Attacks to information integrity identified by the EDMO network in the last weeks confirm what is by now fairly known within the expert community: events that are high in the press and popular in conversations among people are attractors of information manipulation and disinformation. Manipulators exploit the hype and interest of citizens to inject noise and create doubts. Cognitive exploitation finds its way through vulnerabilities, emotions, socio-economic and cultural contexts and extremely reduced attention spans. Opaque algorithmic decisions follow suit and amplify the manipulation strategy, to the gain of both the manipulators and the online platforms. Citizens and democracy pay the price.

The FIFA World Cup: a global event unlocking transnational attacks to information integrity… which have little to do with football

Information manipulation linked to the 2026 FIFA World Cup is a perfect example. The event is clearly of great interest to football lovers and beyond. Cheering for the national team becomes a popular collective action which involves different kinds of emotions linked to traditions, pride, and local culture. As such, interest in the World Cup goes beyond the regular crowd of football lovers. Content verified by the independent fact-checkers clearly shows how this hype is exploited by information manipulators to pursue different agendas, which have little to do with football itself.

Content claiming that the USA have closed their borders to travelers from Africa during the World Cup due to an Ebola threat became viral on TikTok. An article by Chequeado explains that there is no general ban affecting all African travelers. The USA authorities are implementing a temporary and limited measure which affects only individuals who have been in three (out of 54) African countries, namely the Democratic Republic of Congo, Uganda, and South Sudan, within the 21 days prior to travel. These travel restrictions are linked to public health policies. Similar measures are applied by Canada and Mexico (who host the World Cup together with the USA). There is no general ban applying to citizens from the African continent.

The case of the Somali referee Omar Artan made it to the news. The referee was not allowed to entry the USA for alleged security concerns (despite a valid visa, according to The New York Times). As highlighted by dpa David Eby, Premier of the Canadian province of British Columbia posted that “Mr. Artan would be welcomed and celebrated in British Columbia for what he’s overcome and where he is today. Let’s have him referee in Vancouver.” This post, together with expression of similar sentiment by the mayor of Toronto, triggered nonfactual content stating Mr Artan would be assigned as referee of a World Cup match taking place in Canada.  There is no such decision by FIFA, which decided to nominate him for the European Super Cup match in mid-August as a response to what happened.

The FIFA World Cup is also an occasion for malign actors to virally spread non-labeled AI Generated content of beautiful hyper-sexualized female supporters of national teams wearing the national uniforms, respectively of the countries in which they are spread. Such content has a high level of virality, especially among men users, and is hence an effortless way to gain money out of the social media platforms’ monetization programs. Monetisation further continues on other platforms, as these accounts are often linked to other websites such as OnlyFans. This content can create distorted expectations of girls in boys watching it, but it can also trigger anxiety and depression in girls who do not fit with these beauty stereotypes which they see becoming so viral.  In some cases, as highlighted in EDMO investigations, this sexualised AI generated content is an easy way to attract users and to then redirect them to networks that disseminate far-right nationalist political propaganda and xenophobia, mixed with soft-core pornography.

Using generative AI to create viral hyper-sexualized female content is not something new. The case of the AI-generated MAGA influencer Emily Hart is just a recent example. The AI generated influencer, blond, young and nice looking, mostly wearing a bikini and impersonating the MAGA stereotypes and messages, became viral and allowed the creator (and Indian student) to monetise over such content. If such content was mainly produced for monetisation purposes (recalling the case of the Macedonians teenagers during the 2016 Trump campaign), as reported by The New York Times, hundreds of non-labeled GenAI created pro-Trump accounts are emerging on social media, to attract conservative voters in view of the mid-term. As said by Andrew Yoon, “They’re trying to spread political messages and give an illusion of a consensus”.

No, this heat is not normal! And yes, climate denialists are trying, again, to convince about the opposite

Climate disinformation works when it connects complex issues to lived experience and emotion: heat waves, snowfall, bills, or policy debates become hooks for misleading or out-of-context claims. Its appeal lies in simplifying climate science and exploiting declining trust in science and institutions, often through populist narratives that cast experts as detached elites. As Jennie King notes, climate disinformation is amplified by the collision of the carbon and attention economies: fossil-fuel interests benefit from delay, while algorithms reward inflammatory content that drives engagement and revenue. From old to new denialism, the goal is “white noise”: flooding the information space with misleading content to delay climate action, weaken trust, distort debate, and create confusion.

