June 18, 2026. Ukraine’s Defense Forces carried out the largest combined strike on Moscow and the Moscow region since the start of the full-scale invasion. The targets included the Moscow oil refinery (for the second time), fuel depots, and facilities supporting the Russian army’s logistics. According to the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, large-scale fires broke out at the refinery in at least five locations.
Within just a few hours, a second attack began unfolding on social media — an information one. And it, too, was planned, coordinated, and aimed at specific targets: to convince the world that the victim here was Russia.
There is a simple truth that still remains unclear to some parts of the audience abroad, especially due to Russian propaganda. The full-scale war has been going on for more than four years. Throughout this time, Russia has been systematically and deliberately destroying Ukrainian cities — energy infrastructure, residential buildings, and civilian infrastructure. Russian attacks are not a response to any specific events or steps by Kyiv, but a long-adopted strategy aimed at depriving the country of its ability to defend itself, breaking people’s will to resist, and ultimately destroying Ukraine and Ukrainians.
When, after the strike on Moscow, Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov said that the Russian army would continue “massive group strikes” against Ukraine, he was trying to create the impression that further attacks were the logical consequence of the Ukrainian strike. For an outside observer, the scheme was supposed to look like this: Ukraine attacked — Russia responded.
But massive attacks do not happen spontaneously. Russia systematically accumulates missiles and drones. The timing of the next attack depends on how many missiles and drones Russia has stockpiled — not on what Kyiv does. A strike on a Ukrainian city is not put together overnight in response to something: developing routes, approving targets, and calculating the amount of ammunition take days, and sometimes weeks, of careful preparation. The only difference today is that Ukraine now has the capacity to defend itself more effectively and weaken the enemy deep in its rear.
Russia deliberately strikes civilian targets — just recall its campaign to destroy Ukraine’s energy infrastructure in the winter of 2026. Ukraine’s targets are military logistics and infrastructure: refineries, oil depots, and weapons manufacturing plants. These are facilities that directly support the occupying army. Less fuel means more complicated logistics, and more complicated logistics directly reduce the enemy’s ability to continue its aggression. Russian propaganda is working to erase this distinction and equate acts of aggression with legitimate self-defense.
And in the very first hours after the strike, this substitution of concepts began to be broadcast to a global audience — synchronously, with identical wording and the same content.
Assets waiting for the signal
The strike on facilities in Moscow began at around two in the morning and lasted for several hours. The large-scale drone raid had not even ended yet, but a coordinated verdict had already appeared in the information space. Pro-Russian foreign amplifiers woke up in sync, as if on command, and launched a coordinated wave of posts.
One of the first to begin the information attack at 7 a.m. was the anonymous X account, Concerned Citizen. In the profile header, the user presents himself as a fighter against the “collapse of the West,” geoengineering, and the “coronavirus scam.”
His post immediately brought together, in one short text, all the narratives that propaganda would later amplify after this attack: “Meanwhile in Moscow, Russia. Ukraine, aided by NATO and predominantly the UK just launched their largest ever attack on the Russian capital. Drones hit Oil Refinery infrastructure, civilian buildings and forced Airport evacuationst. All eyes on Russia to see how they respond.”

This post became a ready-made outline for further manipulation, combining three key claims: Ukraine is supposedly unable to act on its own, with the involvement of NATO and the UK meant to support the Russian myth of a “war against the entire alliance”; the attack was allegedly directed against civilians, the deliberate blending of a strike on a legitimate refinery with residential buildings in order to brand Kyiv’s actions as “terrorism”; and the expectation of a Kremlin “response,” implying that Ukraine had carried out a provocation that now gives Russia the moral right to retaliate.
Within two hours, the same video of a drone hitting a residential building began appearing in posts by activists who, at first glance, seemed unrelated to one another.
The central link in the chain was Ian Miles Cheong — a far-right blogger with a million-strong audience on X. On the surface, his profile looks like a typical mouthpiece of American ultraconservatism: he comments daily on events in the United States, promotes racist and anti-LGBTQ narratives, and takes part in the country’s “culture wars.” But this image collapses against one fact: Cheong is a Malaysian citizen and lives in the Malaysian city of Ipoh. According to available information, he has never been to either the United States or Canada, yet he presents himself as an expert on their politics.
This geographical distance has not prevented him from working professionally for years with an English-speaking audience in the Kremlin’s interests. Cheong was a columnist for the Russian state channel RT. Researchers at Western think tanks note that, in particular, through figures like him, Russia wraps its anti-Western narratives in “American voices” in order to reach a wider audience.
Cheong’s specialty is amplifying viral fakes. He denied the mass killings in Bucha, spread fake covers about the Kursk operation, and was also one of the first to amplify the large-scale racist fake claiming that Haitian migrants in Ohio were allegedly eating pets. Because of this activity, Cheong has become toxic even at home: Malaysian police investigated his posts under articles related to intentional insult and public order disturbances.
For the Russian disinformation machine, he is an ideal asset. So that morning, too, Cheong quickly picked up the necessary topic, posting the video of the strike on a high-rise building on Threads and X.

