IN THIS EDITION
ON THE RISE
Weekly Watch of Emerging Disinformation Risks
Ceuta crisis: First fuelled, then exploited by disinformation
Since our last publication before the summer break, a major crisis has unfolded at the gates of Europe: the massive migration wave that hit Ceuta, the Spanish exclave in Morocco. The crisis, in which tens of people lost their lives and which sent shockwaves through European politics, was fuelled by disinformation before it happened and exploited by disinformation afterwards.
An investigation by the Spanish fact-checking organisation Maldita.es, a member of IBERIFIER, showed that disinformation in Arabic, circulating in Morocco, played a key role in triggering the movement of more than 70,000 people who crossed the border into Ceuta. It promoted a distorted interpretation of a Spanish Supreme Court ruling of 29 June. According to the false version of the ruling, the Spanish court had allowed migrants who entered the country illegally by sea to remain in Spanish territory. One widely circulated message falsely claimed: “Ceuta is becoming an open door.”
As Maldita.es documented, the July crossings were organised through social media and messaging apps, in groups, many of which had already been active before the events in Ceuta and were potentially linked to groups involved in human trafficking. The Spanish fact-checkers found that Facebook was mainly used for recruitment, while logistical discussions took place in WhatsApp groups.
But disinformation did not only play a major role in triggering the huge migration wave that hit Ceuta; it also played a major role in shaping perceptions of the event. Beyond the usual clickbait-driven disinformation, several far-right networks exploited the crisis to spread messages that dehumanised migrants, targeted EU institutions and spread panic about an ongoing second wave. Politicians from different Member States shared false or misleading information. Foreign public figures also intervened in the debate — including Elon Musk, the world’s richest man and owner of X — promoting the “invasion” narrative. Russia-linked networks amplified a conspiracy theory suggesting that Spain had somehow deliberately allowed the migration wave to happen, despite having prevented similar situations in the past. Israeli and pro-Israel accounts amplified the false narrative that Ceuta and Melilla are Spanish “colonies” in Morocco, in an apparent attempt to attack Spain’s position on the war in Gaza. And so on.
The damage caused by the crisis is therefore multifaceted: first and foremost, the loss of human lives; but also foreign interference, political tensions between and within EU Member States, further polarisation of public debate, proliferation of false and/or hateful content online, and other consequences. There is, however, a potential silver lining in the capabilities demonstrated by the community working to counter disinformation. These capabilities could provide a blueprint for preventive action and help reduce the impact of similar crises in the future.
With adequate resources, European fact-checking organisations could work more closely with counterparts in neighbouring countries — in this case, African organisations monitoring disinformation in Arabic — and develop systematic monitoring of social media groups and platforms. When evidence of an emerging phenomenon is detected, they could issue early warnings that public authorities could use to design targeted, preventive communication campaigns.
The expertise and independence needed for such cooperation already exist. The latter is safeguarded by the strict standards required for membership of organisations such as the European Fact-Checking Standards Network (EFCSN) and the International Fact-Checking Network (IFCN). What is still needed are the resources to build effective monitoring structures and employ the people required to staff them.
ZOOM-IN
A Closer Look at Cases Detected by the EDMO Network
Across Europe, the Ceuta crisis became a catalyst for disinformation narratives about migration, asylum and border control. Fact-checkers found that recycled footage, false rumours, misleading political claims and distorted statistics amplified perceptions of a renewed “migrant wave”, while sowing confusion about EU rules on asylum and migration management policies. Together, these cases illustrate how disinformation and selective political framing can intensify public fears and influence migration debates.
Weeks-old videos exploited politically to raise fears of ‘second wave’ of migrants entering Ceuta
Rumours predicting a new migrant storming of Ceuta started circulating on social media in the aftermath of the mass influx from Morocco to Ceuta of 30 July. On 14 August, Tiekdet identified several posts from Facebook groups and Instagram profiles falsely claiming Spain would temporarily open its border on 15 August, as well as links to misleading visa websites further fueling expectations. During the following days, political figures and influencers in several European countries helped amplify fears of a “second wave” of immigration in Ceuta. The article from The Journal of 21 August, debunked old footage of mass migration, which was presented as evidence of a new crisis by numerous social media accounts, including British far-right agitator Tommy Robinson, who linked the claim to Spain’s Vox party, and a Portuguese MP from the right-wing Chega party, who also shared the footage, portraying Ceuta as “the front of a growing crisis.” The posts attracted millions of views and were widely recirculated online. Although there were later attempts by smaller groups to enter Ceuta, Moroccan authorities prevented them from reaching the border, and there was no evidence of a renewed mass movement comparable to July’s events.