AFP states that claims that France’s late-May-beginning of June 2026 heatwave was ordinary are contradicted by evidence: experts say its early timing, sustained intensity, and widespread records made it exceptional, not comparable to isolated hot days in past decades. Driven by a “heat dome,” temperatures reached 10–15°C above seasonal averages and broke records nationwide, reinforcing warnings that climate change is making heatwaves stronger and earlier.

AFP also shed light on viral claims misrepresenting updates to extreme emissions scenarios, including the move away from RCP8.5, as proof that climate science is unreliable. In fact, these forecast scenarios are tools for exploring possible futures and are revised as real-world conditions change; the highest-emissions pathway has become less plausible by 2100 due to renewable growth, climate policies, and shifting trends. This does not weaken the scientific consensus: evidence that human emissions drive climate change remains strong. The updates come from independent modelling groups, not the IPCC, and reflect refinement, not failure; IPCC scientists contribute voluntarily, and the IPCC assesses research rather than conducting studies, running models, or making measurements.

Finally, a claim circulating in German, English, French, and Dutch says 46 scientists resigned from the IPCC over alleged climate-science manipulation. The narrative is false and recycled: no such resignations occurred, and the claim relies on old quotes, misinterpreted material, and experts who were not IPCC members but reviewers. The cited statements date to around 2013 and were never evidence of IPCC departures. A related chart claiming climate models are inaccurate has also been criticised as misleading, showing how outdated material is repackaged to undermine trust in climate science.

Global risk assessments by the World Economic Forum and the United Nations rank disinformation, climate change, and extreme weather among major threats. Climate disinformation delays action, polarises society, endangers people during floods and droughts, and affects national security.

Enforcement of regulation, such as the DSA, are key. Ohter responses are emerging: the UNESCO-Brazil-UN Global Initiative on Information Integrity on Climate Change has funded projects, including journalist training by the European Federation of Journalists, while the European Commission’s #climatefactsmatter campaign includes an EDMO-backed handbook on spotting climate disinformation. A recording of the EDMO training on disinformation can be found here: Module 1, Module 2.

Russian invasion of Ukraine: while drones are flying in all directions, so do online narratives

Some stories are so intricate that you get lost in the plot, especially when staging fiction is a reality as an action but not in the story. Because of the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine, swarms of drones are flying between the two countries. In some circumstances they fall into the territory of other countries, triggering disinformation narratives. Some of these drones were indeed Ukrainian, which got lost either for technical deficiency or because they were damaged and became uncontrollable due to Russian jamming devices. These facts were manipulatively exploited by Russia to blame Ukraine of so-called false-flag operations, namely Ukraine deliberately redirecting a Russian drone to strike a NATO member and hence trigger a direct war with Russia. To date, there is no evidence that this has happened, but such disinformation was spotted in a number of EU countries.

Uncertainty over capabilities, intelligence, escalation, attribution and responsibility creates an information void which is exploited by information manipulators. The difficulty in understanding and grasping the different military strategies and the military jargon and tools eases the spread of conspiracy theories.

Funky Citizens shows how two drone incidents—the crash of a Russian Geran-2 in Galați on 29 May and the self-detonation of a Ukrainian Magura maritime drone in Constanța on 5 June—triggered different online disinformation dynamics.  With regard to Constanța, four competing narratives took the stage: Ukrainian responsibility, official incompetence, Russian responsibility, and “attribution reversal” theories mixing facts with speculation. Regarding Galați, the disinformation campaign lasted seven consecutive days, with synchronized networks pushing near-identical messages.

The Galați case was also subject to verification by Context.ro, which rejects claims that the drone strike on a residential building in Galați was a Ukrainian-orchestrated provocation backed by authorities in Bucharest and Brussels. This narrative was promoted by pro-Russian commentators and politicians, stating that the incident was staged to fuel anti-Russian sentiment, support for Ukraine, defence spending, or Romania’s involvement in the war.

Finally, a Facebook post debunked by RE: Baltica falsely claims that Ursula von der Leyen stated that the EU is allocating €1.5 billion to the Baltic states to fight Ukrainian drones and suggests the incidents benefit arms manufacturers. In fact, the money, which will come from the Cohesion Fund, is for defense readiness, border surveillance, and economic security projects, while recent drone crashes in the region are linked to Russian activity.

