Beyond Disinformation: How Russia Constructs the Meaning of War — and How to Counter It
The views expressed in this publication are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official stance of the European Digital Media Observatory. This text has been published as part of the latest edition of the new monthly EDMO Signals & Noise newsletter. Sign up here to receive future editions directly to your inbox.
Author: Olena Snigyr, Jean Monnet Fellow at the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies
Summary: Russian information operations seek to redefine the causes of the war against Ukraine, responsibility for it, and the conditions for a legitimate peace. This article examines three interconnected mechanisms—grand narrative construction, sequential legitimation, and normative appropriation—and argues for complementing fact-checking with narrative literacy and psychological inoculation.
Keywords: Russian disinformation; cognitive warfare; strategic narratives; narrative literacy; media literacy
Russia’s information strategy goes beyond the dissemination of false information. It constructs a coherent worldview in which Russia’s aggression against Ukraine is presented as a necessary act of self-defence and part of a struggle for a “fairer” international order, while the use of force is portrayed as a legitimate means of reshaping that order.
This is the cognitive dimension of information influence: a struggle not only over what audiences know, but also over how they understand political reality and which decisions they consider legitimate. The ultimate outcome of such influence may not be belief in a particular falsehood, but a willingness to support political decisions that serve the aggressor’s objectives.
Countering this influence therefore requires more than debunking false claims. It requires understanding how political meanings are constructed and how they shape decision-making.
Grand Narrative Construction
Three interconnected mechanisms can be identified in Russia’s strategic narrative work: grand narrative construction, sequential legitimation, and normative appropriation.
Grand narrative construction targets both domestic and international audiences. It brings together historical and political narratives into a coherent explanation of the causes of the war, Russia’s role, and its political objectives. In Russia’s international communication, this explanation rests on three interconnected strategic narratives that draw on selective interpretations of history.
The first is “Russia is not attacking; it is defending itself.” Moscow portrays its relations with the West as a centuries-long struggle in which Russia has repeatedly been forced to resist attempts to weaken or destroy it. The war against Ukraine is incorporated into this historical narrative as another episode in the confrontation with the West, which allegedly uses Ukraine as an instrument against Russia. The Kremlin’s own decision to launch the war disappears from this explanation.
The second is “Ukraine is not an independent political actor.” References to Kyivan Rus’, the Russian Empire, and the Soviet past are used to deny Ukrainian identity and the independent political choices of Ukrainians. Whenever those choices contradict Moscow’s interests, they are portrayed as the result of Western interference.
The third is “Russia is fighting for a fairer world.” Myths surrounding the Soviet victory over Nazism and Soviet support for anti-colonial movements provide the historical foundation for portraying contemporary Russia as a leader in the struggle against Western domination, with the war against Ukraine presented as part of that struggle.
Together, these narratives construct a Russian grand narrative in which Ukraine is denied independent political agency, the West is portrayed as the source of threats, and Russia appears simultaneously as a victim and a champion of a fairer international order. This construction shifts responsibility for the war from Moscow to the West and provides normative justification for Russia’s political demands.
This grand narrative also serves a domestic political purpose. It helps legitimise Putin’s regime by portraying him as the defender of Russia and its historical greatness, justifies repression through the need to confront an external threat, and allows responsibility for the consequences of the war to be shifted onto the adversary. Within this worldview, war is presented not as an exceptional crisis but as a normal condition of Russia’s struggle for its place in the world.
How Aggression Is Recast as Self-Defence
Russia’s justifications for aggression, both as a broader instrument of foreign policy and specifically in its war against Ukraine, follow a recognisable sequence of legitimation. Moscow first delegitimises the targeted state by portraying its government as “Nazi”, “terrorist”, “illegitimate”, or controlled by another major power. It then identifies populations that supposedly require Russian protection, such as Russian speakers or other allegedly threatened groups. External threats are subsequently invoked to establish a security rationale, followed by legal justifications. Finally, the use of military force is presented as an unavoidable act of self-defence or an intervention necessary to protect vulnerable populations.
Moscow followed this pattern in constructing its justification for the war against Ukraine. Since 2014, it has described the change of government in Kyiv as a “coup”, claimed that Russian speakers were under threat, denied Ukraine’s political independence, and accused it of committing “genocide” in Donbas. In February 2022, Russia presented its full-scale invasion as an act of “self-defence” and “denazification”.
A recent example of a similar mechanism of legitimating potential escalation can be seen in Russia’s policy towards the Baltic states. Years of accusations of “rehabilitating Nazism” have now acquired a legal dimension. On 5 October 2026, a Moscow court declared thirteen individuals and five organisations from Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia to be collaborators with Nazi Germany. At the same time, Russia’s Prosecutor General’s Office explicitly linked these historical accusations to the policies of contemporary Baltic governments, accusing them of glorifying Nazi collaborators.
These developments have taken place against a backdrop of increasingly aggressive official rhetoric, accusations against NATO, and border provocations. A particularly brazen incident occurred on 6 October at the Latvian–Belarusian border: armed, masked men threatened Latvian soldiers and forcibly directed a group of migrants towards the border. Several hours later, unidentified masked individuals crossed into Latvian territory, damaged electrical distribution equipment, and stole two surveillance cameras.