Old video does not show a “second African storm” on Ceuta
False claims of a “second wave” of migrants into Ceuta in mid-August 2026 circulated widely and were politically exploited also in Germany. The AFP’s article debunks a video allegedly proving a new mass movement, which showed instead people gathering near Fnideq, on the Moroccan side of the border, on 31 July when more than 70,000 people reached the border during that initial phase of the crisis. The article highlights how the misleading video was widely circulated across social media, including by AfD politician Julian Adrat, who shared it on X while claiming that a “second African storm” on Ceuta was underway. Despite a Community Note warning that the footage was old, Adrat did not correct his posts. Meanwhile, rumours that Spain would reopen its border around 15 August spread through social media and WhatsApp groups. Spanish and Moroccan authorities deployed substantial security forces and prevented a comparable second mass influx.
Are Moroccans the only ones who don’t receive asylum in Spain?
The article debunks the claim that Morocco is the only nationality whose citizens cannot receive asylum in Spain. Maldita.es explains that international protection is assessed according to each applicant’s circumstances, including evidence of persecution or serious harm, rather than nationality. Moroccan citizens can apply for asylum, although Morocco’s designation as a safe country means their applications may undergo an accelerated procedure and applicants must demonstrate a well-founded individual risk. The article distinguishes between refugee status, subsidiary protection and humanitarian residence, each requiring different conditions. It also stresses that economic hardship, social problems, or personal disputes generally do not qualify for international protection.
Echoing the above analysis, Newtral corrects Cuca Gamarra’s claim that Moroccans have no right to seek asylum in Spain. Cuca Gamarra, a senior figure in Spain’s opposition People’s Party, used the EU’s designation of Morocco as a “safe country of origin” to argue that Moroccan migrants arriving in Ceuta have no right to asylum in Spain.
Who are the “dublinants” and why everyone wants to send them back to Italy
The Ceuta crisis has re-ignited a wider debate across several European countries about the right of asylum and relocation of migrants. In particular, the “dublinants” issue has returned to the Italian political debate because Germany, Switzerland, Austria and Finland have resumed or announced transfers of asylum seekers to Italy. Transfers had largely been suspended since 2022 following Italy’s decision to halt them because of limited reception capacity. The Pagella Politica article explains who the so-called “Dublinants” are: asylum seekers who are in an EU country other than the one responsible for examining their application. Under the new Asylum and Migration Management Regulation (AMMR), which replaced Dublin III for applications submitted after 12 June 2026, responsibility is determined using several criteria, including family connections, visas, residence permits and irregular entry into the EU. Italy can therefore be responsible for asylum seekers who entered the EU irregularly through its territory and later moved elsewhere. The article stresses that the new EU Migration Pact has not abolished the underlying Dublin principle, although it introduces new rules and a broader solidarity mechanism between member states.
Statistical tricks: Influencer distorts migration figures in Germany
With State elections looming up in September, the Ceuta crisis has revived a long-standing controversy around migration in Germany. The GADMO article debunks claims by a German far-right influencer who argued that Germany had 22,787 deportations in 2025 compared with 1.48 million “new immigrants,” mainly from Afghanistan and Syria. GADMO explains that the comparison is misleading because the figures measure fundamentally different things. The 1.48 million arrivals include German citizens returning from abroad, EU citizens and others, not simply new migrants; nearly 192,000 were Germans and more than 457,000 came from other EU countries. Meanwhile, deportations represent only one category of departures: tens of thousands also left voluntarily, while many others were refused or pushed back at Germany’s borders. The claim that most newcomers came from Afghanistan and Syria is also false: together, they accounted for about 77,000 arrivals, or 5.2% of the total. GADMO concludes that selectively comparing these statistics creates a distorted picture of migration to Germany.
ELECTION BEAT
Tracking electoral disinformation through EDMO Hubs
Voting without ID? Sweden’s 20-year-old rule sparks online backlash
An X post viewed over 163,000 times sparked accusations of a fraud “loophole” , as it criticized Sweden’s recently announced rule allowing an ID-less voter to be vouched for by someone else. As clarified by the Election Authority, this isn’t new, but the result of a 2006 law tightening.
Indeed, before 2006, no ID was required at all to vote. The norm changed after a 2004 Sydsvenskan investigation, which showed a man voting under ten names using others’ voting cards, prompting a new ID requirement. But there was an exception: it was allowed for someone else to vouch for a voter lacking ID (since many elderly people did not have one), provided the voucher shows their own ID. Both people were then recorded.
Election Authority head Anna Nyqvist says she’s unaware of this process ever being abused since 2006; political scientists agree large-scale misuse would be difficult and likely detected, since voters are checked off the roll. Nyqvist links rising suspicion to U.S.-style election-fraud discourse spilling into Sweden, despite continued high public trust and structural differences between the two systems.
Hoaxes and misdirection in the Swedish election campaign
As Sweden’s 2026 election campaign enters its final stages, fact-checkers from Källkritikbyrån, Valkollen, and SVT Verifierar are tracking false and misleading claims online, from AI-generated clickbait to fake posters and political half-truths.