The pattern is clear, exploiting information voids, the struggle in getting clarity over military affairs and war fear to spread narratives aimed at undermining the credibility of Ukraine, the European Union and NATO.

Exploiting fear to trigger hate. The mutual effect between off- and on-line violence

As recently recalled in a piece hosted by the EC magazine ‘Strategic Communication and Artificial Intelligence”, non-factual and emotionally charged misleading content can trigger online and offline hate speech and violence. The same holds true the other way around.

The recent facts of Belfast confirmed again the strong role played by online content, usually spread by far-right actors, in fueling hate speech, violence and extremism. Off- and on-line are strictly intertwined and fuel each other. The words by the UK regulator Ofcom couldn’t be more unequivocal: “a sudden increase in the amount of illegal content circulating online can manifest in hate crime and violence in the real world”. Beyond what happened in Belfast, other cases were exploited to spread anti-migrant and anti-minorities sentiment.

A claim pushed on NRA.lv by Austri Stankevics, a member of a youth organization linked to Latvia’s National Alliance, alleged that non-EU nationals had formed criminal groups controlling drug distribution. The claim was debunked by Re:Baltica. Latvia’s State Police said they had no evidence such groups exist or have taken over drug trafficking, noting only that they could emerge in the future. Similar claims, featuring third country nationals a particularly criminal were shared by local politicians in the past, and debunked by Re:Baltica as well.

In Poland, Kacper Ignasiak of Korona Młodych, posted a photo of an intercom marked “Krakowskie Centrum Integracji” (KCI), with a Ukrainian note saying the centre was on the first floor. Demagog found the photo was from 2023 and showed a former KCI address in Krakow; the centre suspended operations indefinitely in May 2024 and has not reopened. KCI supported Ukrainians in Poland, mainly refugees, through language courses, counselling, and integration events. Ignasiak used the outdated image to promote a wider narrative that Ukrainian-run integration centres help people from Asia and Africa migrate to Poland en masse, including by obtaining Polish passports. Demagog concludes that Ignasiak placed a real photo in a false context to reinforce a misleading anti-migrant narrative. Similar false claims about Foreigner Integration Centers portray them as relocation facilities, while what they do is providing information and services to foreigners legally residing in Poland.

Viral posts claimed an image showed a Paris street destroyed by “hordes of Africans.” Newtral found the image was AI-generated, with Hive AI assessing a 99.9% probability and reverse-image and map searches finding no matching Paris location. Despite this, it spread on X and Facebook and was shared by a far-right Spanish MEP, fitting a wider campaign spreading fear against migrants.

As stated by the UNHCR, “misinformation, disinformation and hate speech directed at refugees and stateless people has proliferated on digital platforms around the world and become increasingly linked to real-word incidents of xenophobia, violence and even forced displacement”. Similarly, the last report by the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance at the Council of Europe, states that “ECRI has observed that, in a few countries, hate speech has also formed part of wider disinformation campaigns of a political nature targeting certain groups, such as migrants and LGBTI persons. ECRI has further noted that such disinformation campaigns frequently rely on the misuse of data, as well as on the generalisation, decontextualisation or distortion of isolated news events”.

The recent EDMO training on Identity-based disinformation about minorities and migrants she light on this phenomenon and its recording can be accessed here.

To conclude

While the different events which took place in June are very different in nature, the same cannot be said for disinformation narratives and techniques, which are in effect following similar patterns. Recent elections, be it in Armenia, Malta or Latvia, are no exception. Factual events are exploited to implement hidden agendas such as anti-EU sentiment, delegitimisation of Ukraine, delaying climate action, hate against migrants and minorities, monetisation. The messages are simple, linear, and speak to the guts of citizens. They fill their need for simple and easy answers as well as the irrational attraction towards conspiracy theories. They confirm their bias and reinforce belonging to their online communities. Engagement driven algorithms rewarding emotionally charged and outrageous content act as enablers.

The paradox of information manipulation is once again clear: manipulators present themselves and their messages as “saviors” protecting citizens from hidden elite agendas, while in reality they exploit citizens’ vulnerabilities to advance malign goals, create noise, monetize attention, and undermine democracy. Those they claim to protect are, in fact, their first unaware victims.