By EDMO Taskforce for Elections and Crisis-Related Disinformation
Many actors exploit crises for a variety of reasons. In recent years, thanks to developments in AI technology and the shortcomings of social media platforms in managing this phenomenon, unscrupulous content creators have constantly flooded feeds with unlabeled, crisis-related AI slop. They do this in order to monetize the engagement generated by their false images and videos.
Domestic actors, often (but not always) from extremist groups and political fringes, consistently spread disinformation during crises to promote their narratives and advance their political agendas. Several foreign states (using different strategies) create, disseminate, or simply amplify disinformation during crises to widen the cracks in European societies, destabilize governments whose positions are hostile to their interests, and weaken European democracies.
It is therefore unavoidable that EDMO HUBs and the organizations within their respective consortia deal with these kinds of disinformation on a regular basis. These Guidelines aim to support EDMO HUBs in monitoring and countering crisis-related disinformation by providing common definitions and methodologies, as well as recommendations and best practices based on the most recent experiences.
According to the taxonomy adopted by the EDMO Taskforce, an information crisis is defined as “the disruption of the information system characterized by a surge in the volume and intensity of disinformation within public and digital spaces”. An information crisis is typically triggered by a crisis event. The taxonomy divides these crisis events into three categories: predictable (e.g. international events such as COP, G7, the Olympics, etc.), semi-predictable (e.g. summer heatwaves), and unpredictable (e.g. terrorist attacks, floods, emerging wars).
These Guidelines potentially encompass all the information crises caused by the crisis events listed in the taxonomy, with the exception of elections, which are addressed in the dedicated EDMO Guidelines.
These Guidelines are not intended to be strictly binding. EDMO HUBs retain the fl exibility to adapt their activities to the specific national contexts and operational realities of the crises they cover. Not all activities may be feasible or equally relevant in every situation. Moreover, HUBs that, under their respective EU calls, do not have the necessary resources to carry out all the activities envisaged in these Guidelines are justifi ed in departing from them.
Any deviation from these Guidelines by an EDMO HUB must not, per se, be used to assess the HUB’s compliance with the obligations set out in the EU call governing that HUB. All obligations applicable to the HUBs stem exclusively from their respective EU calls. These Guidelines are intended to reinforce alignment and coordination without creating any additional legally binding requirements for the HUBs. In any event, EDMO HUBs retain full editorial independence: these Guidelines must not impact what the HUBs and the organizations inside the respective consortia decide to verify, how they verify it, and the outcome of the verification process.
The EDMO Taskforce is aware of the ongoing efforts, within the context of the Code of Practice on Disinformation Taskforce, to establish a Rapid Response System (RRS) for crises. As soon as the details are defined, an addendum to these Guidelines will be produced by the EDMO Taskforce to ensure, whenever possible, effective coordination with the RRS.
It is recommended that all EDMO Hubs, as soon as possible after the official adoption of these Guidelines, internally designate a person responsible for coordinating activities related to monitoring and countering disinformation linked to crisis events (“Crisis Disinformation Coordinator”) and a deputy, in case of absence due to holidays, illness, or other reasons.
The Crisis Disinformation Coordinator should carry out, with the support of the competent organizations inside the HUB consortium, a risk assessment for the following 6 months, focusing in particular on predictable and semi-predictable crisis events that may occur in the country/countries covered by the HUB. The risk assessment should always be kept updated and repeated every 6 months.
The risk assessment should divide the various crisis events, according to the level of the risk (“High”, “Medium”, “Low”) of them generating a potentially dangerous information crisis. The evaluation should take into consideration the experience from the recent past, the national context (political, societal, informational etc.), if pertinent the international situation, and any other relevant factor according to the different expertises from within the HUB.
The Crisis Disinformation Coordinator should inform the EDMO Taskforce, with an email to the member from the same HUB and to the Chair, about the crisis events that have been classified as “High risk”. The EDMO Taskforce will then create a list with all the “High risk” crisis events fl agged by the different HUBs.
If the Crisis Disinformation Coordinator decides, for any reason and at any time, to change the risk level of a crisis event, either by adding it to or removing it from the ‘High risk’ category, the EDMO Taskforce shall be promptly informed via email and it will modify its list accordingly.
Predictable and semi-predictable “High risk” crisis events should prompt:
1. an intensified monitoring activity by the HUB and by the EDMO Taskforce (e.g. activating monitoring tools, dedicating more people to this activity, dividing among them different media, actors, sources etc.);
2. the publication, on the HUB website and on EDMO website (in English), of prebunking articles, contextual analyses, media literacy campaigns and other similar content that can reduce the impact of the eventual information crisis on public opinion;
If the HUB considers it necessary, in order to reduce the risk of serious harm to individuals and/or society, to establish contact with national or supranational authorities or other relevant entities (e.g. police forces, health authorities, civil protection authorities etc.), it is recommended that such contacts remain exceptional and transparent, and that they do not create expectations of operational cooperation between EDMO HUBs and those authorities.
For predictable and semi-predictable “Medium risk” or “Low risk” crisis events, the HUBs should strive to have a consistent approach but these Guidelines do not recommend any specific action.
For unpredictable crisis events, by definition, it is not possible to carry out preparatory activities.
If an information crisis occurs, regardless of what kind of crisis event prompted it, the following activities are recommended:
1. The competent Crisis Disinformation Coordinator should immediately inform the EDMO Taskforce, with an email to the member from the same HUB and to the Chair, about the information crisis, providing the necessary information.
In particular:
A. the crisis event that triggered the information crisis (date, place, kind of event, eventual entities involved, any other details);
B. main disinformation narratives (see EDMO’s definition and methodology) already detected during the initial stage of the information crisis;
C. main actors and channels contributing to the information crisis detected in its initial stages (e.g. Accounts on specific social media platforms, groups, Telegram or other similar channels, influencers, media, politicians from specific parties, etc.) and eventual signals of coordination among them;
D. impact, engagement and other relevant statistics, if already available in the initial stage of the information crisis.
The EDMO Taskforce will then convene a meeting with the Crisis Disinformation Coordinator, as soon as possible, to discuss the issue and plan follow-up activities.
2. The HUB interested in the crisis, should start publishing on its website analyses and articles about the ongoing information crisis as soon as possible, to create awareness about the main disinformation narratives and their spreaders (actors and channels), focusing on the content and behaviour that are potentially the most dangerous for individuals and/or societies.
The content that is relevant for the broader European public, should be flagged to the Chair of the EDMO Taskforce, during meetings or via email, for publication in English on Edmo.eu.
3. After the peak of the information crisis has passed, if prebunking or media literacy content has previously been published, it is recommended to publish articles evaluating the effectiveness of the inoculation effort.
4. After the crisis has ended, it is recommended to publish an ex post analysis that analyzes the information crisis from its beginning until its end, providing information about the content and the actors involved, the impact.
If an information crisis involves more than one Hub, the Taskforce will endeavour, through both meetings and offl ine communication, to ensure effective coordination among the Hubs concerned, including the exchange of information and content, the avoidance of duplication, the creation of synergies, the implementation of joint projects, and any other relevant and useful activities.