At the same time, the same video and the same narrative about “civilian buildings, zero military value” were posted by the account Syrian Girl. Behind this pseudonym is Maram Susli, a Syrian-Australian commentator with more than half a million followers on X. For years, she built an image of an independent analyst of Middle Eastern politics who supposedly takes a critical view of all sides of the conflict. In practice, however, her career has been a consistent defense of Bashar al-Assad’s regime. She denied chemical attacks by the Syrian army against its own population, which earned her a lasting reputation as a spreader of disinformation, and wrote columns for the same RT, Press TV, and Al Mayadeen — media outlets serving the interests of Moscow, Tehran, and, in the past, pro-Assad forces.

The overlap between Cheong and Susli is revealing and not accidental: both wrote for RT for years, both have audiences that trust them as “independent voices,” and both performed the same function that morning — delivering the Russian narrative to people who might not have received a direct Kremlin message. On June 18, dozens of similar accounts did the same, each reaching its own regional audience.
Blackmail with “World War III”
After the attack on Moscow, propaganda pulled out another familiar template — the supposedly inevitable outbreak of World War III. “Geopolitical experts” who glorify Putin and Russian power wrote that Ukraine’s response would allegedly lead to nuclear Armageddon.


Anonymous amplifier accounts fueled this claim in every possible way.

The logic is distorted, but it works reliably: responsibility for possible escalation is shifted from Russia, which started the war, to Ukraine, which is defending itself.
NATO is not an accidental detail here, but a necessary part of the construction. If one acknowledges that Ukraine itself attacked facilities supporting the aggressor army, the picture becomes inconvenient: a country that has been under attack for years was able to reach the enemy’s logistics, which does not present Russia in a particularly respectable light. But if it was not Ukraine “behind” the strike, but an entire military alliance, the picture changes immediately: now it is no longer the victim responding, but superpowers entering into direct confrontation with Russia. The same construction also solves another task: it explains why Russian air defense failed to defend its own capital, making the failure seem less humiliating.
The Ukrainian segment of the campaign
The same narrative — “now wait for the response’” — also works in the Ukrainian information space. Here, too, it is fueled by bots and anonymous accounts, although they are hardly even necessary: exhaustion from Russian attacks does its job, and threats fall on already prepared ground.

The narrative works especially well because not everyone who shares or picks up this message is a sponsored bot. Fear of Russian attacks is real, and hostile injections only scale up an already existing sentiment. As a result, alongside the euphoria over strikes on the Russian capital, another parallel atmosphere is forming on social media — one of general hysteria and uneasy anticipation.
This is the second layer of the same terror. The first is physical: missiles and drones. The second is psychological: a person is forced to live in constant anticipation of a strike even before it happens, worn down by fear.
Conclusions
What happened on June 18 was not a one-off episode, but a demonstration of a mechanism Russia uses systematically. Every time Ukraine delivers a meaningful strike in response to years of attacks, the same set of tools is activated on social media within hours: Russian officials and propagandists reverse cause and effect, portraying the aggressor as the victim, while foreign accomplices carry this message further — each for their own audience, in their own language, in their own region.
The shelling of Ukrainian cities will continue regardless of whether Kyiv strikes Moscow or not — Russia started this war unprovoked and has been waging it for more than ten years. The only way to stop it is to show that aggression will no longer go unpunished.
Author: Kateryna Ionova, Vox Ukraine