/2026). Nawrocki nevertheless maintained his refusal.

The confrontation escalated on 30 October, when senior judge Anna Korwin-Piotrowska suspended Święczkowski and his deputy for thirty days, assumed leadership of the Tribunal and barred Święczkowski from entering the building. The legal basis for her intervention remains disputed.

In the days following 30 October, the confrontation intensified, with Tusk and Nawrocki exchanging accusations over responsibility for the crisis. Nawrocki denounced the suspension of Święczkowski as an unconstitutional seizure of a state institution and convened consultations with parliamentary parties to restore constitutional order. Tusk, in turn, accused PiS and the President of undermining the rule of law, insisting that the crisis could be resolved without constitutional amendments if Nawrocki recognised the judges lawfully elected by the Sejm. The President’s consultations – as for November 2 – did not produce any accepted compromise.

What are the different actors saying about the situation in Poland?

The confrontation has also rapidly acquired an international dimension. Prominent figures from Europe’s far right have expressed support for PiS and Nawrocki. Viktor Orbán in Hungary, Geert Wilders in the Netherlands, Marine Le Pen and Jordan Bardella in France, George Simion in Romania and Nigel Farage in the United Kingdom and others, all circulated statements defending Nawrocki’s position and some even denouncing a “coup” by Tusk and the EU. Influencers and personalities associated with the MAGA movement in the United States have also weighed in, often portraying the developments as a judicial coup by Tusk and the European Union against conservative forces, and spreading disinformation.

Russia has likewise sought to position itself within the controversy. On 31 October 2026, Dmitry Medvedev, Deputy Chairman of Russia’s Security Council and former Russian President, described the events in Poland as a “constitutional coup”. He accused the “liberals around Tusk, Brussels’ protégé” of oppressing PiS conservatives.

Prime Minister Donald Tusk reacted to Medvedev’ statement saying that “now it’s all clear” and, more in general, he framed the institutional confrontation in geopolitical terms, accusing Nawrocki and the opposition of advancing Russian strategic interests. In his address of 31 October, he further alleged that pro-Russian forces and Russian social-media bots were supporting one side of the conflict, but as for now no publicly verifiable evidence has established direct Russian involvement in Nawrocki’s actions.

Polish fact-checking organization Demagog.pl stressed that mutual accusations of acting as agents of influence, particularly when unsupported by credible evidence, contribute to deepening polarisation and undermining trust in public debate. And this is important: not everything happens because of Russian interference and disinformation. And, even more importantly, national politicians whose positions align with Russia’s are not necessarily Russian agents. They may have the same ideas about some issues, and benefit from the circulation of the same narratives. But this does not mean that those national politicians are controlled by Moscow.

Far-right, United States and Russia, again

On the other hand, the de facto alignment among far-right forces in Europe, Russia and the United States on many issues is now undeniable.

The crisis in Ceuta this August was not prompted by any of these actors, but all of them quickly jumped on the issue, spreading the same narratives: the EU is doomed, muslim migrants are violent parasites that destroy white-christian societies, the Great Replacement is happening, and so on.

The same happened in September about the youth protests in France and elsewhere across Europe: the U.S., the European far-right, and networks of accounts linked to Russian disinformation and propaganda did not cause the riots, but were immediately ready to spread the same narratives about the events being a violent uprising of muslim migrants, incompatible with European societies, that should be remigrated.

Now with the ongoing crisis in Poland the same recurring scheme is unfolding again: European far-right forces, Russia and the United States (this time not as the administration, like it happened for Ceuta and the protests in France, but with MAGA influencers) are spreading the same narrative about the situation being a judicial coup by globalist, liberal forces, supported by the EU.

The alignment happens for both ideological and practical reasons. Russia is interested in weakening European countries that support Ukraine, and to bolster far-right parties that want to end that support. Far-right forces are interested in convincing voters that their Eurosceptic, anti-Ukraianian, pro-Russian stances are the most reasonable and beneficial for the citizens. The United States are interested in weakening the EU, considered a “transnational body that undermines political liberty and sovereignty”, and support political forces in the EU ideologically more aligned with the Trump administration and the MAGA movement. European societies are therefore targeted by messages from these actors that often overlap and reinforce themselves.