Taken together, these developments resemble a familiar escalation playbook: historical accusations are used to delegitimise contemporary governments, while the construction of threats provides a potential justification for the use of military force.
Normative Appropriation: Redefining the Language of Legitimacy
Another instrument of Russia’s strategic narrative work is normative appropriation. Moscow draws on widely recognised principles of international law — sovereignty, self-defence, and the protection of civilians — and reinterprets them to make its own aggression appear lawful and necessary.
Kosovo provides an illustrative example. In 1999, NATO intervened militarily in Yugoslavia without authorisation from the UN Security Council, and in 2008 Kosovo declared independence. Russia has repeatedly invoked these events as precedents to justify its own actions: the recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia in 2008, the annexation of Crimea in 2014, and the recognition of the self-proclaimed entities in Donbas in 2022. In doing so, Moscow transfers legal arguments from one context to another, disregarding fundamental differences between them.
The same selectivity is evident in Russia’s interpretation of state sovereignty. Alongside a conception of sovereignty that divides the world into genuinely sovereign powers and their “vassals”, Moscow insists on non-interference in the internal affairs of other states, particularly when human rights violations by regimes friendly to Russia are concerned. In this interpretation, sovereignty becomes primarily a means of shielding ruling elites from international pressure and accountability. Yet when a neighbouring state pursues a political course that Moscow opposes, Russia claims the right to restrict its sovereignty in the name of its own “security interests”.
How Russia Turns Its Explanation of the War into the Terms of Peace
Russian narratives do more than justify the war. They also shape perceptions of how it should end, in line with Moscow’s foreign policy objectives. If NATO enlargement is presented as the cause of the war, restricting the Alliance becomes a necessary condition for peace. If Western military assistance to Ukraine supposedly prolongs the war, ending that assistance is portrayed as a step towards peace. Invoking Russia’s “legitimate security interests” allows Moscow to demand restrictions on neighbouring states’ sovereignty under the guise of security guarantees. Finally, if the war is framed as a struggle against an unjust international order, concessions to Moscow can be presented as correcting a historical injustice. The struggle over the interpretation of the war’s causes and nature is therefore also a struggle over the legitimacy of the terms on which it will end.
A key technique in Russia’s strategic narrative work is legitimation through false analogies and associations. Drawing on real grievances — Western double standards, controversial military interventions, and colonialism — Moscow turns legitimate criticism into a justification for its own aggression. Western violations supposedly invalidate criticism of Russia’s invasion, while opposition to Western dominance makes Russia an anti-colonial force and its war against Ukraine part of a global struggle for justice. The manipulation lies not necessarily in distorting facts, but in drawing political conclusions that do not follow from them.
Why Do Russian Narratives Resonate Beyond Russia?
Russian information influence goes beyond propaganda and disinformation, offering audiences a coherent picture of international politics that explains who sets the rules, why wars occur, who bears responsibility, and what place Russia occupies in the world. Questions of international status and recognition are central to this narrative.
Many countries are dissatisfied with their position in the international system, inequalities of influence, and Western double standards. Russia exploits these grievances – it draws on existing historical ties and collective memory, particularly memories of Soviet support for anti-colonial movements and decades of military, economic, and educational cooperation. This allows Moscow to embed its political objectives in historical narratives familiar to these audiences, giving them greater emotional resonance.
This mechanism can be understood through ontological security — the need for a stable sense of identity and place in the world. By invoking a shared anti-colonial past and presenting itself as a defender of sovereignty against Western domination, Russia links its political objectives to other countries’ historical experiences and aspirations for recognition. Supporting Moscow’s position may thus appear as a continuation of their own struggle for independence and justice.
Countering Cognitive Warfare: From Fact-Checking to Narrative Literacy
While fact-checking is essential, it primarily addresses individual claims rather than the broader narratives that establish causality, assign responsibility, and suggest political solutions. Consequently, even a successful debunking may leave intact the broader story through which audiences interpret the war. What is needed is an additional skill — narrative literacy: the ability to distinguish facts from interpretations, recognise false causal connections, and critically examine the political conclusions promoted through history, collective memory, and international norms.
Psychological inoculation (prebunking) offers a useful approach here by familiarising people with common manipulation techniques before they encounter them. A study conducted across twelve EU countries found that short videos explaining such techniques improved people’s ability to recognise them. Inoculation complements fact-checking, which increasingly also examines the broader narratives behind individual claims. However, the long-term effectiveness of inoculation requires further evaluation. In practice, this means that educational materials and should examine three dimensions of a message: the facts on which it draws, the causal story constructed around them, and the political views or policy choices it encourages audiences to support.
The purpose of countering cognitive warfare is to protect people’s ability to independently evaluate evidence and make decisions. Fact-checking asks, “Is this true?” Narrative literacy adds an equally important question: “What picture of the world am I being encouraged to accept — and what decision is it leading me towards?” Fact-checkers increasingly also analyze the broader narratives behind individual pieces of fact-checked content Viewpoint?