A Vietnam-linked click-farm network resurfaced with AI-translated fabrications, including false claims that Jimmie Åkesson and Magdalena Andersson had become parents, and posts about political debates that never took place, all designed to drive traffic to ad-heavy “news” sites.
Foreign interference concerns also grew, as NORDIS researchers documented pro-Russian “hacktivists” boasting about disruptive attacks in Telegram groups, building on a pattern of Russian influence operations against Sweden.
AI-generated content proved especially potent: four TikTok accounts posing as far-right Swedish teenage girls turned out to be created by a single actor, while fabricated images falsely linked Andersson to Jeffrey Epstein and depicted MEP Alice Teodorescu Måwe in doctored clothing. Politicians also faced scrutiny, as fact-checkers debunked mistranslated clips, false claims, and disputed statistics from across the spectrum.
What is Matryoshka, the Russian propaganda tool that seeks to destabilize the French political scene?
Three of the candidates for France’s 2027 presidential election, Gabriel Attal, Édouard Philippe, and Raphaël Glucksmann, were targeted by disinformation attributed to Russia.
According to French anti-interference agency Viginum, the attack against Attal was linked to Matryoshka, while Philippe and Glucksmann were targeted by a separate group, Storm-1516. Both groups produce fake media with journalistic-style formatting, often recycling old scandals and reassigning them to new targets for false credibility. Researcher Carole Grimaud notes that content is sometimes published in English to extend reputational damage internationally. Storm-1516, reportedly linked to Russian military intelligence (GRU), reuses established amplifier accounts, while Matryoshka creates new accounts per campaign. Grimaud notes that while the two aren’t necessarily run by the same operators, their shared goal is discrediting France’s political class, something not new in Storm-1516 campaigns Viginum has tracked since 2023.
Impact remains uncertain, since much engagement appears artificial. Grimaud and a state source note media coverage may amplify these otherwise limited campaigns, even without proof they change public belief.
GLOBAL PULSE
Disinformation narratives shaping the world’s conversations
Trump reignites NATO spending debate on Truth Social and paints distorted picture
This summer, the US president again lashed out at NATO partners and rekindled the narrative that Europeans freeride on the US, which in absolute terms indeed is NATO’s largest contributor. However, using raw figures is misleading, since the US, as the world’s largest economy, logically spends more in absolute terms.
Measured as a share of GDP – NATO’s usual yardstick – the US actually ranks only joint-eighth, behind seven countries including Lithuania, Estonia, Poland, and Denmark, many of whom border Russia. Per capita, Norway, Denmark, and Sweden lead alongside the US. Experts also note the figures miss non-military contributions, like Spain and Portugal’s role on migration and border security, meaning Trump’s claim, while technically true, gives a distorted picture.
It is false that the current US administration has the lowest cumulative inflation since 1989
In an interview published on August 11, Donald Trump claimed that his current term has the lowest inflation rate of the last 10 presidencies, which includes administrations from 1989 to the present. “Did you see the charts that came out yesterday? I’m the president with the lowest inflation in the last 10 years. It’s crazy,” he said during an interview.
This is false. The US president used as a reference an infographic video posted on Instagram showing the cumulative inflation of the last 10 US presidencies. But the video compares the cumulative inflation figures from four years of each presidency with just one and a half years of the current administration. If all presidencies are measured over the same period, the Trump administration has the fourth highest inflation rate since 1989.
Six claims about the EU’s “Chat Control” extension, fact-checked
The European Parliament recently extended, until 2028, a 2021 rule letting services voluntarily scan for known child abuse content – separate from “Chat Control 2” (CSAR), a still-unadopted proposal that would make scanning mandatory. Contrary to viral claims, the vote doesn’t introduce mass surveillance, doesn’t affect encrypted apps like WhatsApp or Signal, and doesn’t end encryption. A claim that it caused “80% of arrests” also misquotes a Commission report, which actually referred to investigations opened, not arrests.
Claims of unanimous expert opposition are misleading too: over 800 cryptographers criticized the future CSAR proposal, not July’s vote, while some child-protection groups and Europol support scanning. One claim stands out: the text passed despite more MEPs voting against it (314–276). In reality, in case of extension of existing legislation, EU rules require an absolute majority to reject it, a threshold opponents narrowly missed.
ON A DIFFERENT NOTE
The Digital News Report 2026 documents unprecedented levels of declining trust in news and points to general dissatisfaction with news coverage. “On the most divisive topics – particularly climate, immigration, and the conflict in Gaza – many audiences feel poorly served by existing news coverage”. While these are a growing challenge for journalism, support for principles such as impartiality persists. “People still care about what news and journalism – in new ways and in some traditional forms – aspire to.”
Paolo Cesarini, Editorial Director
Tommaso Canetta, Editor-in Chief
Editorial Staff include Elena Coden, Paula Gori, Elena Maggi
This edition draws in part on automated translation and reflects information available as of 26 August 2026. Later developments may not be included.