ZOOM-IN

A Closer Look at Cases Detected by the EDMO Network

The contributions selected for this weekly Zoom-In offer complementary perspectives on the current constitutional crisis in Poland: from an historical overview of the controversy regarding the legitimacy of judicial appointments to the latest institutional tensions exacerbated by information manipulations on social media. We have also included an academic analysis that traces the persistent fragility of Poland’s constitutional balance back to a defining feature of Polish legal culture – the so-called ‘juristic scientism’.

The rule of law dispute: how to end the conflict over “Neo-Judges”?

Back in October 2024, Demagog.pl examined the conflict over the status of so-called ‘neo-judges’, appointed following the controversial 2017 reform of Poland’s National Council of the Judiciary (KRS). The article highlighted the difficulty of reconciling judicial independence, constitutional legitimacy and legal certainty. Justice Minister Adam Bodnar proposed a differentiated approach to reviewing appointments, while the Venice Commission stressed that individual assessments, proportionality and the right of appeal were essential.

Experts interviewed at that time by Demagog.pl considered a political compromise unlikely. They identified several possible scenarios: negotiated reform, prolonged stalemate, pragmatic political resolution or a “cold war” scenario – the latter being considered as the most probable. The article stressed that this scenario “could result in a Polish equivalent of the storming of the Capitol on January 6, 2021” with “pure emotion and street criteria” leading to a constitutional crisis: a prediction that finds today a bewildering echo in the increasing polarisation and competing institutional loyalties that have led to a dysfunctional judiciary and the current institutional confrontation.

A soldier declares his readiness to defend the tribunal? This could be a fake account

A suspicious profile on X, whose owner presents himself as ‘Powel’ – claiming to be a former non-commissioned official in the Polish army – has attracted hundreds of thousands of views by stating his willingness to defend Poland and its constitutional order, in support of President Karol Nawrocky.

However, according to Demagog.pl, several elements cast doubts on the authenticity of the profile: the account was created in October 2026 and has already published a large volume of controversial content, including anti-EU and antisemitic content. It is managed from Georgia, and the profile image appears to be AI-generated – as suggested by the SynthID watermark. Demagog.pl emphasises that some of the allegations levelled against the profile by Anonymus are also inaccurate. The article therefore urges caution and rigorous verification, especially when political and institutional tensions can quickly escalate, based on inauthentic statements and ill-informed speculations.

Poland’s rule-of-law crisis revisited: The story of juristic scientism

Wojciech Zomerski, Visiting Fellow at the European University Institute (EUI) and Associated Researcher at the University of Wrocław, contends that the roots of Poland’s rule-of-law crisis go deeper than the 2015 populist turn, arguing that the crisis has grown from enduring deficiencies in Poland’s legal culture. It adopts an integrative, agentic-structural perspective, emphasizing that structures matter but so do the decisions of the agents acting with them.

The article highlights specifically the role of “juristic scientism,” a legal imaginary prevalent among Polish legal scholars that assumes legal professionals can uncover the “true” and “objective” meaning of law through a rigorous scientific method. Initially construed by legal scholars during communism as a defence of legal autonomy against authoritarianism, this imaginary persisted in the democratic period, hindering the development of a robust rule-of-law culture. According to the author, juristic scientism leads to “excessive formalism, poor quality of the statements of reasons, and inability to convince the public of those reasons”, ultimately undermining the very sense of justice.

ELECTION BEAT

Tracking electoral disinformation through EDMO Hubs

Preliminary report ahead of 2026 general elections in Spain

IBERIFIER’s report ahead of Spain’s general elections shows the risks of growing disinformation and foreign interference that the country faces. The report identifies key threats to the integrity of the electoral debate, including generative AI content, impersonation of established media outlets and usage of private messaging platforms. Researchers warn that Spanish-language disinformation can spread rapidly, with narratives that target democratic institutions and migration-related issues. The report highlights the increase in AI-generated deepfakes and manipulated videos, as well as cloning of public figures’ voices. These developments take place in an environment where only 33% of the Spanish population trust the news and 74% struggle to distinguish true from false information online.

The report draws attention to patterns observed in other electoral cycles, including claims about voting manipulation in the 2023 general elections, and to Russian-linked operations targeting the 2024 European elections. IBERIFIER warns that the use of altered political content can blur the distinction between real and manipulated material, and consequently reduce people’s trust in truthful evidence.

IBERIFIER activates Rapid Response System against electoral disinformation

IBERIFIER has activated the EU Rapid Response System (RRS) ahead of the Spanish general elections next 29 November. The mechanism, integrated into the Digital Services Act (DSA), identifies and alerts major digital platforms about disinformation campaigns that could threat electoral integrity. The monitoring period will run from 2 November to 6 December and focus on viral disinformation campaigns, information manipulation and foreign interference. It signifies the first activation of the RRS in Spain, since the DSA entered into force shortly after the country’s previous general elections.

IBERIFIER will notify digital platforms about irregularities without prejudice to the platforms’ actions. Monitoring will follow principles of neutrality, independence and rigour, and threatful notifications will only be submitted after verification against reliable sources. The mechanism does not limit freedom of expression or allow the observatory to remove content, and platforms will remain independent in their assessment of the notifications. Neither national governments nor the European Commission are involved in identifying content.

Bulgaria’s pre-presidential election Facebook information environment

The second issue of BROD’s Narrative Atlas examines Bulgaria’s pre-presidential election information environment on Facebook, right before the 25 October presidential election. The report identifies a move in political discourse towards controversies surrounding campaign financing, candidates’ participation in debates and Black Sea maritime security incidents. Most narratives focused on the figure of acting president Iliana Iotova and her refusal to participate in pre-election debates, and on claims that certain candidate lists were registered to benefit from public subsidies. The report also highlights how post-euro accession concerns and the cost of living were used to mobilise voter discontent. 

BROD’s analysis also identifies a disparity in the visibility of political content on Facebook, with confrontational political commentary and investigative publications getting more views than official communications from electoral authorities. BROD concludes that the Bulgarian pre-election information environment was characterized by polarized narratives, the amplification of emotionally charged content and challenges to institutional trust. It highlights the importance of distinguishing verified claims and misleading information or political satire when assessing online electoral discourse.

GLOBAL PULSE

Disinformation narratives shaping the world’s conversations

Egypt launches AI fact-checking chatbot based on government-approved information

Facta reports on the launch of “Chat Egypt”, an AI-powered fact-checking chatbot introduced by the Egyptian government as a tool to monitor and counter online misinformation using information from official state sources. Facta argues that, rather than relying on independent verification, the platform is built around government-approved narratives and has already shown significant shortcomings, including failing to detect a manipulated image and omitting or refusing to address sensitive issues such as Egypt’s poor press freedom ranking.

The launch has drawn criticism because it comes amid an escalating crackdown on independent journalism under President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, including the arrest of six fact-checkers, allegations of torture, the prosecution of journalists, and the closure of independent media outlets. Critics therefore see Chat Egypt less as a genuine fact-checking initiative and more as part of a broader effort to control information and shape the official version of events.

Artificial intelligence created new problems in the US election

The 2026 US midterm elections highlighted both the growing influence and the risks of AI chatbots as sources of political information. As millions of voters turned to AI tools for information about candidates and voting, researchers found that major chatbots sometimes provided inaccurate or misleading responses, including factual errors, fabricated quotations, incorrect voting guidance, and the repetition of false narratives linked to foreign influence campaigns.

At the same time, studies showed that chatbots could also play a constructive role by rejecting common election conspiracy theories and directing users toward verified information. The experience of the midterms underscored the need for users to approach AI-generated political information critically and to verify important claims against trusted sources.

No evidence for Trump’s claims of mass non-citizen voting

BENEDMO partner Factcheck.Vlaanderen examines repeated claims by Donald Trump that large numbers of non-US citizens are illegally voting in US elections. It finds that while isolated cases of non-citizen voting have occurred, there is no evidence that the practice is widespread or capable of affecting election outcomes. Multiple studies, audits and investigations have consistently shown that such cases are extremely rare, largely because voter registration systems include safeguards and because the penalties for illegal voting are severe. The article concludes that Trump’s allegations of mass voting by non-citizens are unsupported by the available evidence and contribute to a misleading narrative about election integrity.

ON A DIFFERENT NOTE

Media and information literacy is a shared commitment that requires cooperation across borders, sectors and communities. With the creation of these Chapters, the UNESCO MIL Alliance is taking an important step forward, bringing people and organizations together to turn ideas into concrete action.

UNESCO MIL Alliance announces the creation of 16 Chapters to strengthen global cooperation

Author: Mariya Gabriel, Assistant-Director General for Communication and Information, UNESCO

Paolo Cesarini, Editorial Director

Tommaso Canetta, Editor-in Chief

Editorial Staff include Paula Gori, Elena Maggi

This edition draws in part on automated translation and reflects information available as of 4 November 2026. Later developments may not be included